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Introduction  
 
 Recent developments in both theoretical and empirical economics literature have 
demonstrated many aspects of the negative socio-economic consequences of high inequality in 
the distribution of wealth.  High inequality tends to hinder subsequent economic growth (e. 
g., Persson and Tabellini 1994?), inhibits the poor from realizing their full potential in 
economic activities and human development through credit constraints (e. g., Deininger and 
Squire 1998), encourage rent-seeking activities (e. g., Rodrik 1996), and seriously hinder the 
poverty reduction impact of economic growth (e. g., Ravallion and Dutt ??).  The Philippines 
is a classic example of an economy suffering from all of these consequences.  The 
Philippines has long been known for its high inequality in distribution of wealth and income; 
unlike many of its Asian neighbors characterized by relatively less inequality by international 
standards, the Philippine economy has often been compared to Latin American countries 
which are characterized by high inequality in land distribution.  Partly due to its historically 
high inequality there has long been intermittent incidence of peasant unrest and rural 
insurgencies in the Philippines.  As a result, the issue of land reform (or ‘agrarian reform’ as 
more commonly called in the Philippines, of which land reform constitutes the major part) has 
continuously been on political agenda at least since the early part of the 20th century; 
nevertheless land reform in the Philippines has been, and still is, an unfinished business.  
Against such a historical background, the main objective of this essay is to synthesize a broad 
range of existing literature on the various aspects of land reform policies in the Philippine 
context as relevant for today’s policy makers.  The paper is meant as a stock taking exercise 
delineating what is known and what is not.  We will pay attention to both political and 
economic issues arising from the land reform policies since both of these aspects are equally 
important for policy making.  Furthermore, in our attempts to derive some 
lessons/implications for the current policy makers we will draw on both historical experiences 
in the Philippines and recent land reform experiences from other developing countries.   
 
 The paper is organized as follows; section 1 provides a historical overview of the 
land reform legislation and the implementation records in the Philippines for the past forty 
years; section 2 focuses on the political dynamics behind the evolution of the land reform 
legislation and implementation records as reviewed in the previous section; section 3 turns to 
the major economic issues involved in land reform by drawing on both theoretical 
development and accumulated empirical evidence; based on the previous sections, section 4 
focuses on major issues involved in the design of land reform schemes in the contemporary 
Philippine contexts, drawing on recent policy experiments in other developing countries as 
well as on the theoretical and empirical literature from the Philippines; and final section pulls 
together our survey results and concludes the paper.    
 
1. Historical Overview of Land Reform Legislation and Implementation Record in the 
Philippines  
 
1-1. Evolution of Land Reform Code  
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A series of land reform programs have been legislated and, to a lesser extent, 
implemented by successive administrations during the last several decades in the Philippines.  
In this subsection, we will review a few distinct episodes in the evolution of land reform 
legislation, mainly in terms of its stated goals and its design.  We will take a closer look at 
the actual implementation of land reform laws in the next subsection.   
 
 Land reform policies have been continuously on political agenda in the Philippines 
since the early part of this century.  Generally, the land reform initiatives of the government 
have been combinations of (though not limited to) regulation on land tenancy, resettlement to 
public lands, and appropriation and redistribution of private lands.  Since the Commonwealth 
period, among these three broad categories of land reform measures, governments in the past 
tended to rely more heavily on the first two (tenancy regulation and resettlement) rather than 
on the politically contentious land redistribution.  However, as the relative scarcity of land 
increased due to the closure of the frontier areas, and in response to the continuing peasant 
unrest, redistributive land reform has become increasingly high on policy agenda more 
recently.   
 
 The land reform initiatives by the Philippine government since the 1950s are broadly in 
line with the series of initiatives taken by President Manuel L. Quezon’s administration 
(1935-41).  More specifically, President Quezon’s initiatives included regulation of tenancy 
relations, an anti-usury law, organized land settlement in Mindanao for the landless of Luzon 
and Cebu, issuance of free patents to homesteaders on cultivable public land, and a “landed 
estates” policy which provided funds for the negotiated purchase of large holdings for resale 
to tenants.  Strongly influenced by the American land reform policy at the time, the main 
focus was on resettlement and tenancy regulation rather than on land redistribution.  (e. g., 
Hayami, et al. 1990).   
 
 The land reform initiatives by the successive administrations of Manuel Roxas (1946-
48), Elpidio Quirino (1948-53), and Ramon Magsaysay (1954-56) generally fell along these 
lines although each had its own policy initiatives.  In particular, a series of land reform 
legislation during the Magsaysay administration is seen by some as “the first significant 
legislation toward land reform in the post-war Philippines.” (Wurfel 1988)  The 1954 
Agricultural Tenancy Act limited land rent at 30%, placed an interest rate cap of 8 –10% per 
annum, and increased tenants’ exceptions from creditors’ liens.  The 1955 Land Reform Act 
embraced the idea of compulsory land expropriation for rice lands but the retention limit was 
set generously at 300 contiguous hectare for private lands planted with rice, 600 hectare for 
corporate farms, and 1024 hectares for private farms other than rice.  (Takigawa 1976, Putzel 
1992, Riedinger 1995)   
 
Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 
 
 One of the major turning points in the recent history of land reform legislation (if not 
implementation, as we will see later) appears to be the 1963 Agricultural Land Reform Code.  
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The stated goal of the 1963 Code was “to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic 
family-sized farm … to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant…”.  A 
distinct feature of the Code was that, unlike in the earlier land reform initiatives, land reform 
was considered as a means to increase agricultural productivity, which, in turn, was based on 
the need for supply of cheap food for urban consumers as well as the ‘Marshallian view’ of 
inefficient share tenancy which was widespread among young economist-technoclats of the 
day.  (Hayami, et al. 1990; see below for more on the ‘Marshallian view.’)  In its attempt to 
increase agricultural productivity by creating owner-cultivatorship, the Code stipulated a two 
step procedure for land redistribution: (1) “Operation Leasehold,” which was to convert share 
tenancy to leasehold with the fixed rent at 25 percent of the average harvest in the three 
normal years preceding the Operation, and (2) “Operation Land Transfer,” where the 
government was to expropriate land in excess of the retention limit of 75 hectares, with 
compensation to landowners of 10 percent of the land value in cash and the rest in interest-
free Land Bank bonds, and then was to resell to tenants for annual amortization payments 
within twenty five years.  Such reforms were to apply only to land planted with rice or corn.   
 
 While the Code can be seen as a major advance in land reform legislation, there were 
serious limits in design as well.  For example, the reform Code covered only rice and corn 
land (which represented ??% of all agricultural land and ??% of tenant farmers as of 1960), 
thereby excluding land planted with sugar, coconut, fruits and other crops.  This also meant 
that landowners could avoid land reform implementation simply by shifting their crop away 
from rice or corn.  Another fault in design was that there was no sanctions against evasion 
through transforming land use or transferring ownership to family members, which were 
common means of sabotaging land reform implementation.   Furthermore, the initial version 
of the Code included progressive land tax, which was subsequently deleted in the final version.  
Indeed, these limits generally persisted through the subsequent land reform codes (1971 and 
1972) until the enactment of CARP in 1988 (see below).   
 
Land Reform under Marcos Presidency   
 
 While President Ferdinand Marcos took office in 1966, it was not until the early 
1970s that land reform program made any major advance.  First, in responding to the 
pressures from farmers’ protests supported by a highly politicized student and workers’ 
movement in 1971 (see below for the political process leading to the legislation), Congress 
passed the Code of Agrarian Reform (Republic Act No. 6389).  It established the Department 
of Agrarian Reform, declared the entire Philippines a land reform area (the 1963 Code, on the 
other hand, required that the National Land Reform Council should first declare a given 
region to be covered by the program before actual implementation could proceed in a given 
region), provided for the automatic conversion of tenancy to leasehold tenancy in all areas and 
declared share tenancy illegal, included regulations on interest rates, on the sale of farm 
animals and implements and on the conversion of agricultural land into other uses, and finally, 
reduced the landlord retention limit from 75 hectares to 24 hectares.   
 
 Just about a year later in September 1972, President Marcos imposed Martial law.  
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In the early years of the Martial Law period land reform was high on policy agenda.  A 
month after the Martial law regime started, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 
27 (PD 27) aimed at “emancipation of the tiller from the bondage of the soil.”  (as quoted in 
Hayami, et al. 1990).  Under PD 27, all rice and corn fields over the lowered retention limit 
of 7 hectares were to be transferred to the tenants who tilled them at a price 2.5 times the 
value of average annual production, payable to the Land Bank at 6 percent interest within 
fifteen years.  When the tenant completed amortization she/he would be issued a land title, 
called “Emancipation Patent” (EP), transferable only to her/his heirs; during the period of 
amortization the tenant would receive a “Certificate of Land Transfer” identifying her/his 
cultivated area and promising her/him the right to purchase it.  On the other hand, land 
owners were to be paid 10 percent in cash and 90 percent in Land Bank bonds, as was 
stipulated in the 1963 Code.  Furthermore, under the “Operation Leasehold (OLH) Program,” 
tenanted rice and corn fields under the 7 hectare retention limit were to be tilled under fixed-
rent lease contract with the official rental ceiling of 25 percent of average output (net of costs 
for seeds, harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling, and processing) for three ‘normal’ years 
prior to the reform implementation.   
 
 While PD 27 can be seen as an improvement in expanding the potential coverage of 
land reform compared to earlier legislation, it still included some notable limitations in its 
design, which were also shared by the earlier laws.  Among others, PD 27 stipulated; (1) that 
the land must already have been in agricultural production by 1972, thereby excluding new 
agricultural land which subsequently amounted to 1.24 million hectares between 1971 and 
1980, (2) that land reform was limited to rice and corn fields which amounted to about 4 
million hectare as of 1972 while excluding its application to 2.5 million hectares of coconut 
and sugar lands (as of 1972), and (3) that the decree applied only to tenanted areas, which 
represented about 24 percent of all rice and corn areas, excluding landless laborers and 
subtenants amounting to 3.5 million in 1975.  As so designed, PD 27 would cover about 12 
percent of the total Philippine farm area as of 1972.  (Hayami, et. al. 1990, Mangahas 1985, 
Balisacan 1990)  In addition, such design provided landowners covered by the decree with 
opportunities to avoid its implementation by shifting to crops other than rice or corn (or to 
non-agricultural use), or by evicting tenants, replacing them with hired labor and undertaking 
direct management of the farm operation.  (see below for more on the impact of such evasion 
practices by landowners.)  
 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Aquino Presidency1 
 
 President Corazon Aquino assumed her presidency amid hightened expectations 
toward a more comprehensive land reform program than any previous land reform initiatives.  
As a start, the 1986 Philippine Constitution was drafted (and later supported by plebiscite in 
February 1987) by a 48 member Constitutional Commission appointed by the President2.  
                                                        
1 This subsection draws heavily on Balisacan 1990, Hayami, et al. 1990, Riedinger 1995, and Putzel 1992.    
2 Of the 48 members of the Commission, only one, Jaime Tadeo, the leader of KMP, was generally seen as 
representing the peasantry.  According to Tadeo, only 9 out of the 48 members were in favor of 
distributive land reform.  (as cited in Putzel 1992)   
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While it was a substantially “watered down” version of the initial draft adopted by the 
Committee on Social Justice under the Commission, the Constitution was nevertheless a 
major improvement vis-à-vis the previous Constitution.  Above all, it mandated a 
‘comprehensive’ land reform covering all agricultural lands and natural resources (thus going 
beyond rice and corn lands under PD27) and both tenants and regular farm workers (who had 
been excluded as beneficiaries in the previous reform Codes).  At the same time, however, 
many of the crucial aspects of the defining characteristics of the reform were left with the 
Congress to determine, including: the retention limits, to be set according to “ecological, 
developmental, and equity considerations;” types of exempted lands; and phasing and time 
table of the program.  Constitution also included various alternative measures to land re-
distribution, such as voluntary land sharing, and it allowed private corporations to lease up to 
1000 hectares (while local citizens 500 hectares) of public lands.   
 
 The second step that the Aquino administration took before the newly elected 
Congress convened was to issue Executive Order 229 (EO229) in June 1987.  It was a 
response to the mounting pressures from pro-reform social forces following the “Mendiola 
Bridge massacre” (where thirteen members and supporters of Kilusang Magbubukid ng 
Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines) rallying near Malacañan Palace for a 
‘genuine land reform’ were killed) on January 22, 1987.  During this period, however, 
President Aquino rejected (acting upon the recommendations from her key economic 
ministers, such as Finance Secretary Jaime Ongpin) the Accelerated Land Reform Program 
(ALRP) proposal put together by key government officials immediately following the 
Mendiola incident, which included a uniform 7 hectare ceiling for all croplands and the 
sequencing of reform program starting with large privately owned farms.  Instead, EO229, 
drafted by her conservative cabinet members including Secretary Ongpin and then signed by 
President Aquino, mostly focused on procedural matters and, once again, left many of the 
critical aspects of land reform, including retention limits and priority setting/phasing, to the 
Congress.3  EO229 was issued five days before the new Congress was to meet for the first 
time in fifteen years.  Many observers have concluded that, by leaving the most critical 
aspects of her land reform program to the Congressional process, President Aquino was not 
able to take full advantage of the historically rare opportunity to initiate a massive 
transformation of Philippine rural economies, due to her strong popular support, especially 
among the middle class, and to the fact that the opposing landlord block had not been 
consolidated, during the initial days of her presidency   
 
 The newly elected Senate and the Lower House of the Congress proposed, debated 
and passed their respective versions of land reform bills during the period between June 1987 
and June 1988.  The House bill (HB400) was originally based on a draft proposed by the 
Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR), a coalition of major peasant organizations, 
and initially included a uniform land retention limit of 7 hectares, sliding scale of 
                                                        
3 In addition, some observers note that the clause in EO229 permanently disqualifying from participation 
in the program of “all persons, associations, or entities who prematurely enter the land” effectively ruled 
out cooperation with peasant movements/organizations, some of whom were engaged in land occupation 
tactics, in the process of land reform implementation.  (Putzel 1992)  
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compensation for landowners based on size, and full peasant involvement in the 
implementation process.  Such features of the bill, however, disappeared in the process of 
passing through the House Committee on agrarian reform and to the House floor, where more 
than half of its members were considered landowners or having them as patrons.  Indeed, the 
bill was so substantially ‘watered down’ that its initial sponsors withdrew their support from 
the bill.  (Hayami, et al. 1990; Balisacan 1990; Putzel 1992, Reidinger 1995)  The bill that 
eventually passed the House floor, HB400, stipulated retention limits of 7 hectares, with 3 
hectares for each heir, for landowners, 24 hectares for homesteaders, and 3 hectares for 
reform beneficiaries.  HB400 also included as exempted lands farms under corporate stock 
sharing or voluntary land sharing as well as the exemptions included in EO 229.  In terms of 
the timing of reform implementation, HB400 placed priority on alienable and disposable 
public lands and lands under management of multinational firms over (domestically owned) 
private lands.  The bill that passed the Senate, on the other hand, had a 5 hectare retention 
limit for landowners (except for the rice and corn lands under PD 27 where 7 hectare limit 
applied) with the 3 hectare limit for the reform beneficiaries, and included additional 
exemptions such as lands with 18 percent slope, lands for the underprivileged, vegetable 
farms, commercial sites, residential sites, industrial sites, parks, forest reserves, mangroves, 
wildlife grounds, watersheds, and other lands of specified uses.   In terms of the time table, 
the Senate bill placed its first priority on private farms of over 50 hectares and corporate farms 
with lease contracts for public lands over 1000 hectares (for the contract with 1000 hectares or 
below contracts were to be honored for five years), with second priority on alienable and 
disposable public lands and private farms between 24 and 50 hectares, then followed by 
private farms below 24 hectares, plantations (including fishponds, prawn ponds, 
livestock/poultry lands), and corporate farms under local management (for lands under the 
management of multinational firms contracts were to be honored until the contracts expired).  
Based on these bills, a compromise was reached between the both chambers and the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, or Republic Act 6657) was passed in June, 
1988.   
 
 The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL: RA6657) stipulated the 
following:   
• Retention limit: CARL set the retention limit at 5 hectares but also allowed additional 3 
hectares for each hair (of at least age 15 and actually tilling the land or directly managing 
it).   
• Land valuation and owner compensation : The law stipulated: that the land owner 
compensation be based on the ‘fair market value’ including various valuation 
considerations (such as the cost of acquiring the land, the current value of like properties, 
owner’s sworn valuation, the assessment made by the government); that landowners with 
50 hectares or more, 24 or more, or below 24 hectares receive, respectively, 25%, 30% 
and 35% of payments in cash; and that landowners be allowed to contest decisions made 
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the judiciary system.   
• Beneficiary repayments: The law stipulated that beneficiaries pay the amortization over 
30 years with 6 % annual interest.   
• Alternatives to land re-distribution: As an alternative to land re-distribution, the law 
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allowed corporate landowners to satisfy their reform obligations by giving their 
farmworkers the “right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation 
that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the 
company’s total assets.” (Sec.31 as quoted in Reidinger 1995)  
• Exemptions: As exception to the reform coverage, a 10 year deferment was allowed on 
lands for: commercial livestock, poultry and swaine raising, aquaculture, fruit farms, 
orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms, cacao, coffee and rubber plantations.  Also 
lands leased to agribusiness corporations were excepted for 10 years or until the lease 
expired.   
• Program phasing and priority:  The reform program was to be implemented in three 
phases: (Phase 1) Year one to four: rice and corn lands covered under PD27, idle and 
abandoned lands, lands foreclosed by government financial institutions, lands acquired by 
the ‘Presidential Commission on Good Government,’ and Private lands voluntarily 
offered; (Phase 2) Year one to four: Public agricultural lands and private lands in holdings 
greater than 50 hectares; (Phase 3) Year four to seven: Private lands in holdings between 
24 and 50 hectares; and in year six to ten: Private lands in holdings less than 24 hectares.  
 
Other Legislation after CARP  
 
 While CARP provided the basic framework for the Philippine land reform policy 
throughout the Aquino and Ramos administrations the legislative battle did not end with the 
enactment of CARP in 1988.  Opponents of land reform repeatedly introduced bills to 
restrict land reform implementation, such as proposals for the exemption of all commercial 
farms, suspension of reform in Mindanao until year 2020, and many others.  Despite all these 
attempts of rolling back land reform, however, few made any headway after all.  
Nevertheless, some of the court rulings, following a large number of legal challenges mounted 
against land reform by disgruntled landowners, did place limitations on reform 
implementation.  For example, a 1990 Supreme Court ruling restricted the scope of the 
reform by exempting commercial livestock, poultry and swine operations. (Riedinger 1995)  
 
 On the other hand, toward the end of the Ramos presidency, there was additional 
legislation to supplement CARP.  Administrative Order No. 363 (Oct. 1997) and subsequent 
Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997 set out some conditions on the 
conversion of lands from agricultural into other uses (such as industrial, housing, etc.), 
including a five year moratorium on the conversion of all irrigated lands and penalties for 
agricultural inactivity on lands and for premature land conversion. (Garilao 1998)  
Furthermore, immediately before the 1997 Congressional session went on recess, with 
national election fast approaching, RA 8532 was enacted, extending CARP implementation 
for another ten years and providing additional 50 billion pesos of funding for its 
implementation.  (Garilao 1998, Borras 1999)  
 
Conclusions on Land Reform Legislation  
 
 In this sub-section, we have reviewed the evolution of land reform codes since the 
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1950s, which is summarized in Table 1.  Land reform has been continuously on the political 
agenda throughout the period and a new piece of reform legislation has intermittently been 
introduced.  Generally, every time such new legislation was enacted, the scope of coverage 
under land reform increased, albeit very slowly.  Such expansion of the reform coverage over 
time is most evident in the gradual lowering of the retention limits for landowners.  We will 
discuss the political dynamics behind such processes in Section 2 below.  Before turning to 
the political processes, however, we now turn, in the next sub-section, to the actual 
implementation records and the impact of land reform during the past few decades.  Land 
reform codes enacted by the national legislature is one thing, and the process of actual 
implementation of the reform code and its impact on rural communities in different parts of 
the Philippines is quite another aspect of the land reform.  We now examine such aspects.   
 
1-2. Implementation Records in the Philippine Land Reform  
 
Land Reform Implementation before Marcos Presidency  
 
 Based on the official record obtained from the Department of Agrarian Reform 
(DAR), the implementation record of the land reform program before the Marcos martial law 
was generally quite modest.  Despite the unprecedented popularity in rural areas and the 
apparent ‘political will’ of President Magsaysay (see below), his implementation record of the 
land re-distribution under the Landed Estates Programs (initiated under the 1940 
Commonwealth Act 539 but subsequently amended or supplemented by the 1955, 1956 and 
1963 codes), is apparently quite dismal.  For example, the extremely generous retention 
limits appeared to have severely restricted the potential scope of the reform.  In addition, the 
requirement of tenants’ petition to invoke expropriation, the requirement of cash payment to 
landowners, and the modest budgetary commitment made of Peso 300,000 for land 
acquisition apparently reduced the potential impact of the reform program. (Riedinger 1995, 
Putzel 1992)  At the end, the record shows that less than 20,000 hectares of land was 
acquired during the Magsaysay (who died in an airplane crash in 1956) and Garcia 
administrations.4  (see Table 2-1) 
 
 Similarly, despite the enactment of the 1963 Land Reform Code under the Macapagal 
administration (1961-1965) addressing some of the shortcomings of the earlier laws, actual 
record of implementation during his presidency was equally quite limited.  Not only were 
there still important design limitations, as we saw in the previous subsection, but also very 
limited implementation of the reform apparently further reduced the real impact on the ground 
of the land reform under his presidency.  The operations based on the 1963 Code were 
limited to pilot areas in Central Luzon, and the actual implementation with significant level of 
intensity was further limited to the pilot project in Nueva Ecija (de los Reyes 1972, as cited in 
Hayami, et al. 1990).  The record shows that it took about two years for the newly 
established program to go through a trial and error period with no land purchased by the 
government under the Code, and the actual budget expenditure (32.4 million pesos) was only 
                                                        
4 Takigawa (1976) also cites similar, though slightly different, figures for the implementation from Land 
Tenure Administration; 18,742 hectares composed of 36 farms were appropriated between 1955 and 1961.   
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20 % of what originally was allotted.  The areas declared as covered under the Code were 
limited to 12 municipalities which were concentrated in Central Luzon. (Wurfel 1983, 
Takigawa 1976)   
 
 The official record (Table 2-1) indicates that during the thirty year period between 
1935 and 1965, the administration under President Quirino (1949-53) accomplished more 
amount of land acquisition, under the Landed Estate Programs, than any other administration 
during this period, even surpassing that of the Marcos regime.   
 
Land Reform Implementation under Marcos Presidency  
 
 During his first and second terms in office (i. e., before the declaration of martial law 
in 1972) President Marcos took over the implementation of the 1963 Code.  He appeared to 
have shown little interest in carrying out the program set up by his predecessor during his first 
term in office (1966-69).  For example, the amount of land acquired under the Landed Estate 
Program was smaller than the amount acquired by President Macapagal.  However, there was 
a major increase in the implementation of the Landed Estate Program during President 
Marcos’s second term (1970-1972); the amount purchased by the government increased by 
fourfold (from 2700 ha in his first term to 12,000 ha in his second: Table 2-1.).   
 
 The impact of the 1971 Code on actual land re-distribution was minimal since it was 
superceded a year later by PD27 issued immediately following the declaration of martial law.  
Despite President Marcos’ own characterization of the agrarian reform program being the 
center piece of his ‘New Society’ (see below), the implementation record, as represented by 
the amount of lands purchased, lagged far behind his rhetoric.  About 17,000 hectares under 
the Landed Estate Program (Table 2-1) and additional 15,000 hectares under the Operation 
Land Transfer (Table 2-2) of lands were acquired during the remaining years of Marcos 
presidency (1972 –1986); on the basis of the annual average amount of purchased lands under 
the Landed Estates Program of 1300 hectare, his record surpassed only Macapagal’s among 
his post-war predecessors and lagged far behind his own implementation record during the 
1970-72 period and also behind the records of Magsaysay-Garcia, Quirino and Roxas 
presidency. (Table 2-1)  Nevertheless, the aggregate record of President Marcos’ 20 year rule 
(including the period before martial law) on Land Estates acquisition was still larger than most 
of his predecessors,’ almost matching President Quirino’s accomplishments.   
 
 Land transfer from landowners to tenant beneficiaries under the Operation Land 
Transfer (OLT) was to proceed in several stages; first, tenants and their landlords were to be 
identified and parcellary mapping was to be conducted by DAR, followed by the issuance of 
‘Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT)’ to the tenant-beneficiaries; subsequently land valuation 
was to be conducted by DAR and compensation to the landowners was to be made and 
amortization payment by the beneficiaries was to start; finally, upon the completion of the 
amortization the beneficiaries were to receive Emancipation Patents (EPs), certifying them as 
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legal owner of the land.5  Furthermore, under PD 27, the implementation of the land 
redistribution program proceeded with a step-by-step manner according to the size of land 
ownership; landholdings of size over 100 hectares were covered first, followed by lands of 50 
hectares or more, and then 24 hectares or more.  It has been observed that President Marcos 
“simply lost his originally keen interest after the owners with more than 100 hectares had been 
dispossessed.”  (Wurfel 1983: 8)  As shown in Table 2-3 President Marcos’s land reform 
implementation appears to have mostly been concentrated in the early 1970s; of all the CLTs 
printed (but not necessarily received by the beneficiaries) during the period between 1972 and 
1985, CLTs covering roughly one third of the entire areas and beneficiaries covered in the 
whole period were printed in 1973 alone.  However, the major delay in the reform 
implementation apparently occurred in the land valuation and landowner compensation stage, 
which was to take place after the issuance of CLTs, mainly due to disputes over the valuation 
of lands.  (Hayami, et al. 1990)  Furthremore, among the CLT beneficiaries on their way of 
paying up their amortization installments to become full owners, the record of their payment 
appears to have been quite dismal; as of mid-1980s at most 10% of those were current in their 
payments.6 (Riedinger 1995)   
 
 In 1982 in order to accelerate the land reform accomplishments in appearance, 
President Marcos revised the original requirement for the EP issuance of full amortization 
payment and allowed EPs to be issued upon the payment of only two successive payments.7  
This procedural change appears to account for the sudden increase in the number of EPs 
printed in 1982 and onward.  Nevertheless, as of 1985, while CLTs were printed for some 
444,000 beneficiaries, covering a little above 100% of the government-claimed potential 
beneficiaries, EPs were printed (much less distributed) for only less than one third of them.  
(Putzel 1992: 139)   
 
 In addition to President Marcos’ loss of personal interest in carrying through the 
reform after the initial few years of PD27 implementation (we will discuss likely reasons for 
this below), a few observers have noted the capacity and design of the implementation agency, 
especially DAR, as another source of the slow pace of implementation.  For example, a 
comparison between the organizational structure of DAR in the early 1970s and the post-war 
Japanese land reform implementation reveals that, in the Philippines, each Agrarian Reform 
                                                        
5 See Hayami, et al. (1990), for example, for a more detailed account of these procedures.   
6 Whether this was mainly due to the inability of the beneficiaries to pay, or due mainly to the 
unwillingness (despite their ability) to pay, is not immediately clear, and either could have been true 
depending on local circumstances.  While ‘unwillingness’ was likely the main reason in areas where 
favorable conditions existed for the introduction of high yielding varieties (Umehara provides a concrete 
example of this), ‘inability’ due to high increase in production costs relative to modest yield increase, or 
due to higher rent/amortization payment requirements (as a result of, say, landowners’ bargaining power in 
the process of land valuation) might have been the case in other areas.  Detailed account of the latter case, 
however, has not been found by the author.   
7 Later on during the days immediately preceding the 1986 presidential election, President Marcos further 
relaxed the requirements for EP issuance by authorizing the immediate distribution of EPs to designated 
beneficiaries regardless of their amortization payment status, in a desperate (but ultimately unsuccessful) 
attempt for re-election.  (see Putzel 1992: 193).     
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Team (ART) consisting of 20 members —the basic implementing unit of DAR—, covered 
one municipality (or more) which in turn included some 20 villages, while its parallel 
institution in Japan, Land Reform Committee including a minimum of 13 members, was 
created for each village, indicating the extremely heavy burden placed on the Philippine 
reform institution.  More importantly, the Japanese Land Reform Committee consisted of 
representatives of the tenant farmer (5), of the owner-farmer (3) and of the landlord (2) plus 
(at least) 3 staff, while the Philippine ART members were all DAR staff members.8  This 
meant that in the Philippines, unlike in Japan, the land reform implementation design had no 
direct involvement by the peasant beneficiaries.  (Takigawa 1976, Putzel 1992)9  Another 
major difference between the Philippine and the Japanese land reform episodes regarding the 
institutional capacity of the reform agencies, as pointed out by many observers, was the 
existence (or lack thereof) of reliable (i. e., undisputed) land registration records as well as of 
‘well-disciplined bureaucracy.’   (e. g., Hayami, et al. 1990)   
 
 Furthermore, since the reform program covered lands planted with only rice and corn, 
the reform program created an incentive for landowners, who would have continued rice or 
corn production without land reform, to shift from rice or corn production to other crops 
excluded from the reform program for the sake of avoiding being subject to the reform 
program.  This likely distorted incentives for agricultural production contributing to 
inefficiency in land (and other) resource allocation although it is difficult to quantify the effect 
of the reform program on such crop-shifting.10  In addition, among the lands planted with 
rice and corn, PD27 applied only to the lands cultivated by tenants and non-tenanted lands (i. 
e., lands under the direct management by landowners with hired laborers) were exempt from 
land reform.  This provided an incentive for landowners, in an attempt to avoid land reform 
application, to evict tenants and convert their lands into farms with direct management using 
hired laborers.  (See next subsection for more on this)   
 
 Besides land redistribution under Operation Land Transfer (OLT), official records 
indicate that some 646,000 tenants held leasehold tenancy covering 690,000 hectares, 
representing 122 percent of the targeted beneficiaries by the end of 1985.  However, studies 
based on micro-level surveys suggest that conversion of share tenancy into leasehold was 
equally slow and uneven, and there are reports of areas where tenancy contract, once 
                                                        
8 In the Philippines, Barrio Committees on Land Production (BCLP) were created in charge of setting the 
value of the land to be transferred and with their membership composition similar to the Japanese Land 
Reform Committee; however, BCLP’s scope appears much more limited than the Japanese LRC, and 
moreover, the landlord-tenant agreement on land valuation was not bound by the BCLP determination.  
(Umehara 1997, Putzel 1992)  
9 Incidentally, in comparing the post-war Japanese land reform and the early PD27 implementation, 
Takigawa (1976) notes as a major similarity the kinds of tactics that landlord employed, including eviction, 
law suits, and threat and use of violence, in their attempts to resist reform implementation.   
10 For example, area harvested with sugarcane increased from 326,000 hectare in 1958 to 550,000 hectares 
in the mid-1970s due to the increasing price in sugar as well as due to such likely effects of the reform 
program.  Although sugar planted areas dropped again to 300,000 hectares by 1980 following the collapse 
of sugar price, such ‘sugar planters who “temporarily” turned to rice and corn production were specifically 
exempted from the reform program.’  (Riedinger 1995, 100)   
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converted to leasehold, was reverted back to share tenancy.  (See, for example, case studies 
included in Ledesma, et al. (eds.))  As a consequence, there have remained areas where 
(supposedly illegal) share tenancy is the dominant contract on rice fields, although the 
quantitative magnitude of how widespread such areas are is not known.11  (Otsuka 1991, 
Putzel 1992)   
 
 Apart from the official record published by DAR, actual implementation of land 
reform might be also inferred by looking at the change in aggregate statistics on farm 
ownership.  The farm ownership patterns, measured by the share of fully or partly owned 
farms to total farms, changed very little among rice and corn farms, while there was a slight 
indication of increasing leasehold tenancy, between the 1971 and the 1980 Agricultural 
Censuses.  (Quisumbing 1988)  Between 1971 and 1980, the Gini coefficient based on 
operated farm sizes decreased not only in the areas where the reform program was targeted but 
in all regions except for Ilocos, whereas it increased in all regions except for (again) Ilocos 
between 1980 and 1991.  Furthermore, the Gini coefficient on the farm size distribution in 
rice lands increased moderately while the Gini coefficient in corn lands decreased sharply 
between 1971 and 1980. (Balisacan 1995)  Little impact of the land reform program thus can 
be discerned from the Agricultural Census data.  As noted by Otsuka (1994: 174), the 
seeming inconsistency of the data on the land reform implementation as indicated between the 
Agricultural Census, on the one hand, and DAR records and numerous micro-level studies, on 
the other, remains an unresolved issue.  One possibility is that there were major factors other 
than land reform policy (e. g., population pressure) that were mainly affecting the farm size 
distribution and the impact of reform policy on farm sizes was relatively small.  Another 
possibility might be that the Marcos reform, targeted mainly to the rice haciendas where 
small-scale tenant farming prevailed, indeed had little effects on operational farm sizes which 
are reported in the agricultural censuses (Census does not report land ownership distribution.).   
 
 Overall, one observer credits that with more than 110,000 tenants placed on the road 
to ownership, representing 11 percent of a very conservative estimate of all rice and corn 
tenants, “the accomplishment was . . . greater than in any previous administration.”12  
(Wurfel 1988:169)  Nevertheless, despite the rhetoric employed by President Marcos, seen in 
the national aggregate figures, the impact of land reform during the Marcos era ended up quite 
modest and very unevenly distributed nationwide.  Many see the increasing spread of 
organized peasant unrest in the countryside, toward the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, as 
a major piece of evidence for the lack of nationwide impact of the land reform on the plight of 
the majority of the peasants.  (Riedinger 1995, Wurfel 1992)   
 
                                                        
11 For example, the author’s fieldwork in one village in Pangasinan revealed that 86 % of the rice planted 
areas under tenancy cultivation in the village was under share agreement while only 14 % under lease 
tenancy as of 1994.   
12 Wurfel (1988: 169) hasten to add, however, that such accomplishments raised expectations of the 
nation’s peasants and, given the limited nature of the implementation of the program, “for every farmer 
grateful for having achieved a new status and perhaps improved income, there were many who resented the 
frustration of their hopes.”    See also the unintended consequences of the reform, as discussed below.   
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Micro Studies on the Impact of PD 27 
 
 Despite such a modest aggregate record, however, observers based on micro-level 
studies all agree that PD27 under President Marcos did succeed in striking a final blow at the 
landed estates based on rice in Luzon.  Although landlord resistance using tenant eviction, 
crop shifting, various attempts to drive up land values etc., was sometimes quite successful, in 
certain areas the reform “did give to all who survived the evictions secure tenure and fixed 
rents” (Fegan 1989a: 134) and thus had a significant, though geographically limited, impact 
on rural economies. (e. g., Hayami, et al 1990, Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, 2000, Otsuka 1991, 
Fegan 1989a, 1989b, Kirkvleit 1990, Umehara 1997, Ledesma, et al. (eds.), Deininger, et al. 
2000)  Some villages in Central Luzon, the initial target areas of the Philippine land reform, 
have traditionally provided a very rich ‘laboratory’ for social scientists (e. g., anthropologists, 
economists, political scientists and sociologists) conducting village studies since the 1950s, 
and many of them report the concrete impacts of the land reform programs, as well as other 
changes such as the introduction of modern rice varieties, of opportunities for overseas 
contract workers, etc. (See Muijzenberg 1996 for a survey)   
 
 There are a few broad points of consensus among these micro-studies about the 
impact of the land reform program, mainly in Luzon, under Marcos Presidency.  First, large 
scale rice haciendas, whose owners had formed a prominent political force in the ‘rice bowl’ 
of the Central Luzon until the 1960s, more or less disappeared.  For example, according to 
Umehara (1997)’s account of the land reform implementation in a Nueva Ecija village –one of 
the areas where the PD27 implementation was initiated–, the 224 hectare portion in the village 
of a 4000 hectare rice hacienda was mostly re-distributed among the 81 tenant farmers by 
1978 when the majority of the former tenants had signed an agreement on the terms of land 
transfer (including the price of P8000 per hectare, which appeared to be roughly twice the 
level determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production –BCLP– earlier13); the 
attempts by the hacienda owners in resisting such re-distribution was circumscribed by the 
disarmament of private armies enforced under martial law in the area.  In this village only 
10% of amortization payment had been paid in by the beneficiaries as of 1992 (and perhaps 
unlikely to be paid14) and thus EPs had not yet been distributed; nevertheless the beneficiaries 
appeared to enjoy de facto land ownership.  Such delinquency in amortization payment 
among reform beneficiaries is apparently widespread, especially in the ‘successful’ reform 
areas under PD27. (e. g., Fegan 1989, Putzel 1992, Otsuka 1991)  A quite different but 
similarly ‘successful’ land re-distribution example in Central Luzon, not through tenant-
landowner negotiation but through occupation of idle portions of hacienda lands in 1977, is 
                                                        
13 Umehara (1997) notes, however, that such overvaluation of land was still not likely to be too excessive a 
burden for the tenant-beneficiaries because of inflation and the increasing rice yield due to the introduction 
of high yielding varieties at that time, and that the tenants actually tended to go along with such terms of 
agreement despite such overvaluation.   
14 According to Umehara (1997), only10 cavans (1 cavan = about 45 kilograms) of palay (unhusked rice), 
out of their average annual production of 80 cavans, worth of payment is required to receive EP; his 
tentative conclusion thus was that the beneficiaries were not so much unable as not finding it necessary to 
pay the amortization.    
 14 
reported in Banzon-Bautista (1989)’s account of a Panpanga village15.  Furthermore, the 
demise of rice landowners is also apparent in the national political arena; for example, the 
contrast between the 1963/55 and 1986 Congressional debate over the respective land reform 
bills reveals that the ‘rice bloc’ feared prominent in the former occasions while no mention of 
the ‘rice bloc’ is found in the latter. (Riedinger 1995)   
 
 Secondly, there were significant income transfers from (former) land owners to the 
land reform beneficiaries who were converted into lease holders or who obtained the 
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) during the relatively early phase of the PD27 
implementation.  It has been demonstrated that the amount of annual amortization payment 
as stipulated by law –2.5 times normal net output equally divided over a 15 year period plus 
6% interest– and the leasehold rent –25% of net production after deducting production costs– 
were roughly equivalent; thus the leasehold tenant beneficiaries were able to obtain as much 
income transfers as did the CLT beneficiaries. (Mangahas 1985, as quoted in Otsuka 1991).  
This was a result of the combination of the land reform and the introduction of modern rice 
varieties.  That is, the timing of the land reform implementation and the adoption of new 
varieties, coupled with irrigation development, in Central Luzon was such that rice yields 
were increasing due to new rice varieties and irrigation development while the rent and 
amortization payments were largely fixed at the level before such yield increases started (early 
1970s) in the ‘successful’ reform areas.  Consequently the large economic surpluses from 
yield increases were appropriated by the land reform beneficiary (lease holders or 
amortization owners).  As of the early 1970s, since the traditional share cropping rent was 
estimated as roughly one third to 40% of the total rice production there was expected to be a 
modest gain to tenant beneficiaries from Operation Leasehold (OLH) who would pay the legal 
lease rent fixed at 25% of production (net of production costs).  (Hayami, et al. 1990, 
Hayami and Kikuchi 2000)  However, much larger subsequent gains from yield increases, 
often reaching 100%, following the introduction of new varieties and irrigation development 
were to accrue to the leasehold tenants/amortization owners as long as the lease rent or the 
amortization payment was fixed at the prevailing level in the early 1970s, as was the case in at 
least some of the Central and Southern Luzon villages.  (Hayami, et al. 1990, Hayami-
Kikuchi 2000, Otsuka 1991, Fegan 1989a, 1989b, Kirkvliet 1990, Umehara 1997)   
 
 For example, in a small-holder village in Laguna, Hayami and Kikuchi (2000: Chap. 
4) found: that OLH had a larger impact than OLT (because of the relatively small holdings 
prevailing in the village, unlike in hacienda villages in the Inner Central Luzon, the impact of 
OLT aimed at land ownership above 7 ha. was relatively small); that the estimated effective 
share of the rent paid by the tenants declined from 40% under the 50% share tenancy to 14% 
under the OLH program as of 1995 due to the combined effects as described above; and that 
the income share of the landlords in total gross value added in the village declined from more 
than 40% in the mid-1960s to about 10% in 1995 while the income share of the reform 
                                                        
15 Banzon-Bautista (1989) notes as possible sources of such ‘success’: a long history of organized peasant 
struggles/resistance in the village dating back to the 1930s, the tacit support of village officers (village 
council members and the leader of farmers’ association), and participation of an owner of a large local store 
and a local labor contractor who had political leverage in the municipality.   
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beneficiaries (i. e., former share tenants) increased from around 30% to 60% during the same 
period.  Otsuka (1991) similarly finds that, as of 1985, the implicit return on lands was 
roughly twice to three times the going rate of amortization fee or leasehold rent (as fixed by 
law) in his sample villages of irrigated or of un-irrigated-but-favorable conditions.  At the 
same time, however, while the income gains to the leasehold tenants were substantial, 
observes have noted that significant income inequality and intra-class differentiation among 
reform beneficiaries emerged based primarily on the distribution of the operational farm sizes 
at the time of the land reform implementation.  (Hayami and Kikuchi 2000, Umehara 1997)   
 
 More recently, using a longitudinal household data set extending the data used in 
Otsuka (1991), Deininger, et al. (2000) find that the PD27 beneficiaries (mostly the early 
beneficiaries in the mid-1970s) tended to have substantially higher investments in physical 
capital and in children’s education than did non-beneficiaries during the period between 1972 
and 1985; the average difference in the asset accumulation between the beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries over the period amounted to roughly US$1,000.  Furthermore, the impact of the 
land reform on accumulation appears to have been larger for the households with smaller 
before-reform asset holding than those with greater assets, implying that the reform helped 
poorer beneficiaries catch up with relatively better-off beneficiaries.16  Also, the years of 
schooling among children were roughly one year higher among the PD27 beneficiary 
households compared to the non-beneficiary households during the same period.  In addition, 
they find that the PD27 beneficiaries tended to have higher household income and higher rice 
productivity levels than did non-beneficiaries during the period between 1985 and 1998; the 
difference in income growth during the period was a little less than US$100, and the 
difference in rice yield increase roughly 600 kilograms, between the beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries.   
 
 Such substantial benefits to the former share tenants, however, are not likely to have 
materialized either where PD27 was not implemented vigorously or where the circumstances 
did not allow farmers to extract the full benefit of adopting modern rice varieties.  Many 
observers have noted the very uneven implementation across different parts of the Philippines.  
In some communities most of the former tenants benefited (e.g., the above example due to 
Umehara 1997, Hayami and Kikuchi 2000, and others), in some other communities only 20 to 
30% of the prospective beneficiaries received CLTs, and in still other places no tenants 
appeared to have benefited at all; among the reform beneficiaries, some continued to pay their 
rent to the owners, some continued to pay their amortization well beyond the fifteen years as 
specified by the law, and others stopped paying either to the owners or to the government. 
(Riedinger 1995: 94, Hayami, et al. 1990: 67)  For example, in the areas where rice yields 
fluctuate and the gains from new technologies were small tenants (who are risk averse) are 
likely to prefer share tenancy to lease contract.  Otsuka (1991) found that the conversion of 
share tenancy was more pronounced in irrigated or favorable rain-fed areas than in 
unfavorable rain-fed areas, and that the extent of conversion to leasehold was also greater 
where (1) the increase in the rice yield (between 1970 and 1986) was higher, (2) the ratio of 
                                                        
16 This appears to contradict the intra-class differentiation observed by Hayami and Kikuchi, and by 
Umehara, as noted above.   
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the number of landlords to the number of DAR technicians in the municipality was smaller 
(representing the relative administrative capacity of the municipality, which Otsuka (1991) 
interprets as indicating ‘political will’), and (3) the incidence of tenancy was higher as of 1970 
(but found no significant association with yield variation –indicating the degree of riskiness–).  
In general, according to Fegan (1989a), PD27 was weakly implemented outside the Central 
Luzon, Iloilo, and Isabela ‘rice bowls’ while it had little impact in areas such as the Eastern 
Visayas and Mindanao.   
 
 The third point as a broad consensus in the literature on the impact of PD27 is that 
the class of landless laborers in rural Philippines, who are at the bottom of village hierarchies, 
did not gain and more likely was made even worse-off due to land reform, and that some of 
the former tenants lost access to land due to tenant eviction triggered by land reform.  As 
noted above, the land reform beneficiaries under PD 27 (as well as under earlier reform codes) 
were limited to tenant farmers and excluded landless laborers, thereby bypassing altogether 
the landless as reform beneficiaries.  Furthermore, because of the reform program 
landowners possibly grew increasingly reluctant to rent out their land in fear of losing their 
ownership to land to the tenants.  As a consequence, some observers have argued, the 
opportunities for upward mobility for a landless laborer by climbing up the “agricultural 
ladder” through a tenant farmer to a owner farmer appeared to have been virtually closed after 
the 1970s.  (e. g., Hayami, et al. 1990, Hayami and Kikuchi 2000, Deininger, et al. 2000)  
To what extent such ‘closure of the agricultural ladder,’ preventing upward mobility among 
landless laborers through agriculture, was a direct consequence of the land reform program is 
not clear, however.  As pointed out by Lipton (1990), such route for upward mobility is 
expected to be more important in a land abundant environment rather than in land scarce one 
(such as in the Philippines).  A longitudinal study in a Pangasinan village suggests that the 
possibility for upward mobility through ‘the agricultural ladder’ was substantially reduced 
since the early 1980s, possibly due to population pressure, even in a village where land reform 
implementation had very little impact. (Fuwa 1999)  Similarly, Deininger, et. al. (2000)’s 
finding that the significant ‘narrowing the agricultural ladder’ occurred after the mid-1980s 
among their sample of rice growing villages where PD27 was implemented in the mid-1970s 
appears to imply (the authors’ own conclusions notwithstanding) that the main source of the 
observed decrease in land access by the landless may not have been the land reform program.   
 
 In addition, many landowners apparently evicted their tenants and resorted to self-
cultivation with hired laborers in their attempts to avoid land redistribution (since such farms 
were exempted from the reform coverage).  While the quantitative magnitude of such tenant 
eviction at the national level is not known, Otsuka (1991)’s survey finds that in three of his 
five sample villages where a significant proportion of share tenancy was converted into 
leasehold and significant yield increases due to MV were observed, about half of the landless 
workers as of 1985 were former tenants (as of 1972) and a significant proportion (20 to 30%) 
reported to have been evicted by landlords.  Hayami, et al. (1990: 94) notes an example 
where a landowner, who held a 30 hectare rice hacienda in Nueva Ecija, managed her farm 
with the use of an overseer (katiwala) and permanent laborers and had “forced her workers to 
sign written contracts indicating that they are laborers but not tenants.”  In a widely quoted 
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statement, one observer speculates that “in 1980 those deprived of the land they were 
cultivating by corporate farming were more numerous than the approximately 100,000 
‘amortizing owners’ and recipients of ‘Emancipation Patents.’  (Wurfel 1988:174; cited by 
Fegan 1989, Riedinger 1995, etc.)   
 
 In addition to tenant eviction and increasing reluctance of landowners to rent out 
their land, another significant development in the ‘successful’ land reform areas was the 
increasing practice of sub-tenancy or permanent labor arrangements.  Under these 
arrangements, land reform beneficiaries rent out their newly acquired lands to landless or 
other farm families, despite the legal prohibition of such practices.  Partly due to the 
increased disutility of their own work in farm operations following a significant increase in 
income (i. e., leisure being a normal good) and partly due to changing labor endowment 
within the household (e. g., aging of household members, regular non-agricultural 
employment opportunities obtained by household members, household partition, widowhood, 
etc.) supposedly illegal land renting or permanent laborer contract emerged.  Additional 
demand for permanent laborers also came from large farmers and moneylenders/middlemen 
/landlords who were accumulating their de facto cultivation rights through (illegal) land 
pawning or purchase of leasehold titles.  (e. g., Hayami, et al. 1990, Fegan 1989a17)  With a 
significant risk of losing the land title in favor of the subtenants or permanent laborers under 
the “land-to-the-tillers” reform program on the part of the landowners/leaseholders, and with 
increasingly desperate landless laborers seeking employment opportunities, such tenancy or 
permanent labor arrangements were invariably for a short term, usually for one year18.  
(Hayami, et al. 1990, Umehara 1997)  As a result, the economic security of those newly 
emerged subtenants or permanent laborers was significantly lower than that of the traditional 
tenant farmers.  Ironically, the reform program of “land-to-the-tiller” induced at least some 
of these former “tillers” of land to become non-tilling farmers or semi-landlords (see Hayami 
and Kikuchi 2000, and Hayami, et al. 1990 Chapter 4 for examples)   
 
 While the supply of rental land offered to prospective tenant farmers decreased as 
noted above, increasing population pressures likely depressed wage rates in agricultural labor 
markets.  The welfare level of the landless laborer class thus was likely to have deteriorated.  
Because of the (unintended) negative effects of the land reform as well as of the continuing 
population pressure, a new social ‘underclass’ was observed to have emerged in rural 
Philippines, with an increasing income disparity between them and the reform beneficiaries (i. 
e., former share tenants turned leaseholders/amortization owners).  (e. g., Hayami, et al. 1990, 
Fegan 1989b, Hayami and Kikuchi 2000, Umehara 1997)   
 
 Finally, while there was a significant distributional impact due to the income transfer 
from the former landowner to the former share tenant class, efficiency gains from the land 
reform program have been less clear.  Before the land reform implementation, rice and corn 
                                                        
17 In some (many?) cases, permanent laborers were recruited not among village residents but from migrant 
workers from poorer regions such as Bohol, Cebu, Bikol, and Samar.   
18 There were at least three different types of permanent labor contract in different parts of Luzon as of 
1987.  See Hayami, et al. (1990) chapter 4.   
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fields were cultivated mostly by small-size family farm-tenants even when hacienda owners 
held hundreds of hectares of land ownership in Central Luzon.  Thus when the ‘land-to-the-
tiller’ program was implemented the operational size of farms did not change dramatically.  
Thus, possible gains from breaking-up larger farms by land reform, arising from scale dis-
economies in rice production, were likely to be minimal.  To the extent there was to be an 
efficiency impact of the reform, it could have come from incentive effects due to the change in 
tenancy, from share tenancy to leasehold or to owner-cultivatorship.  However, many 
observers (e. g., Hayami and Kikuchi 2000, Mangahas, et al. 1976, etc.) have found little 
difference in per-hectare rice production across tenancy types, such as between share tenancy 
and leasehold. (see below for more on the incentive effects of alternative tenancy contract 
types in the Philippines)19  On the other hand, however, a recent study by Deininger, et al. 
(2000), as we saw above, do find positive impact among reform beneficiaries on asset (both 
physical and human capital) accumulation.  This suggests that land reform had some positive 
incentive effects on investment.   
 
Land Reform Implementation under Aquino and Ramos Administrations  
 
a. Official land re-distribution records:  
 
 It is difficult to obtain a consistent series of data on land reform implementation for 
use in comparing the relative achievements among Marcos, Aquino and Ramos 
administrations.  Table 2-1 through Table 2-4 collect land reform implementation records as 
reported in the existing literature, although the original source of all the data is the 
Department of Agrarian Reform, produced at different points in time; each table presents a 
data series provided to the author by DAR as of June 1999 and a comparable series previously 
published in the literature.  Two data series produced in different points in time by DAR 
differ with each other but still are generally close enough so that relative order of reform 
achievements among the three administrations is not affected.  Generally, the data series 
produced by DAR in different points in time could be incomparable for various reasons 
including: underreporting or downward revision of the reform accomplishments of the 
predecessor administration (which can inflate the achievements by the current administration) 
as well as change in reporting period (e. g., in reporting Aquino Presidency’s ‘achievements’ 
DAR used calendar year and period since July 1987), and change in data aggregation 
subcategories. (Riedinger 1995; Puzel 1992)  Indeed, Riedinger (1995: 194) found various 
DAR figures, reported in different points in time, of the cumulative land acquisition by the 
government as of end 1985 ranging between 64,000 ha and 315,000 ha!  A strong possibility 
of some double counting in reporting land reform achievements has also been pointed out. 
(Quisumbing 1999)  These observations should alert us about the reliability of the official 
record reported by DAR at different points in time in the past.   
 
 With such caveats in mind, let us examine available data in an attempt to assess the 
                                                        
19 Incidentally, such a finding of the neutral efficiency or ‘incentive’ effects of land reform is in line with a 
recent study on the post-war Japanese land reform, which converted share tenancy into owner cultivation 
but, like the Philippine case, did not significantly affect the operational size distribution.  (Kawagoe 1995)   
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relative land redistribution achievements among Marcos, Aquino and Ramos administrations.  
Land re-distribution under these three administrations consists of: Landed Estates, Operation 
Land Transfer (OLT) and the new redistribution programs under CARP.  Landed estate 
programs are the oldest (dating back to 1940) but its relative importance among land 
redistribution programs became quite small during the period of both Aquino and Ramos 
administrations; under this program, the Aquino administration acquired more lands 
(26,000ha) than did the Marcos martial law regime (between 11,000 ha and 17,000 ha, 
depending on data series), although if pre-martial law period is also included then more lands 
were acquired (between 43,000 ha and 48,000 ha) under the Landed Estate program during the 
twenty year Marcos period than during the six year Aquino presidency.  On the other hand, 
the Ramos administration acquired more lands (41,000 ha) than any of its predecessors under 
the Landed Estate program.  Redistribution of rice and corn lands under Operation Land 
Transfer (OLT) made a major advance under the Aquino administration (340,000 ha), with an 
increase of more than twenty fold compared to the amount transferred during the Marcos 
martial law regime (15,000 ha).  Land transfer under OLT during the Ramos administration 
(155,000 ha) was less than half the amount transferred under the Aquino administration but 
still ten times the amount transferred under the Marcos administration.  While the total 
amount of land transferred under OLT was much larger during the Aquino and Ramos 
administrations than during the Marcos martial law period, it is not likely that the kind of 
substantial income transfers from landlords to former tenants, as observed in some parts of 
Central and Southern Luzon during the 1970s, occurred after the 1980s.  As we saw above, 
such income transfers were mainly due to the timing of the land reform implementation 
(especially the fixing of the land value or of the lease rent) being immediately preceding the 
substantial yield increase due to the introduction of high yielding varieties, as well as 
accompanying irrigation investment and modern inputs, during the 1970s.  Such conditions 
no longer existed, however, during the Aquino and Ramos administrations (the Green 
Revolution potential appears to have been exhausted in the 1980s).  Thus, it would be 
reasonable to expect that, despite the impressive expansion of the program coverage of OLT 
after the fall of Marcos presidency, the income redistribution impact on each beneficiary was 
likely to be more modest than it was during the martial law period.  Unfortunately, however, 
the kind of systematic empirical studies, as we saw on the impact of OLT during Marcos 
presidency, do not yet seem to exist for the period under Aquino and Ramos presidency.   
 
 Apart from the acceleration of OLT implementation, a major advance under CARP 
was the newly enacted redistribution of privately owned land (above the retention limit of five 
hectares plus three hectares each for ‘qualified’ heirs) planted with crops other than rice or 
corn.  Such redistribution could be implemented through ‘voluntary offer to sell’ (VOS) and 
‘voluntary land transfer’ (VLT) initiated by landowners, or through ‘compulsory acquisition’ 
(CA).  During the Aquino administration, the total amount of non-rice/corn lands acquired 
was rather modest (88,000ha) although it still exceeded the total amount of land redistribution 
under the Marcos regime (47,000ha combining landed estate and OLT programs).  Among 
the three sub-components, the major emphasis was apparently on the voluntary offer to sell 
(VOS), representing 60% of non-rice/corn private land transfers, rather than on the 
compulsory acquisition (AC), representing only 15%.  (Also see below on major scandals 
 20 
involving the VOS program during Aquino presidency, however)  A remarkable advance in 
land redistribution of private lands was recorded under the Ramos administration; the total 
amount of land transferred/acquired, under CA, VOS and VLT combined, increased eight-fold 
between Aquino and Ramos periods.  The main mode of transfer appears to have sifted from 
VOS (now representing 36%) to VLT (47%) with the continuously low priority on the land 
transfer through CA (17%).  Apparently, unlike the pattern during the Aquino administration, 
the re-distribution of non-rice/corn lands became by far the most important component of 
redistributive land reform, surpassing land re-distribution under OLT, during the period under 
the Ramos administration.   
 
 The amount of lands acquired by the government, often called the land reform 
‘accomplishment,’ has often been discussed in relation to the reform ‘targets.’  Observers 
have pointed out the very frequent changes in the declared ‘targets’ that have been in constant 
revision from one administration to another, coupled with the changes and ambiguities in the 
reported ‘accomplishments,’ making difficult any serious assessment of land reform 
implementation relative to the potential pool of beneficiaries.  Despite such difficulties, what 
is clear from the DAR record is that there are enormous variations in the degree of 
‘accomplishment’ among program components and among successive administrations.  As 
shown in Table 2-5, which contains land reform ‘accomplishments’ relative to the ‘targets’ as 
of June 1999, the accomplishment rates were quite modest during Marcos presidency.  Only 
2.6% of the target area under OLT was actually covered during the period under President 
Marcos.20  The great majority of the OLT ‘target’ was covered during the Aquino 
administration, with roughly 60% of total areas to be covered under OLT being accomplished 
during this period; additional 27% of the potential OLT land was covered during the Ramo 
administration.  Altogether, according to the DAR record, almost 90% of the potential OLT 
lands (tenanted rice or corn lands) was already redistributed among tenants as of 1998.   
 
 On the other hand, the progress has been much slower in redistributing privately 
owned lands not covered under OLT but covered by compulsory acquisition (CA), voluntary 
offer to sell (VOS) and voluntary land transfer (VLT) under CARP in 1988.  Redistribution 
of these lands was almost negligible (i. e., 4%) vis-à-vis the program ‘targets’ during the 
Aquino administration.  While land redistribution in these program components gained much 
momentum during the Ramos administration, only 37% of the potential lands was 
redistributed under CA, VOS and VLT combined by the end of the President’s term in 1998.  
Furthermore, there are even larger variations in the reform ‘accomplishment rates’ among 
these three modes of private land transfers.  Only 9% of the total potential areas was covered 
under CA by the end of the Ramos administration, while the land transfer on ‘voluntary’ basis 
proceeded at a much faster pace, with 78% and 123% accomplishment rates under VOS and 
VLT, respectively.   
                                                        
20 Again, this accomplishment record fluctuates depending on which data series to use.  For example, 
according to the data series obtained by Putzel (1992: 139), EPs printed covered about 25.6% of the target 
areas as of 1985 (data source: DAR) and EPs distributed covered about 1.6% of the target areas as of 1986 
(data source: NEDA).  Thus our 1999 DAR data series is, in the order of magnitude, comparable to the 
data on EPs distributed as reported by NEDA in 1986.   
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 Finally, land transfers under the much older components of the agrarian reform code, 
i. e., landed estates and resettlement programs, went relatively more smoothly than OLT or 
other private land transfer schemes discussed above during the Aquino and Ramos 
administrations.  Under both of these program components, land transfer accomplishment 
rates were over 100% as of the end of the Ramos administration.  This is not surprising given 
the fact that these programs have much longer history and are presumably much less 
controversial politically than the other two components of the reform.   
 
b. Budget  
 
 Shortage in funding during the implementation stage of a reform program has always 
been a major constraint in all the reform programs, and CARP is not an exception.  The 
initial cost estimate of the CARP implementation was P221 billion as of 1986.  Economists 
have pointed out the heavy fiscal burden implied by the original budget; its annual budget 
would have represented about 30 percent of the total national government budget as of 1987.  
(e. g., Balisacan 1995)  About a quarter of its total, or P52.7 billion, was initially allocated by 
the Aquino administration.  Additional international assistance to the CARP implementation 
was minimal during the Aquino administration; as of 1993, US$31 million (P828 million) of 
foreign funding had been committed as ongoing funding.  (Riedinger 1995: 204)  During 
the Ramos administration, however, the amount of foreign assistance increased dramatically 
with US$22 billion added in support of Agrarian Reform Community development (see 
below).  (Garilao 1998)  As in the previous reform programs, budget constraint could 
always be a major bottleneck in CARP.  Furthermore, in relation to the CARP 
implementation, additional concerns have been raised as to (1) the potential diversion of 
resources from non-agrarian reform areas where improvement of support services are equally 
important and (2) the possibility of tying the provision of necessary support services to the 
pace of the land redistribution, which has been quite slow.  (Balisacan 1995)   
 
 During the period under Aquino presidency (July 1987-June 1992) a total of P17 
billion was utilized while P27.7 billion was utilized under Ramos presidency as of December 
1997, a 67% increase.  Apart from the increase in the aggregate amount spent, a major shift 
in the cost allocation occurred between the two successive administrations.  On average the 
Aquino administration spent P3,617 per beneficiary on land acquisition and distribution 
(including initial payments for landowners’ compensation) and P9,950 per beneficiary on 
support services.  In contrast, the Ramos administration spent P9,863 per beneficiary on land 
acquisition and distribution and P3,432 per beneficiary on support services. (Garilao 1998)  
According to the account of Secretary Garilao himself, there appear to be two major reasons 
behind such a policy change.  One was the administration’s relatively stronger emphasis 
(compared to Aquino’s) on the need for increasing landowner compensation in order to 
moderate landowner resistance and to facilitate land redistribution.  The guideline for land 
valuation under the Ramos administration raised the value of land acquired under CARP by as 
much as 50%.  (Garilao 1998: 12)  The second reason was their increasing dependence on 
foreign funding for support services while maintaining domestic funding of the direct land 
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redistribution costs, which in turn was seen as ‘political in nature’ and thus was to be ‘funded 
by the Filipino people.’  (Garilao 1998: 29)   
 
c. Implementation obstacles and other criticisms during the Aquino administration   
 
 The initial years of the CARP implementation under President Aquino suffered a 
series of scandals, intra-administration conflicts over issues related to land reform 
implementation and frequent leadership changes.  A series of scandals involving the 
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program occupied newspaper front pages in Manila in mid-
1989, to the extent of ‘a near-paralysis of the reform program for months.” (Reidinger 1995: 
178)  The most infamous among them was the ‘Garchitorena estate scandal’ involving a hilly 
property of about 1,900 hectares of land largely unsuited to cultivation in the province of 
Camarines Sur.  The land was initially purchased by Sharp International Marketing Inc. as a 
foreclosed estate from United Coconut Planters Bank for P3 million in April 1988 and then 
was offered as VOS land at P63 million to which DAR agreed in December 1988.  Land 
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), whose president was reportedly in political rivalry with the 
DAR secretary, objected the deal in April 1989 and the ‘scam’ became public.  Other 
scandals followed, with a series of congressional investigations, and the then DAR secretary 
Philip Juico resigned.  These scandals involved abuses of the VOS program, presumably 
under the collusion between landowners and DAR officials, with extreme overvaluation of 
lands of little productive value.  Many suspected that the ‘Garchitorena’ and other headline 
cases were merely the tip of the iceberg, which some critics saw as a result of the land 
valuation provisions under CARP.  Observers also pointed out that most of the VOS lands 
were remote, unproductive, with unclear ownership, foreclosed by banks, or/and in areas 
where insurgency activity was strong, with none or very few families cultivating the properties 
in some cases, and that many real estate speculators exploited the VOS program for their own 
profit. (Borras 1999, Riedinger 1995, Putzel 1992)   
 
 While President Aquino, following the resignation of Secretary Juico, named Miriam 
Defensor-Santiago, known as a ‘graft buster,’ as the new DAR secretary-designate with a 
mandate of ‘cleaning up the department,’ Congress refused to confirm her appointment.21  In 
addition to the land valuation scandals, another CARP related issue that wrecked the DAR 
leadership was the issue of land conversions.  For example, in an intra-governmental 
controversy in 1990, then-newly-appointed DAR secretary Florencio Abad attempted to block 
the conversion into nonagricultural uses of the Langkaan estate, a 232-hectare prime 
agricultural land owned by the government in Dasmarinas, Cavite Province, which had 
already been reclassified as industrial by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board 
(HLURB) in 1980.  The land conversion was strongly supported by the then Trade and 
Industry Secretary (Jose Concepcion, Jr.) and Justice Secretary (Franklin Drilon), the view 
upheld within the administration at the end.22  Many observers pointed out that agricultural 
                                                        
21 There are various accounts as to why Defensor-Santiago was not confirmed, including her ‘combative 
personality,’ and, perhaps more importantly, her announced intention to expedite compulsory acquisition of 
farms over 50 hectares.  (Reidinger 1995: 184)  
22 See Riedinger (1995) and Putzel (1992) for more detailed chronologies of the event.   
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lands were being converted ‘prematurely’ (i. e., social net benefit of such conversions was 
lower than the private net benefit of the conversion) into non-agricultural uses by landowners 
whose prime motive was to avoid application of land reform, although the quantitative 
magnitude of such conversions is not known. (e. g., Medalla and Centeno 1994; Reidinger 
1995; Takigawa 1997)  In addition, a major consequence of the Langkaan estate controversy, 
argues Riedinger (1995: 182), was the withdrawal of the nomination of Abad, widely regarded 
as pro-land reform (who as a member of the House of Representatives had proposed a land 
reform bill including a zero retention limit in 1987 and later voted against what became of 
CARL due to its ‘conservative’ nature in 1988), as DAR Secretary.  All in all there were five 
successive secretaries-designate of Agrarian Reform, two of whom were subsequently 
withdrawn due to the Congressional opposition to confirm, during the four years of CARP 
implementation under President Aquino.   
 
 Some critics have also argued that some provisions under CARP run directly counter 
to the spirit of (genuine) land redistribution and were taken advantage by some of large 
landowners in their successful attempts to avoid distributing their lands to small farmers.  (e. 
g., Borras 1999, Putzel 1992, Reidinger 1995)  Notable among these provisions were the 
corporate stock-distribution option and the ‘leaseback arrangements’ for multinational 
corporations operating on government-owned lands.  The former option allowed corporate 
landowners to satisfy their reform obligations by offering their farm workers to purchase 
capital stock of the corporation proportional to the share of agricultural land to the company’s 
total assets.  Most symbolic was the stock-distribution scheme adopted by Hacienda Luisita, 
the 6,200 hectare sugarcane plantation owned by President Aquino’s natal (Cojuangco) family.  
In addition to opposing the very idea of substituting such a scheme for land redistribution 
critics charge that under the scheme land values tended to be excessively undervalued and 
non-land assets overvalued thereby unduly reducing the value of the stock to be offered to the 
farm-worker beneficiaries; Putzel (1992: 336-337), for example, argue that, as of 1989, the 
additional incomes due to the stock sharing scheme per beneficiaries was only in the range 
between 30 Pesos and 133 Pesos per month.  Balisacan (1995) also casts doubts about the 
effects of stock sharing option on a similar ground.  Hayami, et al. (1990) also criticize the 
stock-sharing option as both impractical and discriminatory.    
 
 On the other hand, the ‘leaseback arrangements’ allowed multinational corporations 
operating plantations on government-owned lands to maintain leasehold over such lands, 
whose ownership was to be transferred to worker-cooperatives under CARP; Putzel (1992) 
argues, however: that in none of the three largest cases of such land transfer in Mindanao (two 
of them involving major transnational corporations, Del Monte and Dole) worker-
cooperatives were independently organized by workers (but rather under strong influence of 
the corporation management or of a trade union); that lease rent was set at a very low level; 
and that the poorer segment of the landless workers gained little from these arrangements 
since they benefited (though very modestly) only corporate farm workers who were already 
better paid than most surrounding workers.  Despite such anecdotal pieces of evidence, 
however, detailed studies on the effects of these schemes on the productive capacities and 
economic welfare of farm worker-beneficiaries have not yet been available.   
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d. DAR leadership under Ramos administration and Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC): 
 
 One notable contrast in the CARP implementation process between the Aquino and 
Ramos administrations is the fact that the DAR leadership during Ramos presidency was very 
stable.  One observer in a peasant organization at the time has noted that while the 
background of President Ramos as a top military general under Marcos presidency, as well as 
his campaign platform of raising the retention limit from 5 to 50 hectares, “elicited grim 
predictions about the fate of the already much weakened CARP,” such predictions were 
“proven incorrect.”  (Borras 1999: 48)  President Ramos appointed as DAR secretary 
Ernesto Garilao, the head of the country’s “biggest mainstream NGOs” funded by large 
corporations and foreign donors and “loosely identified with the conservative wing of the 
social democrats.” (Borras 1999: 48)  Garilao was not only confirmed by the Congress but 
served as DAR secretary for the entire six year term under Ramos presidency.  Furthermore, 
upon his appointment as secretary, Garilao convinced President Ramos to drop his campaign 
promise of a 50 hectare retention limit, recruited several NGO activists into DAR leadership 
positions, and directed a shift in CARP implementation toward greater consultation and 
cooperation with the members of the NGO community “to the surprise of many of [those 
members].” (Borras 1999)  In addition, Garilao, one of the only two Ramos cabinet members 
serving the full six year term, has been credited for his maintenance of stable ‘two-way’ 
relationships with the office of the President.  As explained by Secretary Galilao himself, he 
placed a major emphasis on increasing the landowner compensation by modifying the land 
valuation scheme for the purpose of facilitating redistributive components of CARP but he 
also recognized the crucial importance of the participation by farmers’ organizations for 
successful implementation of the land reform program.  (Garilao 1998)   
 
 As a result, argues Borras (1999), the new leadership provided under Garilao initiated 
a major shift in the CARP implementation processes within DAR toward the combined forces 
between DAR bureaucracy and social mobilization ‘from below’ (we will come back to this in 
a later section) which appears to have pushed forward significantly the redistributive land 
reform program under Ramos presidency compared to the much more limited accomplishment 
under Aquino presidency, as we saw earlier.   
 
 Another policy initiative in CARP implementation under Secretary Garilao was the 
new focus on “Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC).”  The ARC approach to beneficiary 
development was launched in 1993 and was intended to concentrate DAR resources for 
support services in selected areas, rather than to spread the resources thinly in a wide range of 
areas.  Behind this idea was the recognition that the reform sector needed to be made 
productive and economically viable.23 (Borras 1999)  The main components of ARC 
                                                        
23 Additional consequences of adopting ARC strategy, according to Borras (1999: 67), were: enhanced 
interests within the foreign donor community for funding, countering the political attacks often mounted by 
reform opponents on the ground that land reform disrupts production, and ARC projects provided capacity-
building opportunities for rural development related skills for state bureaucracy as well as for the civil 
society.   
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development programs include: basic social services (such as water and power supply, health, 
and education), investment and marketing assistance, and Agrarian Reform Beneficiary 
Information and monitoring system.  ARC development was implemented with active 
involvement of NGOs/POs and agribusiness communities, although many NGOs and peasant 
organizations were initially quite critical of the idea and thus was inactive.24  As of end 1998, 
921 ARCs covering over 350,000 farmer-beneficiaries had been launched. (Garilao 1998)   
 
 Discussions in the literature on the success or failure of CARP have often focused 
mostly on ‘how much land was redistributed’ but relatively little attention has been paid to the 
economic consequences such as the economic welfare and the competitiveness of reform 
beneficiaries.  In contrast with PD27, there have not yet been thorough studies on the 
economic impact of CARP based on micro level data.  There has been, however, a series of 
household-level surveys conducted by the Institute of Agrarian Studies at the University of the 
Philippines at Los Baños (IASt-UPLB).  The comparison of the 1989 baseline and the 1995 
survey indicated that the incomes of agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) had increased by 
21 % during the six year period and that three out of every four ARBs perceived their lives to 
have improved after CARP implementation. (Garilao 1988)  Without a detailed analysis, 
however, it is not clear how much of the 21% income increase could be attributed to the net 
impact of the CARP implementation.25   
 
Conclusions on Land Reform Implementation Record and Impact  
 
 According to official records by DAR (and its predecessor), the amount of land 
redistributed by the government remained quite modest before CARP was enacted.  Despite 
the rhetoric accompanying the martial law rule, the actual amount redistributed under Marcos 
presidency was much smaller than under his successors.  Redistribution of rice and corn 
lands gained much momentum, however, during the Aquino administration.  While CARP 
was enacted during Aquino presidency, redistribution of non-rice/corn lands (especially 
through compulsory acquisition rather than through voluntary offers by landowners) did not 
get under way until Ramos presidency.  While the land reform implementation under the 
Aquino administration focused on rice and corn lands and other private lands ‘voluntarily 
offered by landowners,’ the reform implementation during the Ramos administration made 
some headway into appropriating non-rice/corn lands through the compulsory acquisition 
(CA) program.  As of the end of the Ramos administration about 90% of the ‘targeted’ rice 
and corn lands and 36% of the ‘targeted’ non-rice/corn private lands had reportedly been 
redistributed, at least on paper.  We will turn to political explanations of the evolution of 
reform implementation in the second subsection of the next section.   
 
                                                        
24 Main points raised by the critics was the rather exclusionary character of the ARC idea by focussing 
only on a fraction of potential beneficiaries, but many NGOs increasingly became ‘drawn into’ ARC 
programs over time.  (Borras 1999: 67)    
25 Similarly Geron (1994), for example, addresses the question of the CARP impact on coconut and sugar 
sectors; but her survey data set (a cross section on beneficiaries only) does not allow any identification of 
CARP impact.   
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 While the implementation of land reform under PD27 was limited to specific 
geographical areas and thus the total mount of land redistributed ended up very modest, many 
village-level studies found significant impact of the reform program in the areas where the 
program was targeted.  While the reform program led to significant income transfer effects 
from landowners to former tenants and induced higher asset accumulation among 
beneficiaries, the reform design also provided incentives for landowners to evict tenants, to 
shift crops away from rice or corn and to become reluctant to rent out lands.  As a result, 
many have argued, the net impact of the program on landless laborers, who form the bottom 
stratum of village hierarchies, was negative.  PD27, in accordance with President Marcos’ 
intention, also placed a final blow to the political power of the owners of rice hacienda in 
Central Luzon.  The micro-level impact of CARP, on the other hand, has not been as well 
studied as that of PD27.  While it is unlikely that the implementation of OLT (rice and corn 
lands) since the 1980s had the kind of impact similar to the PD27 implementation in the 
1970s, not much has yet been known.  Equally understudied at the moment is the impact of 
CARP on non-rice/corn lands, including that of the non-distributive options (e. g., corporate 
stock sharing option), on the productive efficiency and on the economic welfare of the reform 
beneficiaries.   
 
2. Political Dynamics Behind Philippine Land Reform  
 
 In the previous section we have reviewed the evolution of the Philippine land reform 
codes and the patterns of reform implementation as well as of some of their impact.  In this 
section, we will examine the political dynamics behind such land reform outcomes (land 
reform legislation and its implementation).  Before discussing the political forces behind 
land reform in the past four decades in the Philippines, however, we will start with a brief 
overview of historical legacies that have significant implications in today’s political dynamics 
in the first subsection.  In the second subsection, we will briefly discuss a basic framework 
for analyzing political dynamics found in the economics literature, i. e., the neo-classical 
political economy.  In third and fourth subsections, we will discuss political forces behind 
land reform legislation and those behind reform implementation, respectively, during the past 
four decades in the Philippines.  In reviewing the processes of land reform legislation and 
implementation, one question naturally arises; why land reform in the Philippines has been 
taking so long?  This question will be explored in the fifth subsection.   
 
2-1. Historical Legacy  
 
 Both the origin of the various episodes of rural unrest that have prompted land reform 
initiatives by the government (see below), on the one hand, and the inability of the 
government to legislate and implement substantial land re-distribution in a swift manner (as 
we saw above), on the other, have their roots in the historical legacies spanning over the past 
500 years.  While it is impossible to do enough justice to the entire history over the period 
here, for our present purposes, we will briefly discuss some of the more prominent historical 
legacies that exert major influence in today’s Philippine political economy.   
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Pre-Hispanic Period  
 
 On the eve of the Spanish arrival in the mid-sixteenth century, people inhibiting what 
today constitutes the Philippine archipelago were mostly of Malay ethnic stock, engaging in 
hunting, fishing and shifting cultivation.  Usually the largest political unit was a kinship 
group of fewer than one hundred households, called barangay, headed by a chieftain, or datu. 
(Wurfel 1988)  There appear to have existed some degree of stratification within barangay, 
such as freemen, serfs and slaves (although the exact composition of social stratification is 
still being debated), and the main source of wealth and power was the command over labor 
and not over land.  (Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, Fegan 1989a, Putzel 1992, Wurfel 1988)  
Population was generally sparse, located mainly on the coasts and rivers, and there is no report 
of large farms or production of crops for long-distance trade.  (Fegan 1989a)   
 
Hispanic Legacy  
 
 The Spanish conquest starting in 1571 superimposed a colonial state and church, 
producing a profound impact which still characterizes many aspects of the Philippine political 
economy today.  For example, Putzel (1992: 43) argues that “[t]hree hundred and fifty years 
of Spanish rule followed by half a century of US colonial administration largely set the 
parameters within which families like Aquinos, Cojuancos and Laurels compete for power in 
today’s Republic, while peasants struggle to survive on the land.”  Many of the Spanish 
legacies were perhaps unintended (Wurfel 1988), but they have nevertheless been profound 
and long-lasting.   
 
 Initially the main interest of the Spanish in the Philippines was twofold: a base for 
galleon trade (between Mexico and China) and evangelism.  (Putzel 1988, Fegan 1989a, 
Riedinger 1995)  This relatively limited interest in maintaining the colony resulted in: (1) 
reliance on the traditional datus (chieftain) for colonial governance and (2) the monopoly of 
land ownership by the Catholic church with powerful institutions to protect its own economic 
interests.  The reliance on datus (or renamed as caciques) for colonial governance was seen 
as a way of minimizing the cost of colonial administration.  (Riedinger 1995)  The newly 
endowed role of a datu (cacique), as a colonial headman (i. e., as a tax collector, an organizer 
of compulsory labor services and a judge), in turn enhanced the power of a datu/cacique over 
his fellow members in a barangay, and gave him opportunities to collect landholdings from 
those who defaulted on loans advanced by the datu/cacique for tax payment.  (Hayami and 
Kikuchi 1982)  Caciques often abused their power, prompting the history of continual 
peasant resistance and periodic peasant rebellion.  (Riedinger 1995)  Many families or 
communities are reported to have fled inland from tribute and forced labor. (Fegan 1989a)   
 
 Among the most profound of the Spanish legacy is the introduction of the notion of 
private property rights on land.  With the newly introduced notion of land title and the 
principle that ‘all lands except those officially proved to be private or communal possessions 
belonged to the Spanish crown,’ the crown’s land ownership was established over vast areas 
of uncultivated land.  (Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, Puzel 1992)  While Spanish officials 
 28 
limited their attention to Manila galleon trade the Catholic friars established themselves on 
agricultural lands from early on, and by the end of the colonial period the Church owned much 
of the best land in the Philippines. (Putzel 1992)  The church not only owned the largest 
chunk of land but also developed powerful techniques for protecting its interests including 
centralized bureaucracy.  (Wurfel 1988)  Later in the 19th and into 20th century, much of the 
lands owned by the Church were leased, sold or re-distributed via state to the Filipino landed 
elite, which is the ancestor of the politically and economically powerful families today.   
 
 Another major event having a profound impact during the Spanish regime was the 
opening of the colony to exports of tropical agricultural products toward late 18th century after 
the British occupation of Manila (during the Seven Years War).  This move was induced by 
the decline of galleon trade, the opening of new shipping routes with improved shipping, and 
the example of British and Dutch India companies.  (Fegan 1989a)  Foreign demand for 
tropical agricultural products created induced demand for lands in the Philippines.  (Hayami 
and Kikuchi 1982)  On one hand, newly created demand for lands in turn induced migration 
of peasants from old seacoast and river towns into the interiors. (Fegan 1989a)  On the other 
hand, the demand for agricultural products induced Chinese mestizos to expand their land 
holding.  Before the opening of world trade, Chinese merchants (originating from Fukien and 
Kwantung and attracted to the Mexican silver found in Manila) had earlier started to expand 
their internal trading network and had intermarried with the local elite to form a group of 
Chinese mestizos.  (Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, Putzel 1992)  Toward late 18th century, 
these Chinese mestizo traders expanded their land holding by purchase or by foreclosure on 
debt (called pacto de retroventa) from traditional elite (casique) and also inter-marring further 
with them to form a group of rural elite (principalia).  This process eventually created 
patterns of small and medium scale landownership where landlords typically reside in 
provincial towns (poblacion), with patron-client relations prevailing between landowners and 
tenants, on the coastal areas of Luzon.  (Fegan 1989a, Hayami and Kikuchi 1982)  The 
expansion of trade opportunity also induced the monastic orders, who had established 
ownership of land over huge areas of inner islands, to lease their idle or pasture lands to 
agricultural entrepreneurs/middlemen (inquilino/ inquilinato), who in turn sub-rented the 
lands to share tenants, forming vast tracts of hacienda in the inner areas of Luzon.  In 
addition, private haciendas were established through royal grants and purchases of royal lands.  
Many of the tenants who cleared and cultivated the inner haciendas on Luzon were migrants 
from Ilocos or Southern Tagalog. (Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, Putzel 1992)  On the island of 
Negros, where large sugar plantations developed, sugar monopoly was initially introduced in 
the mid-19th century by the Spanish authorities but the commercial house established in 1857 
by a British vice-consul in the Philippines appears often credited with catalyzing the 
development of sugar industry in Negros.  Introduction of new canes from Sumatra and of 
advanced milling equipment and the high sugar prices (especially between 1850-1860) led to 
sugarcane monoculture on the island, and the frontier characteristics of the island—relative 
land abundance and labor shortage— led to the system of centrally and hierarchically 
managed haciendas employing hired labor, which is distinct from the patterns observed on the 
Luzon island.  (Hayami, et al. 1990)   
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 Thus by the end of the 19th century, most of the basis of the present day elite in the 
Philippines had been established, coming from two original sources: educated Chinese and 
Spanish mestizos, on the one hand, and cacique, traditional elite who were descendants of 
datu-turned-colonial administrators.  (Putzel 1992)  For example, the 19th century witnessed 
the founding of many of the prominent family enterprises such as Ayala (1834), Soriano (San 
Miguel) (1890), Cojuanco (1870) as well as sugar haciendas in Negros Occidental.  (Putzel 
1992)    
 
 In addition, other historical legacies that are direct consequences of, or that started 
during the period of, Spanish colonial policies have been identified in the literature.  They 
include: (1) loss of cultural self-confidence and of consciousness of Malay cultural roots 
(Wurfel 1988); (2) practice of corruption, such as selling of offices (Wurfel 1988); (3) loss of 
traditional Asian trade networks (Fegan 1989); (4) exacerbation of the incentive for land 
accumulation induced by trade liberalization by granting tobacco (and other?) monopoly 
(Fegan 1989a, Putzel 1992); and (5) preservation of regional fragmentation, and thus of the 
barrier to the development of centralized statehood, as a result of the Spanish clerics’ decision 
to translate Christian doctrines into local vernaculars. (Riedinger 1995)   
 
American Legacy  
 
 “As had their Spanish predecessors, U.S. colonial administrators (1898-1946) relied 
upon the Filipino elite and their clientelist networks for social control.”  (Riedinger 1995)  
Following the revolutionary movement against Spain, the U.S. pacified the revolutionary 
forces by winning over the elite (ilustrado), who had emerged toward the end of the 19th 
century as we saw above. (Wurfel 1988)  Consequently, the U.S. policies essentially re-
enforced the position of the elite.  Institutionally, the U.S. introduced elected legislature 
(1907), political parties, strong presidency and independent judiciary.  Shortly after the initial 
introduction of those institutions, during the period of 1913-1921 witnessed a rapid 
‘Filipinization’ of cabinet, civil service and school teachers.  The Filipinized posts in 
bureaucracy and legislature were naturally filled by the landowning elite. (Wurfel 1988, Putzel 
1992)  Furthermore, the control of the state corporations given to House of Representatives 
further provided opportunities to accumulate wealth by the landed elite, by, for example, 
allowing these state corporations (such as Philippine National Bank) preferential treatments 
for their family owned businesses.  (Putzel 1992)   
 
 In addition, land policies under the American colonial administration also helped 
further consolidate the economic power of the Philippine elite.  As an early land reform 
attempt, the U.S. administration purchased about 200,000 hectares of friar estates, 
representing about 90% of total friar estates, for $7 million in 1905, intending to re-distribute 
the estate to 60,000 share tenants.  Their subsequent decision to sell these lands at cost of 
purchase, however, ensured the result that much/most of these lands were purchased by the 
landed oligarchy and inquilinos, rather than by landless tenants.  (Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, 
Putzel 1992)  Furthermore, the land titling introduced in 1902 created great windows of 
opportunity for land-grabbing by the same group of elite.  (Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, Putzel 
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1992)  As a consequence, the history of the combined colonial rule by the Spanish and the 
Americans led to “[t]he process of land acquisition by the elite, through royal land grants, 
land-grabbing and privileged access to legal formalities” creating “a system of property rights 
which tends to appear arbitrary to peasants in the barrios.”  (Putzel 1992: 60)   
 
 Finally, the access to the U. S. market under the American colonial rule provided 
additional economic opportunities for the landowning Filipino elite.  For example, the U.S. 
market quota and the subsequent free trade with the U. S. (1913-1935) created handsome 
profit opportunities for export agriculture.  This induced an increase in sugarcane haciendas 
in Luzon as well as the further expansion of sugar haciendas coupled with infrastructure 
investment in Negros, and what is today the Del Monte Philippines (Philippine Packing 
Corporation) laid the foundations of its huge pineapple plantation in 1926 in Bukidnon on the 
island of Mindanao, which represented the last frontier for colonization at the turn of the 
century.  (Putzel 1992, Hayami, et al. 1990, Tsurumi 1982)   
 
Historical Legacy: conclusions 
 
 In sum, many aspects of the Philippine socio-economic structure and politics have 
their roots in the Spanish and American colonial periods.  This helps us understand how 
long-standing and deeply rooted the today’s political dynamics are.  Such understanding 
would warn us against easy optimism for the prospects for rapid and sweeping land reform 
(which never occurred) and against an idea of transplanting other countries’ policy 
prescriptions without enough consideration of historical contexts within the respective 
societies.  The major legacies of the Philippine colonial history include: the patterns of 
highly concentrated land ownership throughout the archipelago; the patterns of paternalistic 
(patron-client based) tenancy in some parts of the Philippines (such as in the coastal Luzon), 
of haciendas which dominate other parts (such as the inner Central Luzon), and of plantations 
on the island of Negros and others; the dominance of landowning families in both local and 
national politics; the prominence, in particular, of a small number of land-owning families 
(landed oligarchy) in both economic and political spheres; (arguably) a relatively fragmented 
society with weak state apparatus (which is not capable, for example, of administrating 
substantial land re-distribution policy) and with weak collective action capacities among the 
peasantry; and the dubious legitimacy of the system of private property rights on land in the 
views among the rural poor.   
 
2-2. A Theoretical Framework for Political Dynamics of Land Reform   
 
 The so called ‘new/neoclassical political economy’ approach could be a starting point 
providing a broad framework to understand political outcomes (such as various land reform 
codes) as ‘equilibria’ between the ‘demand’ for and ‘supply’ of such policy outcomes.26  It 
sees the ‘equilibrium’ amount of land redistribution as an intersection between the ‘marginal’ 
cost schedule (which tends to increase as more land is redistributed as a result of land reform) 
                                                        
26 See Hayami, et al. (1990) and Balisacan (1990) for more detailed discussions of this framework in the 
Philippine land reform context.   
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and the ‘marginal revenue/benefit’ schedule (which tends to decrease as more land is 
redistributed as a result of land reform), as perceived by policy makers who are mainly 
motivated to maximize the likelihood of staying in power.  In order to stay in power, so the 
argument goes, policy makers need to balance the ‘cost’ of making more radical land 
redistribution (coming mainly from landlords and their allies’ opposition and from any other 
economic cost, if any, depleting the policy makers’ political capital) and the benefit (coming 
from peasants’ political support, from calming rural unrest and from any other economic 
benefits such as productivity gains ultimately contributing to their political capital), as shown 
in Figure 1. [add a figure]  This framework helps us in making a distinction between the 
political forces pushing for and against more radical land redistribution (this is roughly similar 
to Putzel (1992)’s political analysis in terms of ‘pro- versus anti- land reform forces’) and in 
highlighting the general nature of such forces (e. g, the increasing marginal ‘cost’ and the 
decreasing marginal ‘benefit’ as more land is redistributed).  This framework has been used, 
for example, to explain the very different locations of the political ‘equilibria’ among other 
East Asian land reform episodes, such as the one in Japan, and the Philippine case. (Hayami, 
et al. 1990, Balisacan 1990)   
 
 In most of the developing countries, it has been observed, the ‘effective demand for 
(marginal benefit of)’ land reform for policy makers tends to be relatively small since the 
potentials for collective action among the would-be beneficiaries, peasants, tend to be weak 
due to their large number and their geographical dispersion (so it is difficult to get together 
and to act together), their relative lack of education, their lack of cooperatism or unionism, 
and their being prone to free-rider problem.  On the other hand, the ‘effective supply’ or 
‘marginal cost’ of reform tends to be relatively large since there are relatively greater 
collective action potentials among landowners due to their relatively small number (so it is 
easier to get together and act together), their education, and their good access to political 
power in general and to legislators, both local and national levels, in particular.  Such 
demand and supply schedules in the ‘political market’ constantly shifts overtime, however, 
and we need to understand the dynamics of those factors shifting the demand and supply 
schedules.  In the following subsections, we will discuss the historical events that were likely 
to be related to such shifts in the ‘political market.’   
 
2-3. Politics of Land reform Legislation in the Philippines  
 
 In understanding the changing political dynamics of land reform in the Philippines, it 
seems useful to distinguish the legislative process of land reform policy making, on the one 
hand, and the implementation stage of such policy, on the other.  (Riedinger 1995, Borras 
1999).  The political dynamics behind legislative processes of setting the terms of land 
redistribution, allocating budget envelope for its implementation and appointing DAR 
secretary (which requires Congressional approval) is mainly played out in the national 
political arena (mainly by the executive branch in the case of PD 27 and EO 229 and in 
Congress in most other post-war land reform legislation including CARL).  Furthermore, any 
legal code is a reflection of the political equilibrium in such national political arena at a 
particular point in time when the law is enacted.  On the other hand, the actual 
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implementation (of identifying beneficiaries and lands for re-distribution, valuing the lands 
and transferring them to the beneficiaries) is necessarily a much more decentralized process; it 
reflects more localized political processes and it is also a continuing process over an extended 
period of time (such as 10 years or more, as in CARP).  For example, despite the modest 
(though geographically limited) success of PD 27 under the Marcos martial law regime, its 
implementation seems to have toned down substantially after the initial few years; part of the 
reason was that President Marcos increasingly came to appreciate his need for local leaders as 
intermediaries in the patrimonial system through which he controlled local-level political 
processes including the implementation of land reform. (Wurfel 1988, Fegan 1989)  
Similarly, CARL was a political compromise reflecting a political equilibrium in the specific 
point in time; while the law governing land reform has remained essentially the same since 
1988, the implementation record and the mode of operation have changed significantly in the 
subsequent years, especially between the Aquino and Ramos administrations.  Furthermore, 
one observer noted a difference in the speed of decline in the political power of the landed 
elite between central and local politics, which could induce divergence between the legislation 
and the implementation stages of land reform; while the political influence among landed elite 
was generally on the decline in the national political arena, changes in local elite were much 
slower to come (Wurfel 1983).   
 
 We will discuss the political dynamics in these processes in turn.  What are the 
main factors affecting the particular political equilibria resulting in the land reform codes as 
described above?; in this subsection, we will review various political explanations behind the 
major episodes of land reform legislation in the past three decades.  We will explore what 
common factors may have been operating throughout these episodes in the concluding sub-
section. (subsection 2-5)  
 
1954/55 Land Reform Legislation 
 
 Some observers argue that the 1954 Land Tenancy Act and the 1955 Land Reform 
Act under the Magsaysay administration were ‘the first serious, if modest, effort to carry out 
land reform in the Philippines.” (Wurfel 1988)  During the mid-1940s the “Huk rebellion,” a 
peasant rebellion movement spread across Central Luzon, emerged; it was, in a large part, a 
reaction on the part of peasants to the rapid deterioration of the traditional patron-client 
relationship and it was mainly a call for the restoration of such relationship, which ultimately 
failed, rather than a call for outright land redistribution.  (Kirkvliet 1977)  In response to the 
rising rural unrest, coupled with the perceived threat of spreading communism prompted by 
the newly established Communist China, the U. S. government, covertly and overtly, 
supported the presidential bid by Ramon Magsaysay, then the defense secretary in the Quirino 
cabinet as an opposition-party candidate.  The U.S. government attempted to replace the 
‘corrupt’ regime of President Elpidio Quirino partly because he favored resettlement over land 
redistribution among land reform options.  Apart from the U.S. concern, Magsaysay himself, 
who had led the battle against the Huk, well recognized the social unrest behind the 
movement.  (Hayami, et al. 1990)  While Magsaysay won an overwhelming victory by 
capturing the rural support with the help of his land reform agenda (which was vaguely 
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defined27), the US appears to have backed away from an earlier support of ‘liberal’ land re-
distribution in the wake of the decline of the Huk rebellion toward the mid-1950s.28 (See 
Putzel 1992 for a detailed accounts of the US involvement in Magsaysay’s election)  
President Magsaysay also faced a fierce opposition from landowners against his reform 
attempts who employed strong nationalistic rhetoric.  As a result, while the initial bill 
proposed by the President included the idea of a retention limit of 144 hectares, of conversion 
of share tenancy into leasehold, of including sugar land tenants under the reform program, and 
of progressive land tax, they were all excluded, through the Congressional process, from the 
actual legislation enacted under the Magsaysay administration.   
 
 There is a general consensus in the literature regarding the main political forces 
behind the Magsaysay reform; the most important factor prompting the legislation was the 
need to pacify the Huk rebellion that swept the main ‘rice bowl’ of the Central Luzon.  Many 
observers also tend to agree that there was a significant degree of involvement by the United 
States government both in the election of President Magsaysay and in placing land reform 
onto the political agenda in the process.29  Such forces pushing toward land redistribution 
were largely blocked, however, by the powerful political interests of the landed oligarchy, as 
we can see from the ‘watering down’ process in the Congress. (See Riedinger 1995 for the 
congressional debate, and Putzel 1992 for a broader discussion of the political climate)  
Finally, the political motives toward significant reform, both domestically and from the US, 
weakened significantly as a result of the decline of the Huk rebellion in the early to mid-1950s.   
 
1963 Land Reform Code 
 
 While President Magsaysay has been credited by some political observers for his 
‘political will’ toward land reform (e.g., Putzel 1992, Wurfel 1988), one of the major turning 
points in the recent history of land reform legislation appears to be the 1963 Agricultural Land 
Reform Code.  There does not seem to exist, however, a clear consensus among observers on 
the political explanation behind such a significant piece of legislation in general, and, in 
particular, as to what prompted President Macapagal to initiate the land reform legislation.30  
Apparently land reform was not among his political agenda of the then opposition candidate 
Macapagal during the Presidential election (his main campaign issue was corruption instead), 
nor was he vocal about land reform in the initial years of his presidency. (e. g., Putzel 1992, 
                                                        
27 One observer remarked that “the ‘promise of reform’ was more important than the reform itself.”  (Karl 
Jackson, as quoted in Putzel 1992)  
28 A major episode during this period was a U.S. government mission in 1952 headed by Robert Hardie, a 
land reform advisor who had worked on the Japanese land reform program during 1946-49.  The Hardie 
report, released in December 1952, called for establishment of family-sized, owner-operated farms by 
introducing a re-distributive land reform with a four hectare retention limit as well as tenancy reform, a 
program that included all the essential components of the post-war land reform in Japan.  The report 
induced strong opposition among Filipino elites, including the then President Quirino, and the U.S. 
government backed away from its recommendation.  (See, for example, Putzel 1992: 85-99, Takigawa 15-
17) 
29 Putzel (1992), Takigawa (1976), Wurfel (1988), and Hayami, et al. (1990), to some extents.   
30 A detailed account of the 1963 Code legislation can be found in Takigawa (1976).   
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Takigawa 1976)  Nevertheless, all of sudden,31 it seems, he initiated a major improvement 
in land reform legislation, which addressed some of the deficiencies of the 1954/55 codes.   
 
 Some observers appear to credit President Macapagal’s apparent ‘passion’ toward 
enacting further land reform legislation as a result of the triumph of influential economic 
advisors who saw land reform as a necessary component of a strategy for rapid economic 
development  (Balisacan 1990, Wurfel 1983); this could be inferred from the fact that the 
tenancy reform of the automatic conversion from share tenancy to fixed-rent lease contract 
was given a major role in the program, which in turn appears to be based on the ‘Marshallian’ 
inefficiency view of the share tenancy, a dominant view among economists at that time. (see 
below)  President’s ‘passion’ toward land reform could also have come from the fact that he 
was a son of a poor tenant farmer (Takigawa 1976).  Many tend to conclude, however, that 
the main political motive behind his initiative was an attempt to enlist tenant farmers’ support 
for his upcoming re-election bid two years after32 (e. g., Putzel 1992, Wurfel 1983).  Yet 
another observer, Takigawa (1976), for example, argues that the main motivation behind his 
initiative was his perceived threat, despite the demise of Huk rebellion ten years earlier33, of 
spreading communism in Southeast Asia, symbolized by the intensifying war in Vietnam; 
such a perception likely was developed through his earlier career as a diplomat.  Regarding 
the broader social forces for land reform during this time, which must have supported 
President Macapagal’s initiative, Takigawa (1976) attributes the then rising force of new 
middle class composed of urban industrialists and other professionals (e. g., school teachers, 
bureaucrats, etc.) as the broader social force behind his initiative.34   
 
Marcos Land Reform 
 
 While the 1971 Code had little impact on the land reform implementation due to PD 
27 issued a year later that superseded the 1971 Code, the political processes leading to the 
1971 Code deserve a major attention.  Toward the late 1960s, the potential for rural unrest 
appeared to have increased once again.  This was partially in response to the further 
breakdown of the patron-client system that started in Central Luzon much earlier, which 
prompted Huk rebellion in the 1940s (recall that the initial aim the Huk of restoring the old 
patron-client system was never achieved when the Huk rebellion was pacified in the mid 
                                                        
31 Another piece of evidence attesting to this apparent ‘suddenness’ of his interest in land reform is the fact 
that Macapagal, a congressman in the 1950s, had earlier opposed the Hardie report, had not participated in 
the debate, nor had even voted on the bill that later became the 1955 Land Reform Code. (Wurfel 1983: 4, 
Putzel 1992: 114)  
32 Macapagal lost to Ferdinand Marcos in the presidential election, and thus his attempt was ultimately 
unsuccessful; however, he did win in tenant-dominated Central Luzon (Wurfel 1983: fn. 17).   
33 The 1963 Land Reform Law appears to be an anomaly within the history of Philippine land reform 
legislation in that it did not emerge as a direct response to domestic rural unrest.   
34 Many other observers (e. g., Hutchcroft 1998, Putzel 1992, etc.) emphasize, and Takigawa (1976) also 
admits, that the major portion of the Philippine industrialists and other emerging elite in non-agricultural 
sectors (e. g., banking) were from landed oligarchy who had started to diversify their portfolio.  Thus, it is 
not clear to what extent these really represented ‘new’ middle class who pursued policies in conflict with 
the landed oligarchy.   
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1950s), but was spreading over the country. (Wurfel 1988, Kirkvliet 1977)  Such growing 
potentials for peasant unrest developed despite, and possibly because of, the enactment of the 
1963 reform code and its limited implementation in Central Luzon, where the reform program 
was targeted.  Some observers attribute the rise in peasant unrest to the increased tension 
between the landowner and the tenants, exacerbated by the land reform implementation: 
through disputes over the rent (in the case of conversion of share tenancy into leasehold), 
tenant eviction and other tactics employed by landowners in resisting land reform (such as 
filing a law suite against tenants in an attempt to delay the reform, to intimidate or even to 
imprison the tenant, using private armies in similar attempts, etc.), and growing frustration 
among tenants given the gap between their elevated expectation and the ineffective 
implementation in the land reform processes.  In some parts of the Philippines, there was a 
revival of the Huk rebellion which had been suppressed 10 years earlier.  (Takigawa 1976)  
Furthermore, against such a background, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was 
re-established in 1968, and its military arm, New Peoples’ Army (NPA), launched in 1969.  
NPA engaged in political as well as military campaigns by offering training for peasants, 
setting up makeshift irrigation and launching own land reform program, thereby spreading its 
influence in Central Luzon.35 (Putzel 1990:122)  Perhaps fuelled by the successful re-
election campaign of President Marcos in 1969 charged with massive fraud, inducement and 
intimidation36, massive popular mobilization developed in 1970.   
 
 The raucous demonstrations accompanying President Marcos’s second inauguration 
in 1970 and subsequent series of demonstrations, mobilizing among peasant groups, labor 
unions and students, pressured the Congress to initiate, for the first time in the Philippine 
history, land reform legislation (all the previous reform legislation was initiated by presidents).  
After a prolonged and intermittent Congressional debate, against the background of a 
continuous ‘live-in picket’ lasting for more than two months in front of the national legislature, 
led to enactment of the 1971 Code (RA6389 and RA6390), including the lowered retention 
limit, which was opposed by President Marcos, and the creation of the Department of 
Agrarian Reform.37  In a broader social context, the political forces behind the legislation 
included political leaders, senior bureaucrats and intellectuals who were alarmed by the rising 
socio-political crisis, some elements of Catholic church, peasant organizations (such as the 
Federation of Free Farmers), labor unions and student movements.  (Takigawa 1976)  
 
 With his second (and the last allowed under the Constitution) term expiring, and in 
an attempt to exploit the growing desire for change among both the popular movements and 
                                                        
35 Putzel (1990: 122) and others note, however, that the CPP-NPA influence then was nowhere near the 
kind of threat posed against the government as claimed by President Marcos when justifying the imposition 
of martial law.   
36 One veteran observer of the Philippine politics’ account of the 1969 election states as follows: “The 
election of 1969 was a devastating blow to the electoral process.  The campaign presented informed 
citizens with a more lackluster choice than at any time since independence. . . . both [candidates] were 
flawed by serious charges of corruption, and neither offered either charisma or clear-cut policy alternatives.  
Under the circumstances, it was perhaps inevitable that the incumbent’s money and threats of violence 
would bring success.”  (Wurfel 1988:17) 
37 See Wurfel (1983) and Takigawa (1976) for concise accounts of the series of events during this time.   
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the elite (especially among frustrated bureaucrats), President Marcos declared imposition of 
martial law in September 1972.38  PD27 was issued just one month after the declaration of 
martial law.  Land reform was given great prominence in the initial years of the martial law 
period; in an often-quoted statement delivered on the first anniversary of PD27, President 
Marcos went so far as to declare, “Land reform is the only gauge for the success or failure of 
the New Society.  If land reform fails, there is no New Society.”  (Wurfel 83: 8)  What was 
the motivation behind PD 27?  There exists a broad consensus in the literature on this 
question.  Clearly, as mentioned above, the growing fear of rural unrest and the threat of 
Communists, as developed through the late 1960s, was the major underlying factor.  Land 
reform was seen as a means of pacifying the growing rural unrest, as had been in the previous 
episodes of land reform initiatives.  For President Marcos himself, however, observers tend 
to agree that the most important political function of PD27 was to place a selective attack on 
his political opponents among the traditional landed ‘oligarchy.’ (Wurfel 1983 and 1988, 
Fegan 1989, Hayami, et al. 1990, Balisacan 1990, Putzel 1992, etc.)  According to one 
account, President Marcos “seems to have calculated that a large proportion of riceland was 
owned by a few very big owners, so that the reform would make many friends and few 
enemies.” (Fegan 1989: 133)  This ‘selective blow’ view appears to be consistent with the 
facts such as: that the Aquino estates, held by President’s single biggest political rival, were 
among the first to be expropriated; that the President took a step-by-step approach starting 
with lands with size of 100 hectare or more and seemed to have lost his originally keen 
interest in reform after the owners with more than 100 hectares had been dispossessed; that 
landed estates other than rice and corn lands were excluded so that he would not antagonize 
all the landed elite; and that he and his family members’ maintained interests in investments in 
export crops. (Wurfel 1988)  During the initial few years of the martial law regime, his land 
reform policy did seem to help “create some support for Marcos in the countryside, blunted 
foreign criticism of his regime, and put the landed elite on the political defensive.”  (Wurfel 
1983: 8)  We will also discuss the accelerating loss of his interest in pushing through land 
reform as the years went by through the late 1970s and early 1980s below, in the context of 
political dynamics behind reform implementation.   
 
1986-88: Politics of CARP Legislation   
 
 There appear to be two broad reasons why a ‘genuine’ agrarian reform became top 
priority in the Presidential campaign of Cory Aquino and in the political agenda in the first 
few years of her presidency; one was (once again) the perceived necessity to address the rural 
unrest and communist inspired insurgency movements, and the other was the political 
circumstances that necessitated the Aquino coalition to place land reform as a key policy issue 
in its attempt to win political support against President Marcos.   
 
 Toward the end of Marcos presidency, the perceived threat of communist insurgency 
                                                        
38 Additional factors affecting the timing of the declaration of martial law were: the then-ongoing sessions 
of the Constitutional Convention, and a Supreme Court decision severely restricting the private right to 
ownership by Americans, with serious implications for American corporations operating in the Philippines. 
(Wurfel 1988)  
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led by NPA was wide spread.  The rather slaggish start of the military campaign by the newly 
established NPA at the end of the 1960s, according to Wurfel (1988: 226), was rescued “from 
oblivion” by the declaration of martial law in 1972; “Authoritarian repression went a long way 
to create those conditions favorable to revolution” by driving “hundreds of well-educated 
youths into the countryside to become NPA cadres.”  With the deepening of the economic 
and political crisis under the Marcos regime, the plight of the rural population, especially the 
rural poor, had become increasingly serious nationwide in the 1980s.  With the land reform 
implementation stalled after the initial martial law period, the NPA version of ‘agrarian 
reform’—primarily rent reduction, wage increases, and debt reduction or cancellation— likely 
had become more attractive for the rural poor by the early 1980s.  (Wurfel 1988)  As a 
result, the NPA forces, estimated at the size of 8,000 as of 1972 (on the eve of the declaration 
of martial law), were estimated to be of the size 25,200 as of 1987, with about 12% of 
barangay (villages) ‘infiltrated,’ i. e., ‘areas where the insurgents stay for long periods of 
time . . . without fear of being discovered or attacked by government forces.’ (see also Table 
4)  Furthermore, their main activities had spread from Central Luzon in early days to a 
diverse set of areas including Eastern and Northern Mindanao, Samar, Bicol, Negros, Panay, 
the Visayas and Cordillera. (Reidinger 1995: 56, Wurfel 1988: 227)  Thus, as was the case 
with most of the previous land reform legislation initiatives, the Aquino coalition’s attempt to 
place land reform on its political agenda was an attempt to address growing rural unrest (and 
potentials for communist-led revolution).   
 
 At the same time, it seems, the prevailing political dynamics toward the end of the 
Marcos regime necessitated the Aquino coalition to place a ‘genuine’ land reform on its top 
policy agenda in order to succeed, as it did ultimately, in uniting much of the broad anti-
Marcos opposition and in preempting other potential opposition candidates.  According to 
Putzel (1992), behind such an attempt was a tacit alliance among the powerful right wing of 
the Catholic Church, the business community and the Cojuangco clan (Cory Aquino’s natal 
family), which had emerged in as early as 1984 with three broad objectives: (1) preempting 
the presidential candidacy of the prominent opposition leader Salvador Laurel, (2) bringing as 
much of the militant grass-roots movement as possible actively into the electoral campaign (to 
legitimize their own candidate and to marginalize the extra-parliamentary opposition), which 
was deemed necessary to challenge President Marcos successfully, and (3) coming up with a 
single candidate capable of gathering popular support as well as the support of the elite and 
the U.S.  It was in this context, Putzel (1992) argues, that the land reform agenda inevitably 
became a main campaign promise and Cory Aquino became a presidential candidate.39  In 
addition, while such a view appears consistent with the rather passive attitude taken by the 
Aquino government and the President herself toward land reform policy after she became 
President, a relatively more benign view of President Aquino identifies behind her 
government’s impetus for land reform four broader political objectives: (1) to increase the 
peasants’ stake in the Philippine society; (2) to defuse the NPA insurgency; (3) to shift rural 
                                                        
39 However, some observers have raised a serious doubt about the extent to which the unorganized rural 
constituency with limited media access actually knew of Aquino’s campaign platform and voted on it, and 
conclude instead that their votes simply reflected the voters’ rejection of Marcos rather than anything else.  
(Riedinger 1995)   
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resources from land to rural industrialization; and (4) to rationalize and increase agricultural 
production. (Riedinger 1995)   
 
 No matter what the main motivations may have been, a ‘genuine’ land reform 
became a top campaign promise of Cory Aquino during the ‘snap’ presidential election held in 
February 1986.  Once on the top policy agenda, the shaping of the land reform legislation 
underwent an extraordinary period of political tag of war in the national political arena 
between the pro- and anti-land reform forces (e. g., peasant mobilization toward greater 
redistribution including land occupation and demonstration in Manila, on the one hand, and 
the pressure against redistribution from the military including attempted coups, on the other) 
in search of a political equilibrium, during the period between the ‘People Power revolution’ 
in February 1986 and June 1988 when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was 
finally adopted.  Major events during this period are summarized in Table 5.  As we saw in 
section one, three major government actions were taken during the period: the new 
Constitution, EO229 and CARL enacted by the Congress.  The whole process during this 
period can be characterized as: (1) general inaction (or, at least, lack of strong initiative) on 
the part of the Aquino administration regarding land reform40; (2) (partly in response to such 
government inaction) a series of proposals made by pro-reform Cabinet members, who 
occupied a small minority in the government, and by activists outside the government 
accompanied by various lobbying and mass mobilization activities; and (3) attempts, largely 
successful, from those opposing liberal redistributive reform inside and outside the Cabinet to 
weaken redistributive elements incorporated in the reform program following each pro-reform 
initiatives.  (Balisacan 1990, Hayami, et al. 1990, Riedinger 1995, Putzel 1992)  As a result, 
many of the important defining features were left for the Congress to determine.   
 
 The initial period of Aquino presidency prior to the restoration of the Congress, it 
appears, also witnessed the weakening of the urgency, on the part of the administration, 
attached to the communist led insurgency, one of the major driving forces behind the demand 
for land reform.  This was in part due to the disarray of the CPP/NPA following the February 
1986 presidential election; CPP decided to boycott the presidential election in which they had 
expected Marcos to win as he did in the previous elections—an apparent tactical error, in 
retrospect, that subsequently led to their diminished political influences in the series of 
political event leading to, and after, the People Power revolution, which in turn precipitated 
internal conflicts and dissent within the party ranks.  (e. g., Riedinger 1995, Wurfel 1988, 
Borras 1998)  Along with such a weakening over time of the perceived threat from the left, 
came political influences from the right: the strong pressures from the military, which played 
the crucial role in bringing President Aquino into power.  Observers point out the strong 
military influence, as witnessed by the cabinet reorganization involving a few ‘liberal’ cabinet 
members as well as the Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile only nine months after assuming 
power, and by a series of military coup attempts, which shook the land reform (as well as 
other) policy making in the initial years of the Aquino administration.  (e. g., Riedinger 1995, 
Putzel 1992, Wurfel 1988)   
                                                        
40 On one account, the Cabinet had any substantive discussion on land reform in only one occasion before 
EO229 was issued.  (Putzel 1992)  
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 By all accounts, the newly elected Congress was a restoration of the pre-martial law 
Congress largely dominated by the landed oligarchy.  For example, of the 200 elected 
members of the House, 129 were believed to be the members of traditional clans and 
additional 38 were related to them.  Riedinger (1995) emphasizes the close similarities in the 
tones of Congressional debate on land reform between the 1950s and 1960s, on the one hand, 
and the 1980s, on the other, with the exception of the relative prominence in the 1950s and its 
conspicuous absence in the 1980s of the rice landowner bloc.  The bill originally passed by 
Senate appeared to have a slightly more liberal flavor, including a lower retention limit.  
Some observers interpret such differences between the bills in two chambers as reflecting the 
difference in the class interests represented between the two chambers; the House bill, 
reflecting the strong landowner bloc in the chamber, tended to protect the interests of locally 
owned plantations, while the Senate bill, reflecting the urban elite base in the chamber, tended 
to protect plantations operated by multinational corporations. (Hayami, et al. 1990).  Others 
argue, however, that senators, who are elected by a national vote, rather than a constituency 
vote (which is strongly dominated by local landed oligarchy), have less direct demands on 
them from landowner networks than do the House members, and senators, some of whom 
have ambitions for higher political offices, “could afford to be bolder in their rhetoric about 
reform.”41  (Putzel 1988: 271)  
 
 While it took the national political process more than two years to reach such a 
political ‘equilibrium’ in the newly restored democratic polity, many observers agree that 
there existed a unique and historic window of opportunity for President Aquino, with ‘a 
wealth of popular support and an image transcending her ties to the political clans (Putzel 
1992: 249),’ to preempt the landlord-dominated Congressional action by the use of 
presidential decrees and to institute a substantive redistributive land reform policy.  There 
were also strong social forces exerting pressures on the President toward such an action.  
After all, however, President Aquino did not act upon such an opportunity but instead left to 
Congress most of the crucial features of the reform program, consistent with the notions of 
representative democracy.  In retrospect, many observers contend, such inaction on the part 
of the President was “the greatest triumph of the anti-reform forces.”  (Riedinger 1995: 176, 
also Putzel 1992)  One interpretation of the President’s inaction was that President viewed 
her role only in terms of the restoration of democratic institutions and that she thus refrained 
from any unilateral action on any issue, i. e., on land reform or otherwise. (e. g., Riedinger 
1995)  According to another view, President’s inaction was a politically rational move since 
by shifting the political responsibility for reform onto Congress and emerging ‘above the 
fray,’ the President could avoid making enemies either among the powerful (by enacting 
redistributive reform) or among her peasant supporters (by preventing reform).  (e. g., Putzel 
1992)  
 
Post-CARP Legislative Politics   
 
                                                        
41 Reidinger (1995) notes that this was the prevailing ‘conventional wisdom’ among the observers.    
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 As noted in section one, after CARL was enacted in 1988 opponents of land reform 
still repeatedly introduced various bills to amend CARL in attempts to restrict the scope of the 
reform.42  Few of them, however, made any headway.  It is not entirely clear why this was 
the case, but several possible explanations for such relative inaction on the part of the reform 
opponents have been offered, such as: (1) that the House and Senate committee activities were 
relatively inactive on any issue; (2) that reform opponents may have found it enough to have 
merely threat posed by these amendments for the purpose of derailing or slowing the reform 
implementation process; (3) that landowners may have been successful enough in avoiding or 
sabotaging reform at its implementation level so that it was not really necessary to push 
through these legislative actions; and (4) that legislators may have been concerned about 
potential political liability of being identified as anti-land reform.  In addition, despite the 
rhetoric employed by reform opponents, following the passage of CARL, to characterize the 
1992 elections (Presidential, Congressional, and provincial and local levels) as a referendum 
on CARP, land reform appears to have played a relatively minor role in these elections.  The 
new Congress elected in 1992, however, was seen by some observers as more conservative 
than its predecessor; for example, 117 of the 197 members of the House of Representatives 
were medium and large landowners.  (Riedinger 1995)   
 
 One major, if modest, legislative advance from the pro-land reform point of view, 
made toward the end of Ramos presidency, was the passage of RA 8532, in February 1998, 
providing additional P50 billion of funding for CARP implementation as well as its ten year 
extension.  The detailed account of the final three days of the legislative process leading to 
the passage of RA8532 suggests that the strong leadership performance by the then House 
Speaker Jose de Venecia (e. g., instructing all of his own LAKAS party congressmen not to 
object to the bill) was instrumental in pushing through the bill within a very limited timeframe 
left toward the end of the Congressional session.  (Borras 1999: 80-84)  On the one hand, 
Speaker de Venecia was running for the presidential election immediately following the 
Congressional session, and was likely in need of a political asset to generate mass support for 
his campaign.43  By taking advantage of such political circumstances, strong lobbying efforts 
orchestrated jointly by the DAR leadership and major peasant organizations at the national 
level were directed toward Speaker de Venecia.  Similar to what was repeatedly found by 
Presidents Magsaysay, Macapagal and Aquino before their respective initiatives for land 
reform legislation, Speaker de Venecia appears to have found the instrumental worth of taking 
an initiative in legislating a land reform-related law as a means of mass campaign aimed at 
presidency.   
 
                                                        
42 This paragraph draws upon Reidinger (1995).   
43 Indeed, the final passage of the bill on the House floor and the intensive lobbying within the 
Congressional building mobilizing some 600 peasants culminated in a symbolic ‘photo session,’ where de 
Venecia shook hands with the DKMP leader Jaime Tadeo and then “abruptly pulled … [their hands] … up, 
making it appear that Tadeo was raising his hands as though to endorse of his presidential candidacy” in 
front of a crowd of hundreds of peasants.  Earlier in a private conversation between Speaker de Venecia 
and DAR secretary Garilao, de Venecia reportedly asked Garilao, “How many votes are we talking about 
here?” to which Garilao reportedly replied, “At least three million.”  (Borras 1999: 83)   
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2-4. Politics of Land Reform Implementation in the Philippines  
 
 We now explore the main factors affecting the political forces resulting in the 
implementation records of the Marcos land reform and CARP.  It is not easy to understand 
the political dynamics behind the lengthy processes of implementing land reform laws.  This 
difficulty partly stems from the serious reliability issues regarding the official data on land 
reform implementation, and partly from the fact that the literature focusing on the 
implementation dynamics appears relatively scarce compared to the one on the national-level 
legislative processes of land reform.  Generally speaking, a major impetus for pushing 
implementation ‘from above’ seems to come from electoral cycle, while major dynamics of 
land reform implementation ‘from below’ come from the development in the civil society.  
For example, the very slow start of implementing the 1963 Code was partially offset by 
President Macapagal’s push for implementation toward the period immediately proceeding the 
November presidential election. (Wurfel 1983)  President Marcos also expanded the declared 
land reform areas under the 1963 Code toward his 1969 re-election bid. (Takigawa 1976)  
Similarly during the days immediately preceding the 1986 presidential election, President 
Marcos authorized the immediate distribution of EPs to designated beneficiaries, regardless of 
their amortization payment status, in a desperate (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempt for re-
election.  (Putzel 1992: 193)  In what follows, we now discuss such dynamics in some 
detail.   
 
Land Reform Implementation During Marcos Presidency  
 
 The DAR data show that there was a major increase in the implementation of the 
1963 land reform code during President Marcos’s second term (1970-1972).  As discussed in 
some detail above, there was a growing rural unrest and political mobilization among peasants, 
labor unions and students in the national political arena.  Such political climate, the same set 
of factors that pushed the Congress to enact the 1971 Code, appears to have forced Marcos 
government to recognize the political urgency of stepping up the land reform implementation 
during this period.   
 
 As we saw above, the implementation record of the Marcos regime indicates that a 
significant portion of the modest accomplishment under his presidency was concentrated in 
the early 1970s.  Many observers interpret such results as an indication of the change in the 
President’s intention: the fading of the President’s even modest commitment to his 
implementing the land reform program, as years went by, for various reasons.  Wurfel (1988: 
176) notes that toward the late 1970s “President Marcos came to appreciate more fully his 
need for local leaders as intermediaries in the patrimonial system, . . . [and] . . . he became 
even less inclined to disturb modestly landed elites.”  According to another account, “Marcos 
wavered when it turned out that a greater proportion of land was owned by small and medium 
owners than expected and that these included the professionals, officials, officers, and 
‘economic middle class’ in general on whom the regime depended for implementation of its 
overall policies and who Marcos hoped might become a new constituency for his regime after 
destruction of the rural oligarchs.” (Fegan 1989a: 133)  Similarly, Hayami, et al. (1990), also 
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suggested that it reflected the emergence of the rural landed middle class.  Another political 
explanation for the slowing-down of the reform implementation beyond the initial stage could 
also be found in the relative forces of resistance between the small number of rice hacienda 
owners, who was targeted first, and the middle-sized landowners targeted after the initial stage.  
The former, though still powerful, had been already targeted by the social and land reform 
measures by the previous administration, was a relative minority in number and had rather 
shallow roots in rural communities (many of them were absentee landlords).  The latter, 
midium-size landowners, were large in number and made allies with wealthy peasants and 
were well connected among the local-level polities.  (Hayami, et al. 1990)   
 
 Furthermore, the speed of land reform also partially reflected the institutional design 
of implementation agencies.  On the one hand, as noted above, each Agrarian Reform Team 
had a whole municipality (typically including some 20 villages) to work with, being 
overburdened (compared to their much earlier Japanese counterparts, for example), thereby 
exacerbating the problems arising from information asymmetry.  In addition, the complete 
lack of peasant representation in ART likely allowed traditional political forces in the locality, 
dominated by landlords, to influence the land reform implementation outcomes.  As a result, 
despite the similar tactics employed by landlords in resisting the reform implementation, both 
the institutional capacity and the political dynamics at the grass root level of the reform 
implementation was likely quite different between the Philippines and Japan.  (Takigawa 
1976)   
 
Was There Any Shift in the Land Reform Implementation Politics Between Aquino and Ramos 
Presidency?  
 
 As we saw in section one, most of the land redistribution achievements during 
Aquino presidency was concentrated on the OLT program (i. e., redistribution of tenanted rice 
and corn lands).  The relatively small achievements, compared to those of the Ramos 
administration, in the redistribution of private lands that was newly introduced under CARP 
concentrated in the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program rather than in the more 
controversial operation of Compulsory Acquisition (AC).  The impressive record of 
implementing the OLT program under President Aquino, compared to the record of the 
Marcos administration, appears still noteworthy.  One likely reason could be the predilection 
of the Marcos-era holdovers within the DAR pipelines although, as we saw above, President 
Marcos himself appeared to have lost interest in expanding land reform after the initial years.  
In addition, it appears that the landowners in the rice and corn sectors had been politically 
marginalized considerably by this time.  While landlord resistance with various tactics was 
highly noticeable during the early period of implementing PD27 (e. g., Takigawa 1976, 
Umehara 1997), the implementation of OLT during the Aquino administration appears to have 
involved less controversy, except in the area of compensation.  A symbolic indication of the 
substantial political marginalization of rice and corn landlords was the contrast between the 
agrarian reform debate during the 1950s where these landlords were actively involved in 
opposing the reform and the 1986-88 CARP debate where rice and corn growers were 
conspicuously absent. (Riedinger 1995)  Another explanation offered in the literature is that 
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due to the deteriorating terms of trade against rice farming during the 1970s rice landowners 
had diverted their investments away from rice land and diversified their asset holdings into 
non-agricultural investments such as: in urban investment and higher education (in the case of 
larger landlords), or in rural light engineering, commercial poultry and pig raising, and farm 
services (in the case of small and medium provincial landlords).  In other words, the once 
powerful (in the 1950s) rice landowners did not have as much stake in the rice land any more 
by the 1980s.  (Fegan 1989b)   
 
 The DAR record shows that, during the period of President Ramos, there was a 
significant increase in the land redistribution ‘accomplishments’ in the more contentious 
elements of CARP, especially in the redistribution of privately owned land through 
compulsory acquisition.  One plausible interpretation appears to be that such a seemingly 
impressive achievements under Ramos presidency merely reflected the acceleration of the 
CARP implementation that started in 1988.  While the process started with the enactment of 
CARP under the Aquino administration, it likely took a few years for the CARP 
implementation to gain its momentum.  According to this view, there was no significant 
difference in the degree of ‘pre-reform’ tendency between the Aquino and Ramos 
administrations.   
 
 In addition, however, there appear to be two supplementary factors that might have 
partially contributed to the significant increase in the land redistribution achievements under 
Ramos presidency: the leadership change, as well as subsequent organizational-orientational 
changes, within DAR, on the one hand, and the broader changes in peasant mobilization and 
in civil society, on the other.  The latter forces, in turn, can be characterized by the increasing 
diversity among peasant organizations and among their mode of mobilization.  On the one 
hand, as noted above, Secretary Garilao apparently established stable leadership in reorienting 
DAR toward pro-reform stance with much greater cooperation with the peasant organizations.  
On the other hand, there were social movements ‘from below’ pressuring the DAR 
bureaucracy toward greater land redistribution.  During the Marcos martial law regime, 
which permitted only armed and clandestine forms of struggle, the Maoist Communist Party 
of the Philippines (CPP) developed a virtual hegemony within the social mobilization against 
the martial law regime.  CPP considered the peasantry as the ‘main force’ (as opposed to the 
proletariats as the ‘leading force’) and carried out selective land reform in the areas where 
they had control.  This orientation of CPP helped its organized armed struggles to spread in 
the countryside during the late 1970s and the early 1980s.  KPM (Kilusang Magbubukid ng 
Pilipinas: Peasant Movement of the Philippines) was formally launched in 1985 under CPP as 
the main legal peasant movement and quickly became the main forces in peasant organization. 
(Borras 1999)  However, the “People Power revolution” in February 1986, leading to the fall 
of the Marcos regime and the subsequent democratization of the Philippines, precipitated the 
major split within CPP and its subsequent decline in its influence,44 on the one hand, and the 
                                                        
44 In this context, a major turning point, as we saw above, was the decision by CPP to boycott the 1986 
‘snap’ Presidential election, which ultimately triggered the People Power revolution.  It led to its 
substantial decline in political influence in the national political arena and the declining influence of CPP 
and its affiliated peasant organizations.   
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multiplication of social actors and the diversification in the forms of social mobilization 
among peasant sectors, on the other.  While KMP remained the most vocal leader of peasant 
movements lobbying for liberal land reform during the initial years of the Aquino 
administration, including the peasant demonstrations leading to the ‘Mendiola massacre,’ its 
relative dominance subsequently eroded; the movements led by CPP, including KMP, 
formally split into sub-groups between the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  At the same time, 
multiple groups have emerged in peasant movements since the mid-1980s, sometimes allying 
and sometimes competing with the KMP leadership.  They included highly diversified set of 
groups including a broad-based and moderate social-democratic bloc under the Congress for a 
People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR), which actively lobbied during the process leading to the 
enactment of CARL and subsequently (after the passage of the substantially ‘watered down’ 
CARL) led a (ultimately failed) signature campaign for the pro-peasant “People’s Agrarian 
Reform Code (PARCode).”   
 
 Not only were there more diverse sets of peasant organizations, but there also 
emerged diversified modes of peasant mobilization.  This included the organized land 
occupation movements, as an intermediate tactic between the full-blown revolutionary armed 
struggle and the “everyday form of peasant resistance” (Kiekvliet 1993).  While a 
‘successful’ land occupation attempt was reported in as early as 1977 in a Bulacan village the 
height of this movement, led by national peasant organizations such as KMP, came around 
1987-88 when the major legislative battle on CARP was being waged in the national political 
arena. (Banzon-Bautista 1989; Kirkvliet 1993; Borras 1999; Riedinger 1995; Putzel 1992)  
KMP claimed that 100,000 hectares of lands had been claimed via such land occupation as of 
1991.  (as cited in Kirkvliet 1993)  Political observers note that these land occupations had 
some political impact on the agrarian reform debate by drawing attention to the plight of 
landless workers (rather than tenants) and by keeping reform issues high in the policy agenda 
at the national level.  (Borras 1999, Kiekvliet 1993)  Also, in some cases, land occupation 
incidents “set in motion events resulting in more land being redistributed under agrarian 
reform laws” although the occupiers themselves were often excluded from the beneficiary 
groups which nevertheless could include relatives of the occupation participants. (Kirkvliet 
1993: 485)45  Furthermore, amid these developments was a shift in the perception of CARP 
within the peasant community; when CARL was passed in 1988 most of the peasant groups 
dismissed the law as ‘anti-peasant,’ but by the early 1990s somewhat revised views emerged 
looking to CARP as a ‘progressive policy’ to work with, among the relatively moderate 
sections of the peasant community, such as DKMP (Democratic Peasant Movement of the 
Philippines) which had split from the CPP-led KMP.46  (Borras 1999)   
                                                        
45 At the end, however, “[land occupation] failed as an alternative land reform program” because much of 
those occupied lands were later recovered by the original landowners, with the aid of private armies and the 
military; “[t]he large majority of take-overs were brief –at most two or three harvests, more likely not even 
a full season, often not longer than a week or two.” (Kiekvliet 1993: 482)  Furthermore, much of the lands 
not later recovered by the owners were not made productive; in one account on the island of Negros, where 
KMP organized occupation of about 45,000 hectares, not more than 10 % of the occupied land were 
rendered productive. (Borras 1999) 
46 According to Borras (1999 :63), a former DKMP Deputy Secretary General, DKMP’s perception of 
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 As a consequence, such a shift in the perception on CARP within the peasant 
community and the shift in the orientation within DAR, triggered by its new leadership, 
toward greater peasant participation converged in the early 1990s, manifesting itself as series 
of DAR-NGO-PO workshops, formation of joint DAR-NGO working committees focused on 
high priority provinces (e.g., ‘Task Force 24’ focusing on fast-tracking land re-distribution in 
24 provinces, which later expanded to form ‘Project 40 Now!’ covering 40 provinces), and 
other direct dialogues between DAR and the civil society where conflicts between local 
NGOs/ peasant organizations and local DAR officials were mediated by national level NGOs 
and DAR officials. (Borras 1999)  According to micro-level studies on land redistribution 
cases under the compulsory acquisition (CA) program, drawn from Nueva Ecija, Davao del 
Norte, Pampanga, Quizon and Laguna provinces, increasingly active involvement in the land 
redistribution by local NGOs took the form of: providing legal advice to counter the 
landowners’ legal tactics, contacting pro-reform DAR officials at the local (i. e., municipal) 
level; helping peasants to bring a dispute with their landowners to higher-level DAR offices 
beyond their own locality (e. g., provincial DAR office); and supporting peasant mobilization 
with demonstration, picketing, land occupation and dialogue with DAR officials.  On the 
other hand, national-level NGOs provided peasants with: logistical support (e. g., providing 
transportation to and accommodation in Manila during the lobbying activities by peasant 
groups, national-level lobbying activities); further legal assistance; supporting collective 
actions; drawing media attention with public relations materials;47 facilitating linkages among 
peasant groups from different localities; providing international linkages with foreign NGOs 
(e. g., facilitating field visits by foreigners which could subsequently lead to international 
campaigns such as letter writing by major donor country citizens to the Philippine 
government); and, perhaps most importantly, making an alliance with pro-reform DAR 
officials at the national level to intervene by pressing the local level officials (who tend to be 
under stronger pressure from, and be dependent on, landowners than national officials) for 
land acquisition.  All of these case studies indicate that, at least in those ‘successful’ 
redistribution cases, the interactive processes of converging social mobilizations involving 
NGOs/POs at various levels as well as peasants themselves (‘from below’), on the one hand, 
and the pro-reform leadership in DAR and other bureaucracy (‘from above’), on the other, 
emerged to counteract the traditionally powerful political forces (which included both legal 
and extra-legal means including use of violence) of the landowners and their allies opposing 
the implementation of redistributive land reform.  (Borras 1999: chapter 3)   
 
2-5. Why Has Land Reform been Taking So Long?   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
CARP was “transformed from a conservative into a progressive policy” because in the early 1990s, when 
most of the reformed sectors in many countries in Latin America, indigenous communal lands in Africa, 
and state cooperative farms were being dismantled and privatized and the state’s role and initiatives were 
being rolled back especially from redistributive reforms like land reform, CARP emerged as progressive 
policy in this current context.”   
47 Watchful media attention not only facilitated political mobilization but, it appears, sometimes had an 
effect of restraining violence to some extent even in rather intensive confrontations.   
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 As our discussion above indicates, the processes of land reform legislation and 
implementation in the Philippines has been a continuous process constantly evolving for the 
past several decades.  In the neo-classical political economy framework, as discussed in 
section 2-2 above, such evolution could be seen as shifting ‘political equiribria,’ reflecting 
constantly shifting ‘demand for’ and ‘supply of’ land reform in the ‘political market.’  For 
example, the relative shift over time in the military strength of the rural insurgency 
movements (see Table 4) is apparently one major element, which certainly contributed the 
evolution of the land reform politics in the Philippines.  As we saw above, the growth in the 
number of insurgency forces apparently coincide with the shift in the ‘political equilibrium’ 
toward larger redistribution of lands in the occasions of the 1955 legislation under Magsaysay 
presidency and the 1988 CARP legislatin under Aquino presidency.   
 
 Furthermore, according to de Janvry and Sadoulet (1989) the failure of redistributive 
land reform programs in Latin America was a result of the rising relative economic power 
(vis-à-vis the competing interests of the urban classes) of medium and large landowners over 
time, which presumably shifted the demand and supply of land reform in the political market.  
Despite the inverse relations between farm size and productivity (and thus the potentials for 
net social gains from reditributive land reform), the Latin American states who mainly were 
motivated to raise agricultural productivity, presumably backed by the political alliance 
between the urban classes and the landless agricultural workers, chose to use the land reform 
legislation as a means of forcing medium and large landowners to modernize their farms; the 
landowners were ‘forced’ to modernize since the state’s threat that their land be expropriated 
if modernization did not occur was credible given the ‘inverse relations’ (i. e ., since land 
redistribution would have raised total productivity, it would have been possible for the state to 
expropriate lands and compensate the landlords who lost lands).  Because of the 
modernization by medium and large farms initially induced by such a threat of distributive 
land reform, however, their productivity and, consequently, their relative economic power 
improved over time; their rise in the economic power, in turn, led to the rise in the relative 
political power of the landlords to the extent that they were able to block the redistributive 
land reform altogether.  According to the de Janvry-Sadoulet model, such path-dependency (i. 
e., because of the state’s initial choice of forcing the modernization of larger farms instead of 
outright redistributive land reform, the state later on lost the opportunity for redistributive 
reform altogether) essentially resulted from the ‘political myopia’ on the part of the state (and 
thus, presumably, on the part of the urban classes and the landless workers who backed the 
state’s legislation on land reform); the state lost its opportunity for pareto efficient land reform 
since it was not able to predict, “either for lack of political foresight or because political 
restructuring was beyond the political horizon of the state itself,” the political consequences 
induced by its own initial policy of ‘modernization before redistribution.’48  (de Janvey and 
                                                        
48 It is not clear, however, how well this model, developed for explaining Latin American cases, also 
captures the Philippine land reform processes.  For example, some would argue that the kind of the shift in 
the relative political power between the landlords and the urban classes may not fit well as an explanation 
of the land reform dynamics in the Philippines; some observers have pointed out that the ‘landed oligarchy’ 
has continuously dominated the Philippine politics and thus there never was any significant growth of an 
independent urban industrial class who would have been in competition with the rural landlords.  For 
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Sadoulet 1989: 1399)   
 
 Apart from such ‘political myopia,’ however, there may be an inertia of some kind in 
the nature of the politics of land reform itself that may explain the long history of incomplete 
land reform in the Philippine context.  A dynamic game theoretic model developed by 
Horowitz (1993) explores such possibilities by analyzing the interaction between the rural 
unrest and land reform policy in a simplified dynamic model with infinite time horizon.  One 
of the major differences of the Horowitz’s model vis-à-vis the de Janvry-Sadoulet model 
discussed above is that the kind of ‘political myopia’ assumed in the de Janvry-Sadoulet 
model is now ruled out and political actors are assumed to be ‘rational’ in the sense of forward 
looking.  The model envisions the land reform policy as the prime instrument for preventing 
rural unrest.  It demonstrates that there exists a unique amount of land redistribution49 (as a 
Nash equilibrium) which is just enough to pacify the potential rebels (i. e., either landless 
tenants and laborers or landlords who are dissatisfied by land reform) depending on the initial 
land distribution and the probability of successful ‘revolution’ when the potential rebel finds 
the reform unsatisfactory; the amount of such redistribution is likely to be larger if the 
divergence between the ‘strategic endowment’ (i. e., probability of successful revolt, which is 
exogenously given and fixed over time) and the actual initial land endowment between the 
landlords and the landless is larger.  Furthermore, the model demonstrates that, under some 
conditions (i. e., (1) there is non-zero probability of armed revolt leading to a stalemate which 
sustains status quo in land distribution, and (2) the initial land distribution between landlord 
and landless is not exactly proportional to the relative probability of wining by landlord and 
landless), the land reform process can be self-sustaining, rather than a one time re-distribution 
alone preventing all the potential future revolts.   
 
 One remarkable feature of this model is that this ‘self-perpetuating’ property emerges 
even though the probability of successful revolt is held constant over time.  Such self-
perpetuating property results from the fact that every land reform episode in one period raises 
the ‘expected payoff’ from revolt for the reform beneficiaries in the next period, creating an 
additional demand for further reform.  Each reform episode raises the ‘expected payoff’ from 
revolt because, as far as there is a positive probability of the stalemate or status-quo outcome 
(which does not change the existing land distribution pattern after the conflict) from revolt50, 
each reform episode increases the expected (future) payoff for the reform beneficiaries in the 
case of status-quo/stalemate outcome (vis-à-vis such payoff in the last period before the 
reform), which in turn raises the expected payoff from engaging in revolt by the reform 
beneficiaries, creating new demand for additional land redistribution.  While each land 
redistribution creates new demand for additional redistribution in the next period, the 
‘optimal’ redistribution is shown to decrease over time.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
example, see Hutchcroft (1998) for such a view.   
49 The uniqueness of such land reform ‘plan’ is dependent on the risk neutrality of both landless and 
landlords.  (Horowitz 1993: 1008) 
50 The other outcomes are: successful revolt leading to revolutionary land reform and the total suppression 
of revolt leading to the capture of all the land by the landlords.   
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 Thus the Horowitz model demonstrates that: (1) if ‘rational’ landlords concede to the 
degree of land redistribution that is just enough to prevent the ‘revolt’ by the potential reform 
beneficiaries in each period, (2) if the ‘revolt’ can lead to a stalemate (status-quo) outcome 
without changing land distribution patterns, and (3) both landlords and the reform 
beneficiaries are risk neutral51, then a land reform program in any one period is not likely to 
result in a land redistribution of enough amount so that the reform ends up as a one time 
reform preventing all the future threat of revolt.  In other words, the model illustrates a 
situation where interactions between ‘rational’ landlords (who is willing to implement land 
reform in an attempt to prevent peasant revolt) and a dissatisfied but ‘rational’ mass of 
peasants/ landless (who poses potential threat of violent revolution) stop short of the kind of 
once-and-for-all land reform as observed in Japan or in other East Asian countries (where 
significant exogenous factors were operating simultaneously).  The hypothesis of such 
‘political rationality’ among actors appears to be consistent with the sequence of the 
‘inadequate’ or ‘incomplete’ reform attempts in one administration after another as observed 
in the Philippine land reform history, as described in the previous two subsections.52  One 
might argue, however, that the kind of ‘rationality’ incorporated in the model is nevertheless 
still rather limited.  In particular, the model’s dynamics follow (first order) Markov 
processes; the decision by the agents is ‘rational’ in the sense of forward-looking, but the 
agents are assumed not to learn from the past history.  Furthermore, such purely political 
‘rationality’ nevertheless lead to economic costs such as large administrative costs of 
prolonged reform, investment disincentive effects due to the uncertainty due to prolonged 
reform, and various social costs of conflict due to prolonged reform processes (see below).   
 
2-6. Conclusions on the Politics of Land Reform in the Philippines  
 
 In this section we have discussed political aspects of the Philippine land reform in the 
recent past.  Our discussion suggests that political dynamics of reform legislation, played out 
mainly at the national political (legislative) arena, and that of reform implementation, played 
out in each locality, could be different.  At the national level, each new piece of land reform 
legislation was a modest improvement in terms of the scope for land redistribution over the 
previous law, as observed typically in the evolution of the retention limits for the landowners.  
At each time such small improvements were made by a government initiative, the political 
motivations behind such an initiative was the combination of the perceived need for 
addressing rural unrest and the substantial and immediate instrumental value (i. e., as a means 
of ensuring political survival) of placing land reform on political agenda.  The timing of the 
most of the legislative initiatives in land reform (except the one in 1965) corresponds to the 
periods of rising rural unrest and insurgency activities.  Examples of the instrumental 
political value of reform initiatives include: the need for building as broad an electoral support 
                                                        
51 If the landlords and the reform beneficiaries are risk averse, then the ‘optimal reform path’ is no longer 
unique, and the perpetual nature of land reform is somewhat weakened.  But the ‘inertia’ of land reform 
program still remains, preventing a once-and-for-all land reform.   
52 One of the Horowitz model’s predictions that are not supported by the actual historical record, however, 
is the pattern of decreasing land-redistribution over time as generated by the model, while the actual land 
redistribution accomplishment has increased over the last three administrations.   
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as possible by an opposition Presidential candidate (Magsaysay, Aquino), one of the re-
election campaign tactics by an incumbent President (Macapagal), or the need for striking a 
selective blow at the economic base of political opponents in an attempt to consolidate 
President’s political power under an authoritarian rule (Marcos).  Furthermore, the recent 
game-theoretic model developed by Horowitz (1993) indicates that there may be a systematic 
tendency in land reform politics where such purely political rationality between the 
government (mainly controlled by landlords) and the landless is not likely to lead to a swift 
and significant land redistribution, as was observed in East Asia, that will prevent future rural 
unrest once and for all.   
 
 Despite such a pessimistic picture of the general political dynamics of land reform, 
however, there appear be some new developments in land reform dynamics at the level of 
local implementation.  Recent experiences during the period of the Ramos administration 
indicate that the involvement by people’s organizations and the effective linkages among 
beneficiaries, peoples organizations, NGOs at local and national levels and the land reform 
administrators have a potential of forging a political force counteracting the strong resistance 
by landlords against land redistribution, which has traditionally constrained sweeping 
implementation of even modest redistributive land reform codes legislated in the past.   
 
3. Major Economic Issues in Land Reform  
 
 In this section, we will depart from the politics of land reform and will focus on 
major economic issues involved in the land reform policy making.  There are two major 
economic issues involved in the Philippine land reform; one has to do with the conversion of 
share tenancy into fixed-rent leasehold, and the other has to do with economic rationale for 
land re-distribution in terms of improving efficiency in agricultural production.   
 
3-1. Tenancy Reform  
 
 As we saw in section one, the conversion of share tenancy into fixed-rent leasehold 
was introduced in the 1963 Code under the Macapagal administration.  Much of the thrust in 
the Congressional debate indicates that the major rationale for the prohibition of share tenancy 
was the perceived inefficiency of the share tenancy contract. (e. g., Hayami, et al. 1990,  
Takigawa 1976)  Many of the economists of the time appeared to share such ‘Marshallian’ 
inefficiency view of share tenancy.  (Hayami and Otsuka 1993)  Theoretical work during 
the following three decades, however, has led to a more subtle view of the relative efficiency 
among alternative contract types suggesting that share tenancy can lead to efficient outcomes 
under various circumstances.  Furthermore, empirical evidence has shown that, at least in the 
Philippines, there is not much of a difference in efficiency among alternative contract forms in 
many cases, and that prohibiting share tenancy in the Philippines likely induced inefficient as 
well as inequitable resource allocation.   
 
Theoretical Reasoning  
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 The so called ‘Marshallian’ inefficiency view rests on the argument that share 
tenancy is inefficient due to the ‘agency problem.’  ‘Agency problem’ arises when 
agricultural workers or tenant farmers face weak incentives to work diligently (or face 
incentives to shirk) on the farm under the contractual arrangement with their farm 
operators/landowners.  Under share tenancy a portion of the tenant’s marginal products is 
taken away as share rent and thus the tenant’s labor effort would be less than the optimal level 
which should occur if he receives full marginal products (i. e., under owner-cultivation or 
fixed-rent leasehold).  If it is possible to monitor the labor effort of the tenant and such 
monitoring is not highly costly, however, then such inefficiency can be avoided by specifying 
the optimal labor effort level by the tenant in the contract. (e. g., Cheung 1969)  Thus, if 
landowners are able to observe the labor effort with relatively low cost (as likely to be the case 
if, for example, the landowner and her/his tenants live in the same community) and if sanction 
can be enforced onto the tenant when the contract is violated (through, for example, tenant 
eviction and/or loss of reputation which could preclude the tenant’s future employment 
prospect within the community), then serious ‘Marshallian inefficiency’ is not likely to arise.  
It appears that such conditions tended to apply in the rice growing areas in the Philippines 
where the tenancy reform was mainly targeted.  (Hayami and Otsuka 1993)  Theoretical 
arguments suggest that under these circumstances of perfect enforceability of optimal labor 
input of the tenant/laborer, the optimal level of per hectare yield would be the same under 
share tenancy, fixed-rent lease or owner cultivation.  (For a detailed theoretical discussion, 
see Hayami and Otsuka 1993: chapter 3-5)   
 
 The agency problem arising from the imperfect monitoring of the labor effort of the 
tenant is a real one, however, and the cost of such monitoring can be quite high in certain 
circumstances.  Even under such conditions, share tenancy can still be seen as an efficient 
contract form due to missing market phenomena.  For example, since markets are usually 
missing for insurance in the case of crop failure for tenant farmers, share tenancy can be seen 
as a risk sharing devise in such a situation. (e. g,. Stiglitz 1974)  It has been shown that when 
tenants are risk-averse share tenancy can be an efficient contract choice.53  Furthermore, even 
without such consideration of risk sharing, a somewhat similar logic can apply under the ‘two-
way moral hazard’ problem of the costly monitoring of labor services of tenants by 
landowners and the non-enforceability of ‘managerial skills’ provision (e. g., information on 
new technology and inputs, on market, etc.) from landowners by tenants under the condition 
where landowners are better equipped with such ‘managerial skills’ (such might be the case 
especially under rapidly changing circumstances); since fixed-rent leasehold would provide no 
incentive for landowners to provide their ‘managerial skills’ share tenancy could be an 
efficient contract form that gives incentives for both the parties to provide their respective 
production inputs.  (Eswaran and Kotowal 1985)   
 
 Theoretical development in the literature thus suggests that, whether or not the labor 
                                                        
53 In general, when tenants are risk-averse, per hectare yield can be higher or lower under share tenancy 
than under fixed-rent lease or owner cultivation depending on the size of the elasticity of substitution 
between labor (work effort) and land (per worker farm size) in the production function.  (e. g., Hayami 
and Otsuka 1993: 49) 
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monitoring costs are high for landowners, prohibiting share tenancy could lead to inefficient 
resource allocation in either case.  As a result, a strong consensus appears to have emerged 
among economists that ban on share tenancy is not a desirable policy instrument.   
 
Empirical Evidence  
 
 Given the wide variety of theoretical possibilities where share tenancy can lead to 
efficient or inefficient outcomes, the question of whether share tenancy leads to relatively 
inefficient outcomes vis-à-vis leasehold or owner cultivation and, if so, the question of the 
degree of such inefficiency become largely an empirical question.  Generally it is not easy to 
compare the relative productivity under alternative land tenure arrangements (i. e., share 
tenancy vs. fixed-rent leasehold vs. owner cultivation) due to the difficulties in fully 
controlling for the various factors, other than the tenurial arrangement, simultaneously 
affecting productivity.  Nevertheless, there have been numerous studies comparing per 
hectare yields under alternative land tenure arrangements in the Philippines as well as in other 
countries.  As a whole there appears no strong empirical evidence to support the existence of 
‘Marshallian inefficiency’ of share tenancy in the Philippines.  For example, Mangahas et al. 
(1976) and Hayami and Kikuchi (2000) found no significant yield difference among share 
tenancy, leasehold or owner cultivation in Nueva Ecija and in Laguna communities, 
respectively.  Agricultural census data collected in the 1950s as well as in the 1960s 
indicated higher per hectare rice yields on share tenancy lands than on owner cultivated lands 
though the differences were found to be small. (Berry and Cline 197954)  Furthermore, 
Hayami and Otsuka (1993) surveyed some 32 empirical/case- studies, drawn mainly from 
South and Southeast Asia, and constructed empirical distributions of the yield and input use 
differences between share tenancy, on the one hand, and fixed-rent leasehold or owner 
cultivation, on the other.  Their overall conclusion is that “on balance, the evidence is 
stronger to support the hypothesis of equal efficiency between share tenancy and other land-
tenure forms.”  (Hayami and Otsuka 1993: 98)  Carroll (1983), on the other hand, found 
significantly higher per hectare yields on leasehold farms than on share tenancy farms, but he 
interprets such difference as the result of the inherent productivity of the farmers self-selecting 
the leasehold (under PD27) than to the incentive effects of the tenure contract.   
 
 In one of the more carefully done statistical analyses on the subject, Shaban (1987) 
found evidence of significant ‘Marshallian’ inefficiency in input use and output (e. g., 16% 
difference in per acre outputs) of share tenancy but no significant difference between fixed-
rent lease and owner cultivation in Indian villages, after controlling for farmer characteristics, 
farmer ability and various land quality measures.  Hayami and Otsuka (1993: 102) note, 
however, that such inefficiency found in Shaban (1986)’s study is likely to be the result of not 
so much the share tenancy per se as of the short-term tenancy contract as a disguised labor-
                                                        
54 As noted by Berry and Cline (1979), it is not clear if such results reflected the productivity differences 
between share tenancy and owner cultivation, or they were due to some other factors.  Nevertheless, one 
possible explanation offered for the higher yields under share tenancy is that, as indicated by a 1955 survey 
by the University of the Philippines, the tenant farmers appeared to have better access to capital, perhaps 
through their landlords’ credit, than did owner cultivators.   
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employment contract under a specific policy context, viz. the land reform regulation 
prohibiting long-term lease, and that the result cannot be taken as evidence of ‘Marshallian 
inefficiency’ of general share tenancy after all.   
 
 A recent study by Foster and Rosenzweig (1994), based on data from Bukidnon 
province (northern Mindanao) collected in the mid-1980s, directly tested the existence of the 
‘moral hazard’ problem (costly monitoring of hired laborers on farm) by estimating the effects 
of alternative contract arrangements on the level of work efforts (as measured by the decrease 
in the body mass index –BMI : weight divided by height squared).  They find that farmers 
spend about 13% more work efforts under owner cultivation, on average, than they do under 
share tenancy, thereby confirming the significant ‘moral hazard’ problem involved in hired 
labor under share tenancy (i. e., ‘Marshallian inefficiency’).  Although Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1994) contain no discussion of the social environments of the tenancy contracts 
in the data area that are important for interpreting their results (c.f. Hayami and Otsuka 1993), 
according to the description of the data area provided by Bouis and Haddad (1990), the data 
area is predominantly small holder based (average farm size being 2.6 hectares) with the 
majority engaged in corn production (255 out of the total 448 households) with prevalent 
share tenancy (58% of the corn farm households being tenants while 35% being owner farms 
and the rest being laborers) although a minority of farms (77 out of the total 448) are engaged 
primarily in sugarcane production with low (fixed rent) tenancy (17% of sugarcane producing 
households).55  Thus, the Foster-Rosenzweig’s findings appear to be primarily driven by the 
inefficiency of the small scale share tenants in corn production.  Although no discussion is 
provided about the extent of absentee landlordism, judging from the facts that the area was 
inhabited by relatively recent immigrants and that the average size of owned farms is small 
(Bouis and Haddad 1990), the owners of the corn farms cultivated by their share tenants in the 
sample are likely to have resided in the same or nearby communities as the tenants’ own.  
Therefore, it appears that the Foster and Rosenzweig (1994)’s findings do contradict the 
Hayami and Otsuka (1993)’s findings on the absence of moral hazard problem in share 
tenancy (see above)56.  It is not clear, however, to what extent such degree of labor ‘shirking’ 
under share tenancy translates into efficiency losses in production, although Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1994: 225) argue that “existing empirical evidence on moral hazard, based on 
directly observed input use, such as labor time, fertilizer, etc., understates the extent of moral 
hazard.”  Furthermore, the existence of significant moral hazard in hired labor under share 
tenancy would not necessarily mean inefficiency of share tenancy contract given other 
possible functions that share tenancy serves, such as risk sharing or incentive for landowners’ 
provision of managerial skills (see above).  Nevertheless, at least in parts of the Philippines 
that are similar to the Bukidnon data areas (e. g., corn predominates in agricultural production 
                                                        
55 Smallholder agriculture in the area was almost exclusively devoted to semisubsistence corn production 
until the mid-1970s, but the establishment of a sugar mill in 1977 in the area led to a rapid spread of 
sugarcane production.  (Bouis and Haddad 1990)   
56 One major obstacle for drawing this conclusion definitively, however, is the lack of descriptive 
information on the characteristics of the landlord-tenant relationship (e. g., the degree of paternalism), on 
which the cost of monitoring tenants’ labor effort could very much depend as Hayami and Otsuka point out, 
in the Bukidnon area.   
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accompanied by relatively small production of rice and sugarcane), the study suggests a 
distinct possibility that moral hazard is a real problem, unlike in the areas where Hayami and 
Otsuka (1993)’s observations were based on.  The issue of the ‘Marshallian inefficiency’ 
under share tenancy does not yet appear to be quite settled in the empirical literature.  On 
overall balance, however, we might tentatively conclude that “[t]he empirical discussion 
shows that inefficiencies of share-cropping, measured at the farm level, are not large.”  
(Binswanger, et al. 1995)   
 
3-2. Economic Rationales for Land Re-distribution: Farm size and productivity  
 
 Another major economic issue closely related to land reform is the question of 
whether breaking up large farms into smaller farms would have negative effects on 
agricultural productivity.  For example, during the Congressional debate over CARP 
concerns were expressed that redistributive land reform, by breaking up plantations where 
there were significant economies of scale existed, would disrupt agricultural production, and 
that decline in production of export crops, produced by plantations, would weaken the 
country’s foreign exchange earnings capacity.   
 
 Based on theoretical and empirical work in the literature in the last three decades, a 
rather strong consensus has emerged among economists about the desirability of land 
redistribution in developing countries where distribution of wealth is highly unequal.  Land 
redistribution is largely seen as improving efficiency as well as equity.  Such reasoning is 
mainly based on the widely-accepted view of the ‘inverse relation between firm size and 
productivity.’   
 
Theoretical Reasoning57  
 
 There are various potential sources of economies of scale in agricultural production.  
They include: (1) lumpy inputs, such as machinery, farm animals and ‘management skills’; (2) 
processing and marketing; (3) credit access and risk diffusion; and (4) occupational choice 
among farmers.  Starting with draft animals for plowing, and later re-enforced by the 
introduction of modern farm machinery for various farm tasks, such as threshers, tractors, 
harvesters, etc., a certain minimum size of land is required to make efficient use of these 
‘lumpy’ inputs.  Management skills (e. g., making decisions about introducing new 
technologies and various inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides) can also be seen as a lumpy 
input whose cost increases less than proportional to the increase in the firm size.   
 
 In addition, for the cases of typical plantation crops, such as sugarcane, banana, oil 
palm and tea, economies of scale seem to arise in processing or marketing stage.  Sugarcane, 
for example, needs to be crashed within a short period of time after harvest and such 
processing of sugarcane is a heavily capital intensive operation with strong scale economies.  
                                                        
57 Theoretical discussions along the lines similar to the ones presented here can be found in: Banerjee 
(1999), Berry and Cline (1979), Binswanger, et al. (1995), Hayami, et al. (1990), Rashid and Quibria 
(1994) .   
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To take an another example, bananas need to be placed into a cold boat within 24 hours of 
harvest, posing a major challenge of careful coordination, including coordination of harvest 
timing, arrangement of boats arriving timely and ensuring transportation between harvest 
point and shipment, which is very difficult to do for a large number of independent small 
farmers.  As a yet another example, careful marketing is said to be required for tea.   
 
 Furthermore, credit is one of the important inputs in developing country agriculture 
partly because of the lack of other inter-temporal markets (such as insurance) to insure against 
crop failure or price risks, but credit markets are quite thin in rural areas in these countries.  
Lager farmers tend to have better access to credit than small farmers.  This is partly due to 
the economies of scale in lending –i. e., the transaction costs of providing formal credit in 
such areas are high and do not increase with loan size, leading to declining unit costs with 
loan size.  Scale economy in credit access can also arise because farmers with larger land 
ownership tend to have larger political power and such political power may play important 
role in the allocation of highly rationed resources such as credit.  Given the much more 
limited access to credit among smaller farmers, these farmers may be forced to accumulate 
assets as a risk diffusing device.  This need could make smaller farmers less able to choose 
efficient (i. e., profit maximizing) asset portfolio than do wealthier farmers who have better 
access to the markets to diffuse risks (such as credit), a yet another potential source of 
allocative inefficiency disadvantaging smaller farmers vis-à-vis larger farmers.  (Banerjee 
1999, Binswanger, et al. 1995, etc.)   
 
 Finally, the process of occupational choice among farmers could also lead to a 
tendency of larger farms being more productive than smaller farms.  That is, more 
productive/talented/technologically-savvy farmers would want to work with more land than 
would less productive farmers.  Thus larger farms may tend to be cultivated by more 
productive farmers. (Banerjee 1999)58   
 
 On the other hand, however, at least some of the potential sources of economies of 
scale identified above could be (and have been) mitigated by various institutional innovations.  
For example, possible scale economies due to lumpy inputs (e. g., draft animals, farm 
machinery) could be utilized by small-scale farms through rental markets.  Similarly, 
possible advantages of larger farms could be counteracted by smaller farms by the use of 
contract farming.  (see below for empirical examples)  These institutional innovations such 
as rental markets for lumpy inputs and contract farming, however, could potentially involve 
agency/moral hazard problems.  The viability of rental markets for lumpy inputs depends on 
the importance of maintenance activities required to keep the input function while on rental; 
since such maintenance (e. g., feeding and other care required) is crucial for the proper 
functioning of draft animals, for example, it is more difficult for rental markets for draft 
animals to develop (or if a rental market emerges, the term of rental would tend to be short 
term, rather than long term, rental) than it is for lumpy inputs that require less maintenance (e. 
                                                        
58 Banerjee (1999: 3) notes, however, such increasing return should be smaller in agriculture than in other 
industries due to relatively slow pace of technological change and relatively smaller importance of talent in 
production success in agriculture.   
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g., machine).  (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986)   
 
 Furthermore, a major force counteracting potential sources of scale economies is the 
‘agency problem’ contributing to greater inefficiency of larger farms.  In the present context, 
agency problem arises because large farms usually require hired labor force while small farms 
are typically cultivated by family labor; unlike family labor (whose labor effort is easily 
monitored or who are motivated to work diligently), in order to prevent hired labor force from 
opportunistic behavior of not working sufficiently hard it is necessary to monitor the work 
effort of these laborers or tenants.  In agriculture, such labor monitoring tends to be costly, 
leading to relative inefficiency of larger farms, which tend to depend more heavily on hired 
labor force, vis-à-vis smaller farms, which mainly depends on family labor.  Feder (1985) 
has shown, for example, that the presence of such costly monitoring of hired labor coupled 
with the limited access to credit (e. g., available credit amount being constrained by the 
amount of land owned that is used as collateral) can lead to the often observed (see below) 
‘inverse’ relationship between farm size and productivity.59  Thus if such ‘agency problem’ 
is serious, braking-up large farms into smaller units would enhance overall production 
efficiency.   
 
 In addition, if operators of large farms can choose optimal contract forms60 then 
making laborers residual claimants, i. e., making them fixed-rent tenants, would provide 
maximum incentive to work hard, but it also makes the laborers or tenants bear all the risks as 
well.  If they are (more) risk averse (than large farmers or farm managers) it could be in both 
parties’ interest to move away from fixed-rent contract to sharing arrangement, leading again 
to lower work incentive. (a la Stiglitz 1974)  In such situations, again, land redistribution can 
enhance overall efficiency if the degree of risk aversion among farm workers/tenants is 
dependent on wealth.   
 
 In a recent paper, however, Banerjee (1999) cautions that there are a few distinct 
theoretical possibilities where redistributive land reforms may not lead to any efficiency gains 
(or even to negative productivity effects) despite the presence of the seemingly ‘inverse 
relationship’ between farm size and productivity which has been consistently observed in 
empirical studies from various parts of the world (see below).  For example, in the context of 
the previous paragraph, if the degree of risk aversion among landless laborers or tenants 
                                                        
59 Even if monitoring is not very costly, Banerjee (1999) argues that, agency problems leading to greater 
inefficiency of larger farms relative to smaller ones could also result from the limitation on enforcement.  
Hired laborers may face weaker incentives to work hard because there is a limit, physically or socially, as to 
how much poor laborers can be punished when they are found not working diligently enough –taking away 
too much as punishment from poor laborers could well be counterproductive (thus such a threat of 
punishment non credible) since such a punishment could render laborers run away or rebel.  Alternatively, 
larger farmers (or managers of large farms) could reward rather than punish laborers in order to provide 
work incentives but rewarding costs money.   
60 Feder (1985)’s model considers only wage labor as the labor hiring contract in his analysis of possible 
relationship between farm size and productivity.  To what extent land owners can choose contract forms 
(i.e., among fixed-wage, share tenancy and fixed rent lease) depends on social contexts such as current land 
reform regulations and the fear of future land reform granting ownership to the ‘tiller.’   
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depends on the combination of individual heterogeneity and self-selection (i. e., the landless 
are more risk averse than landowners because the landless are inherently risk averse people 
who self-selected into the position of laborer/tenants since such positions (occupations) need 
not bear much risks –consequently their attitudes toward risk do not change even if they 
become richer), rather than due to the fact that the degree of risk aversion is a function of 
wealth, then land re-distribution will not enhance efficiency.61  More generally, Banerjee 
(1999)’s discussion suggests that if the observed ‘inverse relationship’ stems solely from some 
exogenous characteristics of the small farmers or the lands they till, rather than endogenous 
factors dependent on the fact that the small farmers are relatively asset poor vis-à-vis larger 
farmers, then land redistribution would not enhance efficiency (though still enhancing equity).   
 
 Apart from the ‘agency problem’ and the resultant ‘inverse relation’ between farm 
size and productivity, another theoretical justification for redistributive land reform is the 
nutrition-based ‘efficiency wage’ argument.62  The main argument here is that labor 
efficiency is affected by income; higher incomes or wealth lead to better nutrition and thus 
more productive workers.  For example, Dasgupta and Ray (1996, 1997) show that assetless 
laborers or tenants, who are usually at the bottom of the social strata in rural areas, tend to be 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis laborers or tenants with some assets in rural agricultural labor 
market63 since the assetless require higher wages per output than those with some assets to be 
employable (while performing work requires certain levels of income to obtain minimum 
amount of food, those with assets can under-cut their wage rates to obtain jobs by 
supplementing incomes from non-labor asset incomes but the assetless need to obtain all 
incomes from wage thus making their required wage higher than those with assets64); thus 
assetless laborers/tenants suffer involuntary unemployment and malnutrition.  If those 
assetless are malnourished, according to this model, redistribution of asset (land) from 
landlords (who do not enter into agricultural labor market) to the landless would lead not only 
to reduction of malnutrition and of poverty but also to higher overall outputs through the 
increased productivity of the impoverished.  (Dasgupta and Ray 1987, Dasgupta 1993)  
Moene (1992)’s model builds on Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987) to include urban sector and 
examine further the relationship between the amount of total land endowment and effects of 
land reform; model shows, among others, that in a highly land scarce society redistributive 
land reform reduces poverty in both rural and urban areas (while in relatively more land 
                                                        
61 Another possibility cited is that small farms may tend to be better land; they may be ‘better,’ for example, 
in the sense of being safer lands where crop failure is less likely and smaller farmers likely place high 
premium on such safety than larger farmers.  In this case, if higher productivity of smaller farmers is 
solely due to exogenous land quality (rather than endogenous land investments or improvements which 
depend on incentives faced by the tenants), again re-distributive land reform would have no 
incentive/productivity effects.   
62 Early references to this line of literature include: Leibenstein (1957), Mirrlees (1975), Stiglitz (1976), 
Bliss and Stern (1978).  Rosenzweig (1988) is an early critique, mainly on empirical grounds (see below).   
63 The focus of attention here is the markets for casual agricultural labor in rural areas on which most of 
the poorest depend on for their livelihood and which are more or less competitive.   
64 In other words, the wage level at which the landless can be productive enough (i. e., the level of their 
‘efficiency wage’) is higher than the ‘efficiency wage’ level of the potential laborers with some assets, 
which makes the landless less attractive candidates for employee from potential employers’ point of view.   
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abundant society such is not necessarily the case), and that redistributive land reform always 
increase aggregate agricultural production while urban-modern sector production could 
decline in certain circumstances.  Both of these theoretical models generally65 support the 
view that land reform enhances both equity and efficiency.   
 
Empirical Evidence  
 
 In this sub-section, we will briefly review empirical evidence on the relative 
productivity of large versus small farms, as well as on the nutrition-based ‘efficiency wage 
theory’ that justifies redistributive land reform.  If smaller farms are more efficient or more 
productive than larger farms then redistributive land reform is likely to lead to both better 
efficiency and better equity with a possible exception of the case of agency problem arising 
from exogenous, rather than endogenous, risk averse behavior among laborers/tenants.  
Whether that is really the case is an empirical question.   
 
 Like the empirical studies on the relative efficiency of alternative land tenancy 
contract arrangements, investigating the effects of farm size on productivity is complicated by 
the difficulties in controlling fully for all the other factors, other than the farm size, 
simultaneously affecting productivity.  Indeed, despite the large number of empirical studies 
found in the literature, none appears to be successful in controlling for all those factors.  
(Binswanger, et al. 1995)  Nevertheless, it has long been recognized in the empirical 
literature that small family operated farms tend to yield larger amount of production per 
hectare than do larger farms.  In one of the well known studies, for example, Berry and Cline 
(1979) find with their cross-country analysis that land tends to be used more intensively on 
smaller farms than on larger farms with such differentials relatively more pronounced in land 
abundant countries.  Based on micro data from six developing countries (i. e., Brazil, 
Colombia, the Philippines, Pakistan, India and Malaysia) Berry and Cline (1979) also find 
consistently negative relationship between farm size and per hectare yields.  A recent 
literature review by Binswanger, et al. (1995) similarly argue that three of the more carefully 
controlled empirical studies from Malaysia and Brazil in Berry and Cline (1979) and from 
India by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) all found negative relationship between farm 
size and profit per unit wealth, and conclude that “even in fairly technologically advanced and 
mechanized areas . . . small farms retain a productivity advantage over large farms” 
suggesting “that rental markets can substitute to a certain degree for the indivisibility of 
machines and some management skills.”  (Binwanger, et al. 1995: 2706)66   
                                                        
65 A main point of these theoretical exercises is to investigate specific conditions which may or may not 
prevent such outcomes.   
66 Additional generalizations based on their review of empirical literature include: (1) the relative 
productivity advantage of smaller farms tends to be larger where land holding inequalities are larger and 
also in land-abundant countries, such as in Latin America and Africa, (2) the highest per unit areas is often 
observed not on the smallest farms (who tend to be part-time farmers) but on the second-smallest farm size 
class (where full-time farmers prevail), (3) some plantation crops, represented by sugarcane in Brazil do not 
indicate negative farm-size productivity relationship, (4) when land quality is controlled for the relative 
productivity advantage of smaller farms weakens but does not disappear, and (5) introduction of green 
revolution technology in India led to weakening but not the disappearance of raw productivity differentials.    
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 More specifically on the Philippines, the 1960 agricultural census data indicate that at 
the national aggregate level per hectare yield tends to decline as farm size increases.  Based 
on crop by crop comparisons, however, per hectare yields do not vary much across farm sizes 
in producing rice, sugar cane, coconuts and corn, although there appeared to be slight negative 
relations in rice and coconut, and slight positive relations in sugar cane and corn, between 
farm size and per hectare yield.  (Berry and Cline 1979: chapter 4)  The 1980 agricultural 
census also showed generally similar patterns of little systematic relationship between farm 
size and productivity. (Hayami, et al. 1990)  Per hectare rice yields were similar across farm 
sizes although they were slightly higher on very small farms (those below 1 hectare, with per 
hectare yields between 2.4 and 2.6 tons) than among slightly larger-small farms (those with 1 
hectare or larger with per hectare yields between 1.9 and 2.2).  Even among the typical cash 
crops which are traditionally major earners of foreign exchanges, and for whose lands 
redistributive land reform had long been exempted prior to the 1988 CARP due to the alleged 
existence of scale economy, there does not appear to exist strong evidence supporting 
economies of scale in production.  For example, per tree coconut yields do not appear to vary 
much across farm sizes although the farm size of the 2 to 3 hectare range has slightly higher 
yields than do farms of below or above this range.  Based on this and other evidence 
including their own field observations, Hayami, et al. (1990) conclude that there is no support 
for the existence of scale economies in coconut production, as does Habito (1988).  Hayami, 
et al. (1990) and Habito (1988) also note the higher intensity in intercropping on the coconut 
lands by smaller farmers than by larger farmers, indicating the higher per hectare agricultural 
output (including coconuts and other crops that are intercropped) on smaller coconut farms 
than on larger farms.   
 
 On the other hand, per hectare sugar yields do tend to be moderately higher on larger 
farms than on smaller farms but per hectare production costs also tend to be higher on larger 
farms than on smaller farms.67  (Hayami, et al. 1990)    Such patterns appear to reflect, 
according to Hayami, et al. (1990), the fact that yield-increasing modern inputs were used on 
larger farms beyond socially optimal level, which in turn is a result of their preferential access 
to subsidized credit.  If such an interpretation is warranted then, despite the seemingly 
existent scale economy in the per hectare yield data, subdivision of large scale sugar farms 
into small family sized farms is likely to lead to more efficient input use in sugar production.  
Furthermore, Hayami, et al. (1990) note some examples of institutional development to 
circumvent potential scale economies due to lumpy inputs (e. g., tractor use) or coordination 
between growers and processing (e. g., in sugar) in some parts of the Philippines; for example, 
rental markets for large tractors (markets for custom-plowing services) were observed in sugar 
areas in Batangas and Bukidnon where both small and large sugar plantations coexist68, and 
                                                        
67 A small household data set taken from small/medium holder communities in Bukidnon province also 
indicates somewhat higher sugar yields on relatively larger farms (above 2 hectares) than on smaller farms.  
(Bouis and Haddad 1990)   
68 Hayami, et al (1995) noted the possible economies of scale in sugarcane production up to 50 hectare due 
to the use of a large tractor for deep plowing as expressed by many planters and technicians during their 
field interviews in Negros, but argue that such potential source of scale economy can be counteracted for 
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an example is found of successful coordination of sugarcane delivery scheduling between a 
sugar mill and small scale sugar planters in Batangas.  (Hayami, et al. 1990: Chapter 6)   
 
 Nor is there much evidence of scale economy in typical plantation crops, which are 
often operated by large multinational firms.  According to the data reported in Tsurumi 
(1982: its original source is David 1981), for example, under the management of the same 
multinational corporation the average per hectare yield of banana was higher among small 
scale contract farms (average farm size being 7 hectares) than among the large-scale corporate 
plantations (size ranging between 500 and 1000 hectares).  Similarly, per hectare yield 
comparisons for pineapples (between small farms and corporate plantations) indicate no 
significant difference across farm sizes.  (Hayami, et al. 1990: chapter 6)  Hayami, et al. 
(1990: 144) add, however, that “[u]nder the prevailing set-up, the need for precision in 
production control and coordination to meet the demands of marketing/processing operations 
appears to be so great for banana and pineapple that the cost of coordination and supervision 
of a large number of small contract growers appears to be greater than that of a centrally 
managed wage laborers.”   
 
 Furthermore, a longitudinal micro study in a Laguna village during the period 
between the 1970s and the 1980s also show no significant yield differentials in rice production 
across farm sizes.  (Hayami and Kikuchi 200069)  In addition, Umehara (1997) finds in a 
Nueva Ecija rice village that larger land holders in the community (meaning the Marcos land 
reform beneficiaries, who were mostly CLT holders) tended to rent out a part of their land; 
this also indicate the lack of any scale economy in the rice bowl.  The household data taken 
from the Bukidnon province in the mid-1980s also appear to indicate little relationship 
between corn yields and farm size.  (Bouis and Haddad 1990)  Thus, on the whole, strong 
support for the ‘inverse relation’ between the farm size and productivity is not found in the 
Philippines.  Rather, there does not appear to be any strong systematic relationship between 
farm size and productivity (with a possible exception of sugar production).  This indicate that 
redistributive land reform is not likely to result in any loss in total production, including the 
plantation sectors where substantial economies of scale are often said to exist.  We should 
note, however, that none of the empirical studies from the Philippines comes close to the ideal 
study with appropriate measures of productivity and with appropriate control variables, as 
discussed in Binswanger, et al. (1995).   
 
 Apart from the possible scale diseconomies observed in larger farms, another distinct 
argument for land redistribution is based on the nutrition-based ‘efficiency wage’ theory as we 
saw above.  According to this argument, if household access to land affects labor 
productivity of its members through their nutritional status, this provides an additional case 
                                                                                                                                                                             
smaller farms once rental markets for tractor services develop.   
69 Hayami and Kikuchi (2000) do find a significant yield differential between larger (2 hectares and above) 
and smaller farms in their 1995 data in the same village; the emergence of such differential is attributed to 
the faster utilization of privately-owned pump irrigation by larger farmers than by smaller farms in response 
to the degradation in the national irrigation system.  As access to pump irrigation spreads, via private 
ownership or via the development of rental market, however, such yield differential is likely to diminish.   
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for land redistribution which enhances both efficiency and equity.  One crucial proposition in 
this theory is that wealth holding and nutritional status affect productivity.  Empirical results 
(and the interpretations of them) on this subject in the literature have been somewhat 
controversial, partly due to various technical and data issues.  While Rosenzweig (1988: 720) 
concluded, based on an early set of empirical evidence, that “it is unclear if the [nutrition-
based efficiency wage] model has any relevance to any known population on this planet,” 
more recent reviews of the literature indicate that there has increasingly been an accumulation 
of evidence from more recent studies that nutritional and health status is significantly 
associated with higher labor productivity.  (e. g., see Strauss and Thomas 1995)  For 
example, data from Bukidnon province in the Philippines, where many of the workers are 
sugarcane cutters, show that the nutritional status or calorie intake has significant effects on 
market wages.  (Haddad and Bouis 1991; Foster and Rosenzweig 1992, 1994)  To the 
extent such evidence support the efficiency-wage argument land re-distribution is likely to 
raise productivity among the poor landless laborers or tenants.   
 
3-3. Conclusions on the Economics of Land Reform  
 
 In this section we have discussed some major economic issues involved in land 
reform policies.  A major component of explaining both the potential ‘Marshallian’ 
inefficiency of share tenancy and the potential ‘inverse relationship’ between farm size and 
productivity is the higher supervision costs of the hired labor/tenants as opposed to the family 
labor.  However, the empirical literature has tended to suggest that such higher supervision 
costs of hired labor/tenants is not generally very serious in the Philippines, except in the 
plantation sector, although the issue does not appear to be quite settled (e. g., the evidence 
from Foster and Rosenzweig 1994 to the contrary).  There has been relatively little evidence 
of either inefficiency of share tenancy or of systematic inverse relationship between farm size 
and productivity in the Philippines, in contrast with South Asia.  This, in turn, suggests that 
prohibiting share tenancy has no efficiency gains while it likely had negative equity effects.   
 
 Furthermore, it also follows that not much efficiency gains can be expected from land 
redistribution per se in the Philippines either, unlike in the areas where much stronger inverse 
relation between farm size and productivity has been observed.  It appears rather unlikely 
that the redistributive land reform under PD27, which had substantial income redistribution 
effects in some geographically limited areas in Central and Southern Luzon, was a major 
factor with the increase in the rice production observed in the 1970s.  The lack of strong 
systematic relationship between farm size and productivity in the Philippines also suggests 
that much efficiency loss is not likely to arise from redistributive land reform even in the 
traditionally more controversial plantation/cash crop sectors.  In the Philippines, therefore, 
redistributive land reform can be seen mainly as a policy instrument for equitable asset 
distribution and rural poverty reduction, but, perhaps, not so much as a policy for increased 
production in agriculture.   
 
4. Alternative Land Reform Designs  
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 The foregoing discussion on the politics and economics of land reform leads to the 
question: what should the government do (or not do)?  This section reviews recent policy 
debates on designing land reform programs.  The main policy questions arising in the 
Philippine context include: (1) Is tenancy regulation desirable?; (2) Is redistributive land 
reform desirable?; (3) And if redistribution is desirable, how should the government design 
policies to facilitate land redistribution that benefits the rural poor?   
 
4-1. A Strong Consensus on the Negative Effects of Tenancy Regulation  
 
 There is a strong consensus among economists that regulating tenancy, such as the 
prohibition of share tenancy under the Philippine agrarian reform code, likely has negative 
efficiency and negative equity implications.  Theoretical arguments suggest that share 
tenancy can be an important device for risk sharing between landowners and tenants or for 
working capital finance (if share tenancy entails cost sharing, as is often the case) under the 
condition of market imperfection in insurance and credit.  Generally, there has been 
relatively little empirical evidence to support the existence of so called ‘Marshallian 
inefficiency’ of share tenancy although the literature does not seem conclusive.  Furthermore, 
tenancy regulation could limit the access to land by landless laborers by way of becoming 
tenant farmers (i. e., via agricultural ladder).  It also reduced land access by former tenant 
farmers by providing incentives for landowners to evict their tenants and to engage in (likely 
inefficient) direct farming coupled with long-term wage laborer arrangements.  More 
generally, as Binswanger et al. (1995) conclude, “[t]he empirical evidence suggests that 
government interventions into … [tenancy and sharecropping] … have had little success in 
achieving their stated objective of protecting tenants, which is hardly surprising given the 
market imperfections leading to the emergence of share tenancy.”  Economists thus agree, in 
discussing alternative land reform designs, that the tenancy regulation prohibiting the share 
tenancy contract should be abolished.  (Banerjee 1999, Balisacan 1990, Hayami, et al. 1990, 
Hayami and Kikuchi 1982, 2000, Hayami and Otsuka 1993, Lipton 1990, Binswanger, et 
al.1995, Rashid and Quibria 1995)   
 
4-2. On Land Redistribution: Alternative Policy Options  
 
 Given the ineffectiveness or undesirability of tenancy regulation, it follows, the 
efficiency and equity objectives of land reform could better be addressed through land 
redistribution rather than tenancy reform.  “Historically,” argue Binswanger et al. (1995), 
“land reform that resulted in establishing owner-operated farms appears to have been a far 
more successful way of addressing the equity question.”  As we saw above, there is a strong 
theoretical as well as empirical case for land redistribution for both potential efficiency as well 
as apparent equity gains although the efficiency gains may be somewhat limited in the 
Philippine context.   
 
 Generally, ‘[o]perating on their own, land sales markets are notably thin, segmented, 
and exclusionary of the poor. . . Indeed, land markets have failed to autonomously allocate 
land to smallholders inspite of the presumed inverse relation. . . . Special interventions are 
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consequently needed if the rural poor are to participate to [sic] these markets.’  (de Janvry et. 
al. 1998)  The question is how such interventions can best be designed.  While most 
discussions in the literature on land reform by economists note, as we did in the previous 
section, that land redistribution is desirable in principle, on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds, there is yet to emerge a clear consensus on how best to design the policies to 
implement land redistribution.   
 
a. Is land reform the best way of re-distributing wealth?  
 
 Despite the near unanimity on the desirability of asset redistribution for both 
efficiency and equity grounds, some economists wonder whether land redistribution is the best 
means of redistribution.  Theories supporting the efficiency gains from wealth distribution 
support any kind of asset distribution, not necessarily land.  In theory, the government could 
expropriate lands, sell them and distribute the proceeds to the beneficiaries, which economists 
would tend to prefer (to distributing land) because the beneficiaries then have a choice of 
purchasing land as well as other alternatives which they might prefer.  Extending along this 
line of argument, Rashid and Quibria (1995)’s detailed survey concludes that “land reform is 
passe” due mainly to political and administrative difficulties involved despite the strong 
economic rationale on both equity and efficiency grounds (to which the authors very much 
agree70); summarizing their argument, Rashid and Quibria (1995: 129) note that “[i]f a State is 
too weak to enforce justice and legislate appropriate taxes, it is too weak to enact effective 
land reform; if a State is strong enough to uphold the law and enforce its taxes, it can achieve 
all the goals claimed for land reform through other, less interventionist, means.”   
 
 The case for land redistribution rather than redistributing money could be made 
(only) if all the poor landless would want to buy land even if given the option of investing in 
something else with the same amount of money, in which case redistributing land saves 
transactions costs compared to the case where expropriating lands, selling it, distributing the 
money and then buying back the lands by the beneficiaries; not much appears to be known, 
however, whether such is the case.  (Banerjee 1999)  Nevertheless, some would argue that 
rural poor would prefer acquiring land to any other alternative investment, given the 
perception of many Filipino peasants that land “is more than an economic factor of production, 
but is also an integral part of the social, cultural and political being of peasants.” (Borras 
1999: 137)  In addition, recent both theoretical and empirical literature on intra-household 
resource allocation indicates that the household head does not necessarily act in the collective 
interest of the household; if there are conflicts of interests within the household or between the 
current and future generations, then “the goal of redistribution may be better served by giving 
the family an asset rather than money” thereby preventing a husband “from decamping with 
the money, leaving his wife and children.”  (Banergee, 1999: 15-16)   
 
 Also land reform implementation requires administrative costs as well as state 
                                                        
70 Rashid and Quibria (1995) do caution, however, that in the realm of the economics of land reform the yet-
largely-unexplored issues involved in the effects of land reform on gender and environmental issues “can turn out 
to be a serious lacuna.”    
 63 
subsidy that fills the gap between the landowner compensation and the beneficiaries’ 
amortization (the effective subsidy rate under CARP has been said to be roughly 10% — 
Borras 1999), which must be provided by fiscal resources.  Unfortunately relatively little is 
known in the existing empirical literature on the relative returns (in terms of, say, poverty 
reduction) on government investment in alternative activities between land redistribution and 
other investment, such as infrastructure, or other services for the poor, such as education and 
health.  (Banerjee 1999)  One study that attempts to address this question (albeit in a 
somewhat limited way) is Balisacan and Bacawag (1995) who caution against diverting fiscal 
resources from infrastructure development and education toward land reform administration; 
based on household-level earnings function (control variables at the household-level include 
age, sex and education of household head, household size and the number of household 
members employed, but not land holding) regression they find that effects of reducing the 
regional-level average inequality in landholdings down to the national average in the areas 
where land distribution is highly skewed has relatively little impact on household income 
while improving access to road and electricity in under-served regions up to the level of the 
national mean has a larger impact on household income.71  They also find that improving 
access to education up to high school level has a large impact.72   
 
b. Social costs of delayed reform  
 
 Despite some skepticism about the cost-effectiveness of administering land 
redistribution, however, one additional argument for land reform could be the social costs of 
delayed reform.  Given the nature of land as the ‘integral part of socio, cultural and political 
being’ as perceived by Filipino peasants, it is likely that the demand for land redistribution is 
likely to continue to be quite high in rural areas.  As the Philippine history shows the social 
costs of the un-satisfied demand for land redistribution, seen as social justice, is likely to be 
high, manifesting through various levels of violence.  Such consideration thus could provide 
a justification for land redistribution in the current Philippine context.  More generally, many 
analysts emphasize the important role of peasant discontent in incidents of regional and 
national violence, and “[i]n many countries, protracted and violent struggles have significantly 
reduced the performance of the agricultural sector and the economy as a whole.”  
(Binswanger, et al. 1995: 2691)   
 
c. Land re-distribution is not enough  
                                                        
71 The authors note a few potential caveats, however, such as the somewhat limited geographical coverage 
(17% of total farm area in 6 out of 12 agricultural regions is covered in the simulation) and its partial 
equilibrium nature (e. g., effects of inter-regional labor migration implied by the simulated land re-
distribution is not taken into account).  Furthermore, since the earnings equations are estimated with cross-
section data, if policy variables (e. g,. regional allocation of electricity, roads and farm size distribution) are 
endogenous with respect to household income, then the estimated impact of policies on household earnings 
could be biased.  (See, for example, Binswanger, et al. 1993, for this line of argument and for a 
methodology for overcoming such a potential problem.) 
72 In the household earnings function, education of household head is controlled at the household level 
while the effects of farm size is controlled by the regional average (but not at the household-level).  It is 
thus not clear whether policy impacts are directly comparable between the two.    
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 All advocates of redistributive land reform, however, agree that simply redistributing 
lands to the landless poor would not achieve equity nor efficiency objectives of land reform.  
The ultimate achievement of land reform program would not be so much land redistribution 
per se as enabling reform beneficiaries to become “competitive in the context of liberalized 
markets and a sharply reduced role of the state.”  (de Janvry, et al. 1999: 14)  Thus 
additional measures are needed to ensure that small family farms constitute a stable class and 
that lands not be re-consolidated into large landholdings, as has sometimes happened 
historically.  Most observers agree that one of the most important of such additional 
measures is the elimination of distortionary government interventions favoring larger farms 
vis-à-vis small farms, prior to land redistribution.  These distortionary interventions include 
taxes, output and input subsidies and subsidized credit schemes which larger landowners tend 
to have disproportional access.  More specifically in the Philippine context, argues Balisacan 
(1996), the high import protection for sugar producers and the so-called ‘safety nets’ intended 
to cushion the impact of the GATT ratification on agriculture (including concessional credit, 
output support prices, post-harvest facilities and subsidies to cooperatives) fall into such 
distortionary interventions.  Such distortions make land values for large owners to be higher 
than the discounted sum of agricultural profits.  With such distortions, after land 
redistribution small farmers are likely to have an incentive to sell out their newly acquired 
lands to larger farmers.   
 
 Another policy measure to complement land redistribution is to ensure access to 
complementary inputs and to output markets by reform beneficiaries.  Making appropriate 
institutional arrangements would be needed for extension services, credit and markets.  
(Binswanger, et al. 1995)  Furthermore, a few others advocate a progressive land tax as one 
of the effective measures of discouraging possible land re-consolidation.  (Hayami, et al. 
1990, Otsuka 1996; see below for more on land taxation)  In addition, a longitudinal study 
from Northern Luzon village shows that access to education is one of the major determinants 
of social mobility between the small-farmer and the landless classes, thereby indicating that 
educational investment could be another additional measure to ensure the stability of the 
reform beneficiaries.  (Fuwa 1999)   
 
d. Retention limits and restrictions on land sales  
 
 Measures often used to ensure the stability of reform beneficiaries and to prevent the 
re-consolidation of lands by large landowners include the ban on land sales by the reform 
beneficiaries and landholding retention limits.  CARP prohibits sale or transfer of lands by 
reform beneficiaries for a period of 10 years except through hereditary succession or except 
for sales to the government, to the Land Bank of the Philippines or to other qualified reform 
beneficiaries.  It has been estimated, however, that about 30% of farmer beneficiaries have 
engaged in currently ‘illegal’ land sales.  (Garilao: 1998: 33, 39)  Also under CARP 
landholding retention limits were set at 5 hectares (plus 3 hectares for each child of the 
landowner provided the child is at least 15 years old and is actually tilling the land or directly 
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managing it) for landowners73 and at 3 hectares for the reform beneficiaries.   
 
 There appears to be a broad consensus that crop-specific retention limits (e. g., 
PD27’s retention limits on rice and corn lands) or retention limits based on the organization of 
farm (e. g., exemptions for commercial farms under CARP, or reform coverage of only 
tenanted farms under PD27) are distortionary and thus should be avoided.  (e. g., Banerjee 
1999, Binswanger, et al. 1995, Hayami, et al. 1990)  To the extent a retention limit is 
desirable such limit should be applied uniformly regardless of crop types or of farm 
organization.  Furthermore, the major role played by retention limits in preventing new land 
(re-)consolidation in the ‘successful’ land reforms in the past, such as in Japan and in Korea, 
has been recognized.  (Binswanger, et al. 1995)   
 
 Desirability (or undesirability) of restrictions on land sales for the reform 
beneficiaries, on the other hand, appears much less straightforward, and no clear-cut answer 
seems to exist.  To the extent the ‘negotiated’ land reform schemes (see next subsection) can 
self-select farmer beneficiaries who are more likely to be viable/competitive farmers, 
potentials for land sales after redistribution could be mitigated by use of such mode of 
redistribution.  However, some fundamental issues still remain.  On the one hand, the non-
transferability of land diminishes collateral value of the land and thus restricts severely the 
critically needed access to credit by the reform beneficiaries. (Geron 1994 for empirical 
evidence)  Such limited access to credit, as combined with land rental regulation, has 
sometimes led to sub-optimal land rental or labor contracts as a partial substitute for credit. 
(Binswanger, et al. 1995, Hayami and Otsuka 1993)  In addition, ban on land sales could 
also limit potentially efficiency-enhancing land redistribution —such as potentially more 
talented farmers taking up farming— or could limit land sales for consumption smoothing; 
talented farmers, however, can obtain and expand farm operation by renting or leasing if land 
rental markets are de-regulated, which most observers advocate,74 and, to the extent the 
beneficiaries may need to sell parts of their land for consumption-smoothing purposes, ban on 
land sales could be complemented with emergency income assistance, such as a food-for-work 
program. (Banerjee 1999)   
 
 On the positive side, on the other hand, ban on land sales could be desirable in the 
early years after redistribution if land markets are thin and accurate information is not 
available on the expected stream of incomes from the land; Binswanger, et al. (1995) argue, 
for example, that a temporary ban on land sales of up to three to four years would be 
                                                        
73 Landowners whose lands were previously covered under PD27 and homestead grantees (or their direct 
compulsory heirs) were allowed to retain their original 7 hectare and 24 hectare retention limits, 
respectively.   
74 The issue could still remain that, to the extent land renting is less secure claim on land than full-
ownership (otherwise ban on land sales would have no effect in the first place), investment in land by such 
talented tenants would be discouraged.  Such negative effects, argues Banerjee (1999), can be mitigated 
somewhat by making it easier, through publicly funded research on agricultural technology, better 
extension services, infrastructure investments and improved credit access, for land owners to make 
necessary investments.   
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reasonable.  Such is not generally the case, however, in the ‘land-to-the tiller’ reform (e. g., 
PD27) since the current ‘tillers’ (tenants) are likely to be reasonably familiar with the 
productive values of their land.   
 
 In addition, a major advantage of a ‘permanent reform’ by restricting land sales could 
be that it reduces uncertainly; once there is one reform there can always arise a social pressure 
for another one, which is always costly (politically, fiscally, and administratively), if the land 
distribution reverts to being too unequal again, and this would provide disincentive to 
investing in lands.  Such argument thus becomes a justification for some kind of restriction 
on land sales.  (Banerjee 1999)  In this regard, removing any distortions encouraging the 
tendency for land re-consolidation would become all the more critical.  Nevertheless, to what 
extent such measures could eliminate the possible future pressures for redistribution is not 
clear.   
 
e. Alternative modes of land redistribution  
 
 Traditionally redistributive land reform programs have mostly been ‘state-led’ in the 
sense that state initiates land redistribution by expropriating and distributing private lands or 
by resettlement on public lands.  State-led land reform in the post-World War II period 
resulted in swift and substantial land re-distribution, effectively eliminating landlordism and 
establishing small-scale owner family farms, in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  However, 
it has become increasingly understood that such successful results of state-led land reform 
were partially attributable to special socio-political circumstances (e. g., occupation by the U. 
S. forces in the case of Japan) that cannot be replicated in many other currently developing 
countries including the Philippines.  (Balisacan 1990, Hayami, et al. 1990, Putzel 1992, 
Rashid and Quibria 1995)  As we saw in section one, the record of state-led land reform 
legislation and its implementation in the Philippines has been an extremely slow process filled 
with cases of resistance, evasion and corruption.  Similarly in Latin America, the sixty-year 
history of state-led land reforms has still left the fundamental aims of the land reform, i. e., 
providing land access to rural poor and rendering reform beneficiaries competitive in the 
market place, incomplete.  (de Janvry, et. al. 1999)   
 
 Such disappointing results of the state-led land reforms worldwide have led many to 
search for alternative land reform designs.  Such alternative approaches to state-led land 
redistribution, according to de Janvry, et al. (1999), can be grouped into two categories: 
‘negotiated’ (also known as ‘market-assisted’ or ‘market-based’), on the one hand, and ‘grass-
roots initiated,’ on the other.  One of the most notable examples of the ‘grassroots-initiated’ 
land reform can be found in Brazil.  Over its 15 year history, the Rural Landless Workers’ 
Movement (MST), a grassroots organization (GRO), “has helped to establish more than 1,100 
land reform settlements by mobilizing approximately 145,000 families to occupy 
unproductive land and pressuring the government to negotiate for title to the property.” (de 
Janvry, et al. 1999: 13)  De Janvry, et al (1999) note that the ‘success’ of the MST in Brazil 
is a rather special case and do not foresee its replication even in other relatively land abundant 
Latin American countries.  While in the Philippines somewhat similar attempts for land 
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redistribution initiated by organized land occupation emerged during the initial years of the 
Aquino administration even their very limited ‘success’ was largely due to the rather special 
socio-political circumstances after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship (Kirkvliet 1993), and 
these attempts were never viable alternative land reform operation.  Nevertheless, the success 
of Brazil’s MST, as well as the recent experiences in land reform implementation in the 
Philippines, does underline the importance of grass-roots mobilization/initiatives and of the 
appropriate state-society coordination/linkages at both local and national levels, and thus 
should be taken into account when searching for an alternative land reform design.  (Borras 
1999, de Janvry, et al. 1999)  
 
 In the rest of this subsection, we will review recent discussions on ‘negotiated’ land 
reform as an alternative to the state-led land reform.  In response to the disappointing records 
of traditional state-led land reform programs, ‘negotiated’ land reform programs have been 
experimented in recent years in Colombia, Guatemala, Brazil and South Africa.  The specific 
contexts triggering the introduction of these ‘negotiated’ land reform programs differ among 
countries.  While in Colombia the loss of the traditional source of finance for the country’s 
land reform agency (INCORA), as well as the nearly 35 years of unsatisfactory achievements 
of the state-led reform programs under INCORA, resulted in the new reform experiments, the 
search for an administratively cheap and quick implementation scheme at state level led to a 
market assisted pilot scheme in Brazil.  In South Africa, on the other hand, the main reasons 
for its pilot schemes utilizing negotiated reform were the felt need to maintain public 
confidence in land markets and respect for property rights. (Deininger 1999)   
 
 Nevertheless, there are a few basic features that are common among different country 
programs (Banerjee 1999; Deininger 1999; de Janvry, et al. 1999):  
(1) Land transfer is voluntary and demand-driven; beneficiaries are self-selected (except for 
the Colombian case) and desirable lands are identified by the beneficiaries, with the 
assistance of grass-roots organizations, peasant organizations and NGOs, and land 
purchases are ‘negotiated’ between buyer and seller with government mediation.   
(2) As a consequence, no target is set a priori for the type of lands, the number of 
beneficiaries, the amount of lands to be transferred, or a time frame.    
(3) In order to ensure economic viability of the reform beneficiary farms, some of these 
programs require the selection of beneficiaries based on ‘productive projects’ or ‘farm 
plan’ (outlining crops grown, input requirements, and complementary investments) before 
acquiring lands.   
(4) The major roles of the government are to help determine appropriate land price, to provide 
subsidy to the landless beneficiaries for land purchase, and to provide various support 
services to beneficiaries so their farms become economically viable.    
 
 Such basic design features of the ‘negotiated’ land reform appear to have a few major 
advantages.  Perhaps the key feature of these ‘negotiated’ reform experiments concerns its 
reliance on local information and local initiatives for beneficiary identification and technical 
assistance.  One major constraint on the state-led reform programs has been the fact that 
government is often ill-equipped to acquire critical local information such as potentially 
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successful beneficiaries, lands suitable for redistribution and necessary assistance that reform 
beneficiaries might need in order to establish viable and competitive farm operations.  Being 
demand-driven, ‘negotiated’ land reform schemes address the problem of such information 
asymmetry between the government and reform beneficiaries by leaving the identification of 
beneficiaries and lands to the beneficiary self-selection, thereby leading to better targeting in 
terms of economic viability and competitiveness of beneficiaries.  Furthermore, ‘negotiated’ 
reform schemes tap local information by facilitating involvement of NGO/PO/GRO, which 
have better access to local information (esp. the local needs of the beneficiaries), in land 
redistribution and provision of support services.  Also, the requirements of drawing up a 
productive project /farm plan for potential beneficiaries before land acquisition, as is done in 
the Colombian case, likely enhance the identification of beneficiaries more likely to be 
successful.  It is less clear, however, to what extent such a scheme can well target the poorest 
population.  The role of NGO/PO/GROs in encouraging and assisting the participation by the 
poor is likely to be crucial for greater equity.   
 
 Secondly, since buyers and sellers negotiate directly, reform beneficiaries (buyers) 
are likely to have better incentives to negotiate for lower prices than would the land reform 
bureaucracy (such as DAR).  Given the many scandals and other cases of abuse involving the 
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program under CARP, this feature could potentially be a major 
improvement vis-à-vis the state-led reform programs, where state officials who negotiate the 
price with the landowners are likely to have less incentive to price down lands than the 
beneficiaries who would have to pay themselves.  Since direct ‘negotiation’ between sellers 
(i. e., landlords) and buyers (i. e., landless tenants/ laborers) could entail massive power 
asymmetry, organization and mobilization of the potential beneficiaries, with assistance of 
local and national-level NGOs, would become a key to successful reform implementation.   
 
 Finally, the feature that no specific type of lands nor any specific time table needs to 
be specified a priori might somewhat ease/bypass the traditionally fierce political opposition 
by landowners against reform legislation.  The historical experiences in the political 
processes of land reform legislation in the Philippines indicate that the tactical moves made by 
landowners have often been to focus on precisely these aspects of reform programs without 
opposing the basic principles of land redistribution per se.  Main results of these landowner 
tactics have been specific ‘loopholes’ inserted into the law, often with negative consequences 
for both equity and efficiency (as we have seen earlier), as well as the long delay in the 
legislative processes while those specifics are debated among legislators.  Therefore, the 
vagueness on targeted lands, on beneficiary and on time table of the ‘negotiated’ reform may 
make it easier to set the basic legal framework of land reform.   
 
 Beyond these common features, however, are the differences in design of the 
‘negotiated’ land redistribution among different country experiments.  For example, in terms 
of beneficiary selection, income ceiling for eligibility is imposed on the self-selected 
beneficiaries in South Africa, while in Brazil beneficiaries, though self-selected, are required 
to obtain state clearance on price and land title.  In the Colombian scheme, while the final 
selection of the beneficiaries is based on the productive projects proposed by potential 
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beneficiaries, there is also an additional INCORA involvement in requiring potential 
beneficiaries to register with their information on reported income, asset, education, etc., 
which in turn is used for their pre-qualification.  Lands to be ‘negotiated’ are identified by 
the individual beneficiaries under the Colombian scheme while they are identified by the 
community in the Brazilian and South African cases.   
 
 Furthermore, a major difference observed among different ‘negotiated’ reform 
schemes is the degree and mode of government subsidy for land purchase.  The Colombian 
scheme provides a grant of 70% of land value (with a ceiling of US$22,000 per beneficiary); a 
flat subsidy of US$ 1,600 is given in Guatemala; maximum grant of US$3,300 is provided 
under the South African scheme.  In the Brazilian case, considerably subsidized bank finance 
is available but no grant is provided.  (de Janvry, et al. 1999, Deininger 1999)  It appears 
that the level of state subsidy has been set in specific country contexts (e. g, in conjunction 
with the pre-existing land reform scheme) and it is not clear what principles should guide how 
its level is set.  In the Philippines, one DAR estimate notes that 10% to 15% of land purchase 
amount is subsidized. (Borras 1999)  Given the relatively high rate of delinquency in 
amortization payment among PD27 beneficiaries the effective subsidy rate is likely to be 
higher.75   
 
 In general, (regardless of whether a land reform is ‘negotiated’ or state-led) there is a 
fundamental trade-off in any land reform design between higher (i. e., more generous) 
landowner compensation, which makes landowners less resistant and thus makes land 
redistribution easier, and the extent of wealth redistribution (the larger the landowner 
compensation, through higher land prices set under the reform, the more beneficiaries would 
have to pay, thereby reducing the wealth re-distribution impact).  In this context, the 
Philippine land reform appears to be one of the reform programs where landowners are more 
generously compensated.  According to some theoretical arguments, if real wealth 
redistribution impact is small then the likely efficiency, as well as equity, gains are also likely 
to be small.76  (Banerjee 1999)  State subsidy can enhance both land redistribution and 
efficiency gains from reform among poor beneficiaries.  The trade-off here is between the 
more easily implemented land redistribution through larger subsidy, on the one hand, and the 
larger fiscal burden placed by larger subsidy, on the other, which would in turn limit the 
program scope.  Indeed, one of the most serious questions raised in the literature against the 
‘negotiated’ reform experiments appears to be that, given their heavy subsidy elements, these 
schemes are very expensive. (Banerjee 1999; de Janvry, et al. 1999)   
 
 Financing land reform with a heavy state subsidy means that the funding has to come 
from the tax money which could otherwise have been spent in other (possibly pro-poor) 
investments, from taxing non-agricultural sector, or from taxing the landowners.  At the 
                                                        
75 Actual (quantitative) magnitude of such delinquency has not been clear, however, under the 
implementation of PD27 nor under CARP.    
76 At the same time, however, Banerjee (1999) discusses a few theoretical arguments for efficiency gains 
from land re-distribution when beneficiaries have to pay all the landowner compensation (i. e., zero state 
subsidy).   
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moment, there is not any solid empirical basis on the relative cost and benefit of investing the 
tax money in land reform implementation versus other investments presumably helping the 
rural poor.  (Banerjee 1999)  The most natural candidate for funding the reform 
implementation thus emerged in the literature is the tax on landowners; progressive land tax 
has been advocated as a means of fiscal revenue generation as well as for its desirable 
incentive effects upon larger landholders to sell their lands. (Hayami, et al. 1990; Deininger, 
et al. 1999, Otsuka 1996)   
 
 Apart from the state subsidy for land purchase, the financing provided to the 
beneficiaries for activities other than land purchase differs among various country experiments 
in negotiated land reform.  While the Brazilian scheme includes credit for reform 
beneficiaries and a $4,000 community grant for off-farm investments, no special financing is 
provided for complementary investments by beneficiaries and off-farm investments are left 
with the municipalities in Colombia and South Africa.  In Colombian case, however, a 
‘municipal land reform plan’ is required, as a key document for reform implementation prior 
to initiating land reform in the municipality, in an attempt to enhance program ‘ownership’ by 
the local government and to integrate land reform into existing municipal development 
priorities. (Deininger 1999)   
 
 Despite the potential advantages of ‘negotiated’ land reform design, it is certainly not 
a panacea.  For example, according to Deininger (1999), experiences during the early years 
of ‘negotiated’ land reform in Colombia encountered several problems and shortcomings that 
other countries could potentially face.  They included: that the restriction of subsidy to land 
purchase (but not complementary investment components) provided a biased incentive away 
from redistributing underutilized land (since investments to make underutilized lands more 
productive was not subsidized, it gave incentive for potential beneficiaries to focus on well 
developed lands that do not require additional investments); that the program had set too high 
a minimum income requirement with the intention of targeting beneficiaries with greater 
viability potentials; and that despite its decentralized institutional structure little incentive was 
in fact given for local leaders.   
 
 Also, the emphasis on the self-selection of the reform beneficiaries with greater 
potential for economic viability and competitiveness suggest some inevitable trade-offs 
against equity consideration.  Thus it would be critical to simultaneously initiate alternative 
programs that take care of the specific needs of the groups among the poor who would not 
benefit from the land reform in the immediate future.  In Colombia, for example, such 
programs include chicken hatcheries and other micro-enterprises for female headed 
households, construction of rural roads under seasonal food for work schemes, and 
reforestation of environmentally fragile zones. (Deiniger 1999)   
 
 Based on the recent experiments in Colombia, Brazil and South Africa, Deininger 
(1999) summarizes the preconditions for successful implementation of ‘negotiated’ land 
reform programs as follows:  
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(1) ‘Negotiated’ reform can only succeed if measures are simultaneously taken to make the 
market for land sales and rental transparent and fluid.  Since there is often little 
information on land market (e. g., prices) and beneficiaries’ ability to assess the value (i. e., 
the productive potential) of a piece of land can be quite limited, a reform program would 
need to provide additionally: (a) technical assistance at the community level, (b) co-
financing by private financial intermediary, who, by bearing a part of the risk, has an 
incentive to assess the viability of farm projects, and (c) ‘market information system’ that 
provides price information.   
(2) Productive projects, rather than land re-distribution per se, are a core element for 
establishing economically viable and productive farms.  This in turn requires active 
beneficiary involvement (e. g., familiarizing themselves with the realities they face as 
independent farmers and with their own aspirations, potential and limitations) prior to 
land acquisition.   
(3) The only way to achieve effective coordination among various entities involved in reform 
implementation is through decentralized and demand-driven implementation.   
(4) The long run success of land reform is likely to depend on private sector involvement, 
especially by ‘crowding in’ private investment by the use of land purchase grant.  In 
providing land purchase grant, a flat and fungible grant (like the South African scheme 
and not like the Colombian scheme) is preferable.  At the same time, beneficiary 
contribution and assured financial market access are also important.   
 
 Perhaps many of these conditions for success do not necessarily apply exclusively to 
the ‘negotiated’ reform schemes but rather they are more general conditions for successful 
land reform regardless of the mode of land reform implementation.   
 
 In fact, many of the features of the recent ‘negotiated’ land reform experiments are 
not entirely new in the Philippine contexts.  Most notably, the reliance of all of the 
‘negotiated’ land reform experiments on local information and local initiatives, assisted by 
local NGOs/POs, for beneficiary self-selection, beneficiary organization and the identification 
of the lands to be redistributed –arguably the key feature of the ‘negotiated’ reform schemes-- 
parallels the major policy shift within DAR in the Philippines under Secretary Garilao in the 
early 1990s, which subsequently facilitated, as we saw earlier, the faster land redistribution 
accomplishments under the Ramos administration.  Despite frequent reference to their being 
‘market-based’ or ‘market-assisted,’ ‘negotiated’ land redistribution transactions are heavily 
subsidized by the state, as the state-led Philippine land redistribution has been.  Furthermore, 
as we saw earlier in Table 2-4, the majority of the land redistribution transactions of non-
rice/corn lands under CARP did not take place through compulsory acquisition but through 
either the ‘voluntary offer to sell’ (VOS) or the ‘voluntary land transfer’ (VLT).  Especially 
during the Ramos administration, the majority (about 47%) of the transactions were made 
through VLT.  While, unfortunately, relatively little has been written on how these 
‘voluntary’ transactions took place and on the consequences of those transactions under 
CARP, one might argue that the recent CARP implementation potentially contains, if not 
systematically, some of the elements incorporated in the recent ‘negotiated’ reform 
experiments, and that there might be much room for systematic mutual learning between the 
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Philippine experiences and those in the ‘negotiated’ reform experiments in Latin America and 
in South Africa.   
 
f. Alternative Proposals for the Philippine Land Reform  
 
 After the passage of CARL in 1988, alternative design proposals for the Philippine 
land reform program have been put forth by various authors, based on their perceptions of 
various shortcomings of the current CARP design.  As a principle, all proposals agree that 
the reform rules (e. g., retention limit, land valuation) should be simple, transparent and 
uniform.  This is a natural conclusion from the past experiences in the Philippine land 
reform; complex regulations and numerous clauses for exemptions have provided ample 
grounds for (legal) evasion from reform by landowners, rent-seeking activities by political 
elite and by bureaucracy and long delay in implementation, all of which are to the detriment to 
both efficiency and equity.  (Hayami, et al. 1990, Otsuka 1996, Balisacan 1995, 1996, Lipton 
1990)  Furthermore, all the proposed alternative reform programs advocate de-regulating 
tenancy contract; they all argue, in particular, that the current prohibition on the share tenancy 
should be abolished.   
 
 Among the earlier and more comprehensive of the proposed ‘alternative land reform 
paradigms’ was the one presented by Hayami, et al. (1990).  They advocate the combination 
of: (1) land tenure de-regulation, (2) uniform land ceiling for all types of lands and 
confiscation with modest compensation after a ‘sufficiently long transition period,’ with long-
term credit programs for land purchase by the poor during the transition period, (3) 
progressive land taxation, both as a disincentive for speculative land holding and as a source 
of funding for credit subsidy, complementary services and land confiscation after the 
transition period, and (4) progressive rent on public land lease.  Among these components, 
progressive land tax appears to have gained particularly strong support by proponents of 
various alternative land reform designs for the Philippines (Hayami, et al. 1990, Otsuka 1996, 
Balisacan 1995, Lipton 1990, Deininger, et al. 2000), but it is not without controversy.  For 
instance, skepticism has been raised by Binswanger, et al. (1995) in that landowners tend to 
find ways around such taxes, that similar attempts were in fact applied but failed in Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia and Jamaica, and that progressive land taxes could entail higher 
administrative costs and protracted litigation.  Binswanger, et al. (1995), as well as Rashid 
and Quibria (1995), also argue that “it is not obvious why such an indirect approach would be 
politically more acceptable than direct redistribution of land,” and somewhat similar (though 
slightly weaker) point was also made by Otsuka (1996), while Lipton (1990) appears to have 
an opposite view arguing that progressive land tax offers few political problems (if levies and 
progressiveness are modest)77.  Thus, while there is no question about the logical necessity 
and desirability of progressive land taxation, its practicality has been debated.   
 
 A relatively more recent proposal by Balisacan (1996) has some similarities with the 
recent experiments in land reform design attempted in Latin America and South Africa as 
                                                        
77 Nevertheless, Lipton also argues that such a scheme is likely to entail serious administrative problems.   
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discussed above.  While agreeing with Hayami, et al. (1990) for advocating land tenancy de-
regulation, simplicity in rules, progressive land taxation and use of market forces, Balisacan 
(1996) appears to place a greater emphasis on de-centralized decision making including ‘fiscal 
federalism’ and reliance on NGOs/POs.  He argues that the relative priority placed on land 
reform, vis-à-vis other development priorities such as infrastructure investment and export-
manufacturing development, should be left with each local government unit (LGU) to 
determine.  Generally, political observers have often equated de-centralized decision making 
in the realm of agrarian reform implementation with greater influence of landowners in the 
decision making (Putzel 1992, Riedinger 1995, Wurfel 1983, 1992).  Wurfel (1983) noted 
that the relative decline of the political influence by the landed elite, to the extent such is the 
case, was much slower at the local level than at the national level.  Riedinger (1995) also 
characterize the attempts by major landowner legislators, most notably Jose Cojuangco, Jr., to 
amend CARP by decentralizing agrarian reform implementation as a landowners’ tactic to 
derail land reform in landowners’ favor.  As a consequence, most political scientists have 
tended to prefer land reform implementation by a strong and centralized national authority; 
how such a ‘strong state’ could be brought about has never been clear, however.  Balisacan 
(1996) argues, on the other hand, that a central authority (such as DAR), without a centralized 
system, can ‘guide’ LGUs in land reform implementation by providing matching grants to 
LGUs; the national government could enhance land reform by linking its fiscal assistance for 
farm infrastructure and agricultural support services with reform implementation.  He 
similarly advocates matching grant schemes for inducing reform beneficiaries to self-select 
and to engage in land market transactions; similar in spirit to ‘negotiated’ reform experiments 
worldwide.  He also suggests additional measures to increase land supply (e. g., sale of 
public lands) or to somewhat reduce land demand (e. g., distribution of public lands) in the 
market in order to check the land price from rising out of control.   
 
5. Conclusions  
 
 There has emerged a substantial range of consensus within the economics literature 
that informs policy makers involved in land reform programs.  While the empirical evidence 
is perhaps not yet fully conclusive, there has been relatively little support, both in theory and 
in empirical evidence, for the view that share tenancy is inefficient, at least in the Philippine 
context.  There has also been a growing view that regulating tenancy contracts is likely to 
have some negative consequences.  Therefore, economists generally agree that regulating 
tenancy contracts (such as the prohibition of share tenancy) does not achieve its stated 
objectives and thus should be abolished.  Furthermore, there has emerged a strong theoretical 
case within the economics literature for the desirability of equitable redistribution of wealth 
for both equity and efficiency goals.  Observers tend to agree that there is little reason to 
expect much efficiency losses from land redistribution, if it were to occur, because of: the 
general lack of systematic relationship between farm size and productivity in a wide range of 
crops (including the traditionally controversial ones, such as those grown on traditional 
plantations—e. g., sugar and coconut— and on large commercial farms—e.g., banana and 
pineapple—) in the empirical literature from the Philippines, and of the examples of 
institutional innovations (e. g., rental market for tractors, contract farming), which can 
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substitute for the economies of scale that do seem to exist in the production/processing of 
some crops.  As a result, there has emerged a strong consensus among economists supporting 
policies for greater equity in wealth distribution.  Such consensus appears to break down, 
however, when it comes to the question of whether redistributive land reform is the best 
means of wealth redistribution.  A main reason for this controversy seems to be the fact that 
little has yet been known empirically about the marginal impact, in terms of poverty reduction, 
of investing fiscal resources into alternative policy instruments such as land reform, human 
capital investment and infrastructure development.  Another source of this controversy 
appears to be the varying assessment of relative political feasibility among alternative means 
of wealth distribution, such as redistributive land reform versus redistribution through taxation.   
 
 Once redistributive land reform is determined as one of the desirable policy 
instruments, however, land reform advocates agree that a successful land reform requires a 
wide range of policy measures.  Economists agree that the main objective of the land reform 
program should not be redistribution per se but the creation of economically viable and 
competitive small farms, which in turn requires policy measures in addition to land 
redistribution.  Among the most important of such additional policy measures are the 
elimination of distortionary taxes, subsidies and credit schemes favoring larger farms vis-à-vis 
small farms and measures to ensure access to inputs and outputs markets by reform 
beneficiaries.   
 
 The question of how redistribution of land should be carried out is obviously a 
central policy issue in designing a land reform program.  Given the historical experiences 
regarding the landlord tactics of prolonged legislative debate over details, of inserting legal 
loopholes and of evasion by exploiting the discriminatory reform implementation by crop type 
or by farm organization (e. g., tenanted versus use of hired labor), observers agree that land 
redistribution rules should be simple, transparent and uniform.  The desirability of land 
retention limits and some types of restriction on land sales by the reform beneficiaries has 
been debated, with a clear consensus yet to emerge, and it would also depend on specific local 
circumstances.  But many would agree that such a restriction, if at all desirable, needs to be 
applied uniformly regardless of crop types or of farm organization.   
 
 Furthermore, there has been an emerging consensus that the past experiences from 
the ‘state-led’ land reform, where the government expropriates lands ‘from above’ and then 
sells/redistributes them to beneficiaries, has inherent problems in its design which resulted in 
unsatisfactory accomplishments worldwide (except for the few East Asian examples whose 
success critically depended on the exceptional political and social circumstances which are 
unlikely to be replicated elsewhere).  The changing attitudes within the Philippine civil 
society during the Ramos period, as well as the experiments of ‘negotiated land reform’ 
programs in Latin America and in South Africa, are based on such recognition, where the 
basic thrust is the emphasis on local initiatives.  Common elements among the recent 
‘negotiated’ land reform experiments include: (1) self-selection of land reform beneficiaries 
and of lands to be ‘negotiated;’ (2) direct ‘negotiation’ between the potential beneficiaries and 
the landowners, mediated by the government, over land transactions including the price; (3) 
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the emphasis on identifying ‘productive farm projects’ prior to land redistribution; (4) the 
crucial roles played by local organizations (i. e ., GROs, POs, NGOs) in facilitating all of 
these processes; and (5) the state’s role being limited to subsidizing land purchase and 
facilitating the functioning of land transactions.  A great variation exists among these 
experiments, however, in terms of: the mode and the amount of state subsidy for land 
purchase by beneficiaries, the criteria for beneficiary eligibility, and the processes of 
beneficiary identification.  In addition, while it is recognized that the ‘negotiated’ reform 
programs need to be complemented by other types of projects to take care of the segment of 
the poor population who have limited potentials as productive and competitive farmers, little 
has been known as to how serious the inherent trade-off between the emphasis on ‘productive 
potential’ and equity consideration may turn out to be.  Systematic principles to guide the 
land reform program design in these aspects do not yet seem to exist; a systematic research 
integrating experiences from such ‘negotiated’ land reform experiments worldwide and from 
CARP implementation where some of the common threads can also be found is likely to yield 
a high payoff for such an attempt.   
 
 In the context of the Philippine land reform, a solid consensus has emerged among 
economists who advocate land reform on the necessity and desirability of progressive land 
taxation, which would both generate fiscal resources and provide strong incentives against 
land consolidation, but some controversy has focused on its political and administrative 
feasibility.  There has also been some divergence in views over the desirability of 
decentralizing the reform implementation between economists, who have increasingly 
recognized the virtue of decentralized decision making processes including fiscal resource 
allocation, and political scientists, who tend to emphasize the stronger influence of landlords 
over local politics than over national politics and to favor centralized implementation by a 
strong state bureaucracy.  Given the serious information asymmetry between the central 
government and local actors, and given the lack of our knowledge on how political processes 
for creating ‘strong bureaucracy’ can be designed, realistic approach might be a combination 
of decentralized administrative structures with ‘fiscal federalism,’ provision of some fiscal 
incentives by central government, and development of civil society that facilitates initiatives 
‘from below’ by the potential reform beneficiaries.  (see below)   
 
 In discussing land reform, its political aspects are no less important than its economic 
aspects.  We have made a distinction between the political processes of land reform 
legislation which play out at the national level and the implementation processes of enacted 
land reform laws on the ground which mainly play out at the local level.  In the Philippines, 
land reform has been on national political agenda at least since the early 20th century and the 
scope of land redistribution has gradually expanded over time as a new piece of reform 
legislation was enacted intermittently as a means of responding to rising rural unrest and of 
other immediate political gains (such as re-election campaign by an incumbent President, or a 
coalition building tool to defeat an incumbent President).  The latest of such legislation, 
CARP, has far more comprehensive scopes for land redistribution than any other previous 
agrarian reform law, but it sufferes from legal loopholes, budgetary shortage, and lack of 
adequate administrative capacities, which hinder swift and massive land redistribution.  The 
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national-level political dynamics dominated by the ‘landed oligarchy’ behind such legislative 
outcomes have been a constant feature of the Philippine politics with its origin rooted in the 
colonial period.  As has historically been the case in the Philippines, and as the logic of a 
simplified game-theoretic model (by Horowitz) shows, it appears quite difficult (unlikely) for 
the interaction between the landlord dominated state and the periodic rise in rural rebellion to 
produce the kind of sweeping land redistribution program that will end such prolonged cycles 
of incomplete/partial land reform and intermittent rural unrest.   
 
 Despite such a pessimistic prospect for the national-level political scene, however, 
there appear to be some indications of changes in the land reform implementation processes at 
the local level.  Especially after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, there has been a spread of 
local level peasant organizations, people’s organizations (POs) and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and increasing linkages among these local organizations, national (and 
international) NGOs and also some elements of the land reform bureaucracy.  In some cases, 
land reform implementation has been enhanced by such new movements which became a 
political force to counter-balance the political force of the landlords who had traditionally 
dominated local politics.  While it is not yet clear how strong such a new force might become, 
such development in the local level political dynamics appears to be consistent with the 
emerging consensus among economists, as we saw above, advocating land reform programs 
with emphasis on beneficiary initiatives and administrative decentralization.   
 
 Finally, our survey has revealed that, despite the relatively large literature on land 
reform in the Philippines which we have reviewed in this paper, little has yet been known 
about the consequences of CARP implementation at the micro level.  There has been few 
systematic studies on the impact of CARP implementation (including redistribution of rice 
and corn lands after the 1980s) on the economic welfare and economic viability of reform 
beneficiaries, on the differences in the reform impact on the beneficiaries among alternative 
modes of land redistribution (such as compulsory acquisition, voluntary transfer, voluntary 
offer to sell) and on the impact of CARP implementation on the extent of poverty and 
inequality in local communities.  Attempts toward designing alternative land distribution 
schemes suitable in the Philippine context would benefit from research efforts synthesizing 
past experiences in the Philippines as well as from the recent experiments in alternative land 
reform schemes from other countries.   
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Table 1. Evolution of Recent Land Re-distribution Legislation in the Philippines  
Legislation Retention limits Type of lands 
covered by reform 
Prospective 
beneficiaries 
Land valuation and 
payment 
Major limitations/ 
loopholes 
Implementation schedule 
& budget 
1955  
(Magsaysay) 
• 300 contiguous ha. 
(private rice land); 
• 600 ha (corporate 
farms); 
• 1024 ha (private fams 
other than rice)  
Sugar and coconut 
lands excluded 
(by tacit 
agreement)  
Tenants 
only?? 
Landowners: cash only 
Land valuation: ‘just 
compensation’ ? 
Beneficiaries: 25 year 
amortization (6% P.A. 
interest).  
Only upon majority 
tenants’ petition 
P300,000 (land 
acquisition) 
1963 
(Macapagal) 
• 75 ha Rice & corn  
(in declared 
agrarian reform 
municipalities 
only)  
Tenant only Landowners: 10% cash, 
Land Bank bonds rest  
Land valuation: ‘just 
compensation’ based on 
capitalized annual rent 
with 6% interest rate.  
Beneficiaries: 25 year 
amortization  
Implementation only in 
pilot areas.  
Rice & corn only  
Tenants only  
2 step procedure: 
(1)operation leasehold 
? (2) operation land 
transfer 
1971 
(Marcos) 
• 24 ha  Rice & corn only 
(entire country) 
Tenant only Landowners: 20% cash, 
Land Bank bonds rest; 
Land valuation: no 
change?  
Beneficiaries: 25 year 
amortization?  
Rice & corn only  
Tenants only 
DAR created 
2 step procedure: 
(1)operation leasehold 
(automatic 
conversion)? (2) 
operation land transfer 
1972 
(Marcos) 
• 7 ha  
• 5 ha (non-irrigated)/ 3ha 
(irrigated) for reform 
beneficiaries  
Rice & corn only 
(entire country) 
Tenant only Landowners: 10% cash, 
90% Land Bank bonds 
Land valuation: 2.5 times 
the value of average 
annual production in past 
3 years.  
Beneficiaries: 15 year 
amortization.  
Rice & corn only  
Tenants only  
 
 
Same as above 
1988 
(Aquino) 
• 5 ha with 3ha for each 
heir for landowners (7 
ha for PD27 covered 
lands) 
• 24 ha for homesteaders 
All crops  Tenant and 
regular farm 
workers 
Landowners: 24~35% 
 cash depending on size 
Land valuation: ‘fair  
market value’ with a  
complex formula 
Many ‘alternatives’ to 
re-distributions offered 
(voluntary land sharing, 
corporate stock 
sharing,)  
1. public lands and 
PD27 lands 
2. private lands over 50 
ha 
3. private lands 24-50 ha 
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• 3 ha for reform 
beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries: 30 year 
amortization  
Commercial estate 
exempted 
 
4. private lands 5-24 ha 
Sources: Hayami, et. al. (1990), Putzel (1992), Riedinger (1995), Takigawa (1976).  
 
 
Table 3. Political Forces behind Recent Land Re-distribution Legislation in the Philippines  
Legislation an opposition 
candidate? 
Campaign 
issue during  
the 
Presidential 
election 
electing 
him? 
President’s Coalition 
included: 
Rural unrest 
present? 
Major 
opposition/enemy?  
External 
influence? 
1955  
(Magsaysay) 
• yes Yes  Huk rebellion Quirino/Liberal 
(Incumbent 
President)  
Yes, strong US 
backing 
1963 
(Macapagal) 
• No No (but, pre-
campaign for 
re-election 
bid??)  
• Tenants’ support in the 
coming re-election campaign 
attempted;  
• New middle class 
(industrialists, professionals)  
Not much at the 
moment (Huk had 
been defeated in 
the 1950s) 
? Makapagal’s 
perception of 
communist 
threats in 
Southeast Asia. 
(e.g., Vietnam) 
1971 
(Marcos) 
• No  n.a. (President not directly 
involved) 
CPP formed; 
pesant 
demonstration 
? US? 
1972 
(Marcos) 
• No Matial law No coalition.   CPP  Traditional 
oligarchy 
US? 
1988 
(Aquino) 
• Yes. Yes Peasants, business, military 
(RAM), ‘urban middle class’? 
NPA  Marcos (Incumbent 
President)  
Relatively weak, 
and no strong 
interest in 
reform by 
outsiders.  
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Table 4. Major Rural Unrest Episodes in the Philippines  
 
Name period Size at peak origin Main aim/ideology Geographical 
strong holds 
How did it end? 
Hukblahap 1942-45 10,000 
(1943 ca) 
Early remnants of 
peasant rebellion 
against patron-client 
(PKP, AMT, KPMP) 
Against Japanese and 
its collaborators 
Bulacan, Nueva 
Ecija, Pampanga, 
Tarlac 
GOP-US military crack 
down and arrest of leaders 
Huks Rebel (HMB)  1946-54 5,000-
10,000  
Remnants of earlier 
Hukblahap; HMB, 
PKP 
Right to retain arms, 
repression, social 
welfare and agrarian 
reforms 
Central Luzon, 
Southern Luzon 
‘battle fatigue;’ 
community development; 
more disciplined military 
propaganda; unti-Huk 
propaganda; 1952 
renouncing by PKP of 
armed struggle; 1954 
surrender of Huk 
commander   
CPP/NPA 1968- present 8,000? (as of 
1972) ?  
25,200 
(1987: 12% 
of barangay 
infiltrated) 
=> 10,600 
(1993) 
Remnants of Huk 
guerrila  
CPP ideology (US 
imperialism; feudalism; 
fascism; ‘two-stage’ 
revolution;  
Nationwide: 
Central Luzon ? 
Isabela (early 70s) 
? Eastern and 
Northern 
Mindanao, Samar, 
Bicol, Cordillera 
(in the 80s??)  
CPP/NPA losing political 
ground by boycotting 
1986 election 
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Table 2. Land Re-distribution Implementation in the Philippines 
 
Table 2-1. Landed Estates Programs (1940-1998)  
Landed estates 
acquired (ha): series 11 
Landed estates acquired 
(ha): series 22 
President Period 
Total Annual 
average 
Total Annual 
average 
Quezon 1935-41 5,825 832 N.A.3 N.A. 
Roxas 1946-48 9,395 3,132 N.A. N.A. 
Quirino 1949-53 33,723 6,745 N.A. N.A. 
Magsaysay 1954-56 1,194 398 N.A. N.A. 
Garcia 1957-61 15,147 3,029 N.A. N.A. 
Macapagal 1962-65 3,342 836 N.A. N.A. 
Marcos 1966-85 
(1966-69) 
(1970-72) 
(1972-86) 
32,054 
(2,727) 
(12,453) 
(16,874) 
1,603 
(682) 
(4,528) 
(1,205) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
(11,041) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
(789) 
Aquino 1987-Jun.92 N.A. N.A. 25,781 4,297 
Ramos Jul.1992-Jun.98 N.A. N.A. 41,201 6,867 
Sources:  
1. Department of Agrarian Reform as quoted in Balisacan (1990: 88) and Putzel (1992: 115).  
2. Department of Agrarian Reform as provided to the author as of June 1999.   
3. Not available in the series.   
 
 
Table 2-2. Operation Land Transfer under PD271: CLTs2 and EPs3 Printed (1972-1985)  
CLTs printed EPs printed Year 
Beneficiaries Area (ha) Beneficiaries Area (ha) 
1972 295 682 - - 
1973 144245 258666 - - 
1974 44645 77790 - - 
1975 19513 29875 97 52 
1976 21882 33642 534 604 
1977 27500 44241 600 465 
1978 28146 46812 287 263 
1979 46561 53520 82 51 
1980 34187 26556 84 83 
1981 50361 74907 115 107 
1982 42524 54544 34913 45592 
1983 34768 55717 62782 71131 
1984 12277 19765 21208 44770 
1985 4038 11458 17229 20453 
Sources:  
1. Department of Agrarian Reform as quoted in Putzel (1988:139).  
2. Certificate of Land Transfer.   
3. Emancipation Patent. 
 
 88 
 
Table 2-3. Operation Land Transfer after PD27: Lands Transfer Completed (1972-1998)  
Land transfer completed 
(ha): series 11 
Land transfer completed 
(ha): series 22 
President Period 
Total Annual 
average 
Total Annual 
average 
Marcos 1972-86 
(1972-85) 
N.A.3 
(11,197) 
N.A. 
(861) 
15,061 
N.A. 
1,076 
N.A. 
Aquino 1987-Jun.92 
(1987-Dec.92) 
N.A.3 
(386,890) 
N.A. 
(64,482) 
340,045 
(356,484) 
61,826 
(59,414) 
Ramos Jul.1992-Jun.98  
(Jan.92-Dec.93) 
N.A. 
(65,705) 
N.A. 
(32,853) 
154,974 
(57,450) 
25,829 
(28,725) 
Sources:  
1. Department of Agrarian Reform as quoted in Riedinger (1995: 92, 196-197).  
2. Department of Agrarian Reform as provided to the author as of June 1999.   
3. Not available in the series.   
 
 
Table 2-4. Land Re-distribution Under CARP (except OLT and DENR) (1987-1998)  
Total (CA+VOS+VLT) Compulsory 
Acquisition (CA)  
Voluntary Offer to 
Sell (VOS)  
Voluntary Land 
Transfer (VLT)  
President Period 
series 11 Series 22 series 11 series 22 series 11 series 22 series 11 series 22 
Aquino Jan.1987-Jun.92 
(Jan.87-Dec.92) 
88,230 
(129,095) 
N.A. 
(122,544) 
13,482 
(9,698)4 
N.A.3 
(10,904)4 
54,011 
(83,397) 
N.A. 
(76,599) 
20,737 
(36,000) 
N.A. 
(35,041) 
Ramos Jul.92-Jun.98 
(Jan.92-Dec.93) 
704,823 
(186,837) 
N.A. 
(194,814) 
120,828 
(34,423) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
255,341 
(97,191) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
328,654 
(55,223) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Sources:  
1. Department of Agrarian Reform as provided to the author as of June 1999.   
2. Department of Agrarian Reform as quoted in Riedinger (1995: 92, 196-197). 
3. Not available in the series.   
4. 1991 only.   
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Table 2-5. Agrarian Reform Accomplishments under Marcos, Aquino and Ramos 
Administrations1 
Marcos  Aquino Ramos  Reform 
Program 
Component 
working 
scope 
(ha)2  
area Accompli
shment 
(%) 
Area Accomplish
ment (%) 
area Accomplish
ment (%) 
OLT 579,520 15,061 2.60 340,045 58.68 
(61.28) 3 
154,974 26.74 
(88.02) 
Non-rice/corn 
private lands 
(CA+VOS+V
LT) 
2,186,789 not 
applicable. 
not 
applicable
. 
88,230 4.03 704,823 32.23 
(36.27) 
CA 1,505,363 not 
applicable.  
not 
applicable
. 
13,482 0.90 120,828 8.03 (8.93) 
VOS 396,684 not 
applicable. 
not 
applicable
. 
54,011 13.62 255,341 64.37 
(77.99) 
VLT 284,742 not 
applicable. 
not 
applicable
. 
20,737 7.28 328,654 115.42 
(122.70) 
LES 70,173 11,041?? 
32,054 
15.73/ 
45.68 
25,781 36.74 
(52.47/ 
82.42) 
41,201 58.71 
(111.18/ 
141.13) 
RESETTLE 566,322 32,054 
246,237?? 
5.66/  
43.48 
193,207 34.12  
(39.78 
/77.60)  
352,497 62.24  
(102.02/ 
139.84) 
1. Department of Agrarian Reform as provided to the author as of June 1999.   
2. As of June 1999.   
3. Cumulative accomplishment in parentheses.   
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2-6. Leasehold Operation (OLH) Accomplishment Areas and Beneficiaries 
 
Year Area (ha) converted to 
leasehold 
Number of farmer-
beneficiaries 
As of 1986 
(cumulative total 
since 1963??) 
 
572,999 
 
546,520 
1987 3,459 4,846 
1988 6,018 3,848 
1989 22,328 16,326 
1990 72,165 43,109 
1991 267,160 170,904 
1992 189,091 113,747 
1993 123,270 75,277 
1994 89,522 50,742 
1995 42,841 25,952 
1996 27,527 12,852 
1997 27,830 13,129 
1998 13,450 7,271 
(source: Department of Agrarian Reform)  
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Table 5. Major Events related to Agrarian Reform (AR)between Feb. 1986 and June 
1988  
Year  Government action Demand for AR 
Pro-reform action/event 
Supply of AR 
Anti-reform action/event 
1986 
 
 
 
 
2:Marcos fleds, Aquino 
assumes Presidency  
3: 1973 Constitution 
suspended 
4: Alvarez named MAR  
5: Con-Comm3 appointed 
   
  
  
6: PCGR10 task force  
 
 
 
 
 
10: Constitution voted by 
Con-Com 
 
11: cabinet shake up (a few 
liberal members ousted)  
 
3: NCARRD1 I, NGOs start 
consultation  
4: KMP’s 6 point proposal2 
5: BISIG4 founded; FFF5’s 10 
priorities    
 NEDA6/UP7’s liberal draft 
policy agenda  
6: (PCGR task force’s liberal 
AR11 draft)  
7~10: peasant demonstrations 
8: NCARRD II  
9~: KPM’s organized land 
occupation  
10: AMA13, KASAMA14, 
PAKISAMA15 join land 
occupation campaign  
  KPM led demonstration to 
mark PD27 anniversary 
(10/21) 
12: ITFAR16 formed  
 
3: Ongpin8 advocates 
corporate stock sharing 
instead of re-distributive 
AR 
 
NEDA/UP policy agenda 
rejected by Ongpin/Mitra9 
 
 
7: ‘Manila Hotel coup 
attempt’ (failed) 
(No action was necessary to 
influence Con-Com since 
anti-distributive land 
reform commissioners held 
overwhelming majority?)  
 
11: coup plot found (mainly 
in response to 
government’s negotiation 
with NPA) 
1987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1: CAC17 appointed to draft 
an EO (1/28) 
 
 
2: Constitutional plebiscite 
approves Constitution 
5: Congressional election 
5~6: public consultation by 
CAC 
 
 
 
7: EO22920 issued (7/22) 
  Congress meets (7/27) 
 
 
8(?): cabinet shake up 
removing Ongpin and 
Arroyo 
1:peasant demonstration in 
Manila and ‘Mendiola 
massacre’18 (1/22)  
 ITFAR proposes reform 
program 
 
 
5: liberal EO draft by ITFAR  
  CPAR12 launched, 8 point 
‘authentic AR’ 
 
 
7: series of CPAR led mass 
demonstrations  
8: relatively liberal House bill 
(HB400) proposed  
 
 
10: relatively liberal Senate bill  
proposed 
 
1: military revolt by ‘Marcos 
loyalists’ failed.(1/27) 
 
2: ‘Total War’ on NPA 
resumed. 
 
5~: ITFAR draft rejected by 
Ongpin19 et al., alternative 
drafts prepared 
 anti-reform lobby intensifies 
after Congressional 
election 
6~7: anti-reform campaign by 
landowners  
  Bankers’ opposition to 
liberal reform 
8: Col. Honasan’s coup 
attempt  
1988 1: provincial/municipal 
elections 
4: House and Senate bills 
passed  
5: Joint House-Senate 
Conference meets 
 
 
 
4:CPAR led ‘Agrarian Reform 
Express’21   
 Church involvement in 
support of AR intensifies 
 
 
3: series of amendments 
‘watering down’ HB400  
 
 
 
 
 92 
6: Aquino signs RA6657 Peasants denounce RA6657, 
PARCODE22 proposed as an 
alternative  
 
1. NCARRD: the National Consultation on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development  
2. KMP: Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines) led by Jaime Tadeo.  
3. Constitutional Commission  
4. BISIGBUkluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (Union for the Advancement of Socialist Thought 
and Action)  
5. FFF: Federation of Free Farmers (center-right)  
6. NEDA: National Economic Development Authority  
7. UP: University of the Philippines  
8. Ongpin, Jaime: Finance Minister  
9. Mitra, : Agricultural Minister  
10. PCGR: Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization  
11. AR: agrarian reform  
12. CPAR: Congress for People’s Agrarian Reform  
13. AMA: Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura (Union of Agricultural Workers)  
14. KASAMA: Katipunan ng mga Samahan ng Mamamayan () 
15. PAKISAMA: Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (National Movement of Peasant 
Organization)  
16. ITFAR: Inter-Agency Task Force on Agrarian Reform  
17. CAC: Cabinet Action Commettee  
18. Mendiola Massacre:  
19. Onping, et al: Jaime Ongpin (Finance Secretary), Deogracias Vistan (Land Bank President), Jose 
Concepcion, Jr. (Trade and Industry Secretary)  
20. EO: executive order .  
21. Agrarian Reform Express: a week long caravans from across Luzon with 20,000 peasants and 
advocates converging in Manila.   
22. PARCODE: People’s Agrarian Reform Code.  
 
